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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Rethinking Queer Poetry:  
Queerness in the French Lyric Tradition from 1819 to 1918 
 
by 
 
Louise Alison Brown 
Doctor of Philosophy in French and Francophone Studies 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020 
Professor Laure Murat, Chair 
 
Current conceptions of queer poetry focus solely on poetry written by a queer poet or 
poetry written about a queer subject-matter. Consequently, they rely on primarily biographical 
and thematic readings of poetic texts. In this dissertation, I argue that a poem’s queerness does 
not derive solely from the queer identity of its author or the queer nature of its thematic content, 
and I call for a critical approach to queer poetry that supplements its conventionally biographical 
and thematic readings with more literary and theoretical readings. In order to rethink current 
conceptions of queer poetry, I examine the nature of both queerness and poetry, and I explore the 
ways in which the two intersect. I situate this exploration in the French literary tradition of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a context marked by three cultural phenomena of 
particular interest – a revitalization of the lyric tradition, a burgeoning interest in non-normative 
sexual and gender identities, and the emergence of modernité in the artistic domain. An 
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examination of these intersecting phenomena provides a framework for exploring the intricate 
relation between poetry and queerness. On a discursive level, I demonstrate that the French lyric 
tradition of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is shaped by, and shapes in return, 
expressions and conceptions of queerness. And on a more theoretical level, I develop the notion 
of “literary queering” to demonstrate how a poem’s queerness can also result from its subversion 
or transgression of literary conventions such as the structure of the love lyric paradigm, the 
nature of versification, and the relation between text and page. As a result, I show that the 
literary field of queer poetry is in fact much larger and more diverse than we currently assume, 
and that a more comprehensive critical approach to queer poetry involves novel applications for 
both poetic theory and queer theory.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
What is queer poetry? Is it poetry written by a queer poet such as Paul Verlaine, Arthur 
Rimbaud, or Renée Vivien? Is it poetry written about a queer subject-matter, like Charles 
Baudelaire’s “Lesbos” (“Lesbos”) or “Femmes damnées” (“Damned Women”), which describe 
scenes of Sapphic eroticism? Or is it poetry that challenges normative knowledges about the 
nature and functioning of the poetic genre, such as Marie Krysinska’s free-verse poems, 
Guillaume Apollinaire’s calligrams, or Stéphane Mallarmé’s “Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le 
hasard” (“A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance”)? Our conception of queer poetry 
depends in large part on our understanding of queerness, and it determines, to a large extent, our 
critical approach to poetic texts. Current conceptions of queer poetry focus solely on poetry 
written by a queer poet or poetry written about a queer subject-matter. Consequently, they rely 
on primarily biographical and thematic readings of poetic texts. In this dissertation, I argue that a 
poem’s queerness does not derive solely from the queer identity of its author or the queer nature 
of its thematic content, and I call for a critical approach to queer poetry that supplements its 
conventionally biographical and thematic readings with literary and theoretical readings of poetic 
texts.   
In order to interrogate the concept of queer poetry, I consider the nature of both queerness 
and poetry, and I examine the ways in which the two can intersect. I situate this examination in 
the French literary tradition of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a result of three 
concurrent cultural phenomena, this context fosters a particularly intricate relation between the 
poetic and the queer: Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, French 
society became increasingly fascinated with questions of “sexual perversion” and “gender 
subversion,” and this burgeoning cultural interest led to a proliferation of discourses on the 
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matter. This discursive phenomenon was paralleled by a sudden revitalization and rapid 
evolution of the French lyric tradition. After the relatively scarce poetic production of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the turn of the nineteenth century witnessed a proliferation 
of poetic works and a dynamic succession of large-scale poetic movements. And in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, the notion of modernité, which began to take hold in the artistic 
domain, encouraged poets to experiment with formal and stylistic innovations that undermined 
prosodic conventions and destabilized conceptions of the poetic genre.  
I ask how these concurrent cultural phenomena intersected and influenced one another. In 
what way did the revitalized lyric tradition shape the discursive production of queerness in 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France? And in what way was it shaped by it in return? 
How might the formal and stylistic poetic innovations characteristic of modernité constitute 
forms of “literary queering”? Under what circumstances can formal poetic features like 
versification be considered queer? And what insights can be gained from conceptualizing 
queerness in poetic terms? Such questions reveal important intersections between literary studies 
and LGBTQ studies, and they concern the critical potential of both poetic theory and queer 
theory. 
 
State of the Field 
 
Despite the rapidly growing field of LGBTQ+ studies and its frequent intersection with 
literary studies, the questions raised above remain largely, if not entirely, unanswered. The most 
in-depth study concerning the role of French literature in the discursive production of queerness 
is Michael Lucey’s Never Say I: Sexuality and the First Person in Colette, Gide, and Proust 
(2006). Lucey closely examines the social and historical contexts influencing twentieth century 
literary articulations of queer sexualities, and he focuses his analysis on the literary technique of 
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first-person narration. By drawing from the field of linguistics, Lucey thoroughly explores the 
pragmatic and metapragmatic issues at stake in the writing and reception of literary works by 
Marcel Proust, André Gide, and Colette, who all narrated stories of same-sex desire in the first 
person. But the scope of Lucey’s study does not consider first-person expressions of same-sex 
desire in the context of poetry. As a literary form that is practically defined by its relation to the 
pronoun “I,” lyric poetry could provide a rich terrain for such a systematic analysis of pragmatic 
and metapragmatic issues surrounding first-person articulations of queerness. 
In The Gendered Lyric: Subjectivity and Difference in Nineteenth-Century French Poetry 
(1999), Gretchen Schultz applies this level of systematic and contextualized analysis to lyric 
poetry, but in regards to the period’s literary representations of gender, rather than queerness. By 
analyzing “the changing inscriptions of gender on various levels of the poem at disparate 
moments in nineteenth century France” and by considering “the play of gender in a number of 
overlaying categories (formal, rhetorical, ideological, and subjective) that define the lyric 
experience,” Schultz provides a systematic examination of French poetry as it relates to historical 
conceptions and representations of gender (6-7). When applied in relation to the notion of 
queerness, a similar degree of formal and stylistic analysis, which takes into account various 
aspects of lyric convention particular to nineteenth century French poetry, could provide novel 
insights into the ways in which the French lyric tradition has informed, and has been informed 
by, the period’s discursive production of queer identity and desire. 
Nicole Albert’s Lesbian Decadence: Representations in Art and Literature of Fin-de-
Siècle France is the only extant critical work to consider the role of French lyric poetry in the 
discursive production of queerness. Published in French in 2005 and then in a revised English 
edition in 2016, this study in comparative literature traces literary and non-literary 
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representations of lesbianism at the turn of the twentieth century. Albert’s overview of literary 
representations incorporates the work of poets such as Charles Baudelaire, Renée Vivien, and 
Pierre Louÿs, as well as lesser-known poets such as Lucie Delarue-Mardrus. And her second 
chapter on “The Poets’ Muse” catalogues diverse poetic depictions of Sappho. Albert’s 
discussion, however, does not take into consideration the formal, stylistic, and rhetorical 
characteristics of these poetic depictions. As such, Lesbian Decadence underlines poetry’s 
central role in the period’s discursive production of lesbianism, but it does not examine the 
nature of this role.  
Extant criticism exploring the intersections of the French lyric tradition and the discursive 
production of queerness in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France is limited not only in 
scope, but also in its critical approach. Published in 2014, Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins’s 
Lyric Theory Reader: A Critical Anthology is the most recent and extensive collection of critical 
approaches to the study of lyric poetry. The anthology contains a section entitled “Lyric and 
Sexual Difference,” which, according to the editors, provides “several examples of gender 
criticism and queer theory that generate different histories of lyric reading by foregrounding 
questions of sexual difference” (7). These examples are intended to demonstrate “how attention 
to ideologies of sexual difference also tends to call into question ideologies of the lyric” (504). 
Of the five exemplary articles, however, four address questions related uniquely to women’s 
writing and employ feminist readings. The only selection out of the five to address questions of 
queerness is Thomas E. Yingling’s 1990 article entitled “The Homosexual Lyric.” Yingling’s 
readings of Hart Crane’s poetry trace the evolution of Crane’s references to homosexuality 
throughout his poetic corpus. But since Yingling is concerned primarily with the content of such 
references, his critical approach is limited to entirely thematic readings of poetic texts.  
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In Queer Lyrics: Difficulty and Closure in American Poetry (2002), John Vincent 
reminds us that there is more to a poetic text than its thematic content. He therefore argues that 
critical approaches to poetic representations of queerness should not be limited to purely 
thematic readings. While there are many excellent studies that highlight the queerness of a poet’s 
work or life, Vincent remarks, the lyric as a literary form has not yet been examined in relation to 
questions of queerness. He attributes this neglect to queer theorists’ privileging historical 
readings of texts over more formalist approaches, which tend to produce transhistorical readings 
less concerned with recovering a queer literary tradition (xiii). He proposes that lyric form also 
plays a significant role in transmitting queer meaning: “Lyric devices have been, since Whitman, 
used as tools in powerful survival and world-making strategies,” he explains (xiii). By focusing 
on rhetorical suspense as one such device, Vincent argues that Walt Whitman’s use of the “not 
… not … not … but” structure, which characterizes many of the “Calamus” poems, “corresponds 
to the thematic oscillation between absolute availability and absolute unavailability, materiality 
and ghostliness, and between the proffering and withholding of ‘the truth’ about the poet’s 
sexual identity” (14). He approaches the poetry of Hart Crane, Marianne Moore, John Ashbery, 
and Jack Spicer in a somewhat similar manner, by examining how their use of literary devices 
such as paradox, polysemy, and disembodiment affect their different expressions of queer 
identity or desire.  
By incorporating a consideration of literary devices into his analyses of poetry, Vincent 
thus moves beyond the purely thematic readings that characterize earlier critical approaches to 
poetic expressions of queerness. But his critical approach remains limited in another important 
way. Vincent states that his readings of poems by Crane, Moore, Ashbery, and Spicer “will 
always attend to the effect of sexual identity on the meanings in the poem” (xvi). In other words, 
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since he works entirely from within the domain of biographical readings, Vincent analyzes these 
poems in relation to their author, and more particularly, in relation to their author’s sexual 
identity. Critics after Vincent have continued to rely on such biographical readings when 
examining poetic expressions of queer identity or desire. This approach, however, implies an 
essentializing view of queerness. By assuming that queer poets’ sexual identities will inform the 
meanings of their poems, critics are, at best, assuming that such poets are primarily concerned 
with the expression of their own queer identity or desire. Or, somewhat more problematically, 
critics are assuming that such poets’ sexual identities will affect the meaning of their poems 
regardless of the poems’ thematic content. Such an essentializing reading reduces the poetry of 
presumably queer poets to an expression, whether intentional or unintentional, of queerness.  
For this reason, my approach to queer poetry moves beyond primarily thematic and 
biographical readings. In order to move beyond thematic readings, I build upon Vincent’s 
approach. In addition to incorporating a consideration of literary devices into my analyses of 
poems, I focus on the nature and function of lyric poetry as a literary form. I ask why an 
individual might chose to express a queer identity or desire through poetry in particular: How 
does this poetic expression differ from novelistic, theatrical, or non-literary expressions of 
queerness? In what ways does the poetic genre facilitate or complicate such expressions of 
queerness? How might characteristically lyric features, like rhyme scheme and meter, non-linear 
syntax, highly connotative language, or the ambiguous referent of the lyric “I” shape expressions 
of, and even conceptions of, queer identity or desire? And in order to move beyond biographical 
readings, I examine the role of poetry in the production as well as the expression of queerness. 
Rather than simply viewing a poetic text as a reflection of its author’s queer identity, I consider 
how a poem might function as a source of queerness, in and of itself. How might certain poems’ 
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destabilizations of the lyric “I,” for example, queer the historically heteronormative nature of 
lyric subjectivity? Can manipulations of conventional rhyme scheme and meter constitute purely 
literary forms of queering? And how might visually innovative presentations of a poem’s text 
work to queer normative processes of meaning production? Such questions become possible 
when working with a definition of queer that is not limited in its application to the ideology of 
heteronormativity.  
 
Defining Queer 
 
Queerness is notoriously difficult to define. Its meaning has evolved significantly over 
the last few centuries; its current definitions are varied and sometimes even contradictory; and 
for certain theorists, queerness must, by its very nature, defy definition. The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary notes that the first uses of queer as an adjective can be traced back to the early 1500s, 
where it signified “differing in some way from what is usual or normal” (“Queer”). It was first 
used as a verb in the early 1800s, meaning “to spoil the effect or success of something” 
(“Queer”). And it first appeared as a noun later in that century to refer to a person whose 
sexuality or gender deviated from established norms (“Queer”). In the twentieth century, this 
nominal use of the word was popularized as a slur to stigmatize such individuals. And through its 
linguistic re-appropriation by members of the LGBTQ+ community, it has also come to function 
positively as an umbrella term with which any and all members of the community can self-
identify.  
With the advent of Queer Theory in the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholars began 
exploring the signifying potential of queer as an adjective, and especially, as a verb. Informed by 
poststructuralism, scholars of queer theory avoided the nominal use of queer to denote an 
identity in the humanist sense (a stable and defining essence) by focusing instead on how it 
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might be employed to resist normative identities and challenge the normative knowledges that 
shape them. In this vein, the term queer has taken on a myriad of definitions as scholars have 
attempted to describe what basically amounts to a non-identity, and as they have attempted to 
theorize the practice of undermining normalized practices. In Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay 
Hagiography (1995), for example, David Halperin argues that queer “demarcates not a positivity 
but a positionality vis-à-vis the normative” (62). As such, “Queer is by definition whatever is at 
odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it 
necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence” (62). For Cherry Smith in “What Is This 
Thing Called Queer” (1997), by comparison, queer is less an undefinable and deviant identity 
than it is “a strategy, an attitude” that “articulates a radical questioning of social and cultural 
norms, notions of gender, reproductive sexuality, and the family” (280). In Fear of a Queer 
Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory (1993), Michael Warner proposes that queer is not so 
much a questioning of “the normal behavior of the social” as a questioning of “the idea of 
normal behavior” so as to “bring skepticism to the methodologies founded on that idea” (xxvii). 
And for Annamarie Jagose, who maintains in Queer Theory (1996) that “queer itself can have 
neither a fundamental logic, nor a consistent set of characteristics,” the concept remains 
amorphous in terms of its nature and purpose (96). 
A further disputed aspect of “queer” concerns the context(s) in which it manifests and 
operates. For Halperin, queer is a “positionality that is not restricted to lesbians and gay men but 
is in fact available to anyone who is or who feels marginalized because of her or his sexual 
practice” (62). In this sense, “it could include some married couples without children, for 
example” (62). But while Halperin confines manifestations of queerness to the realm of sexual 
practice, he considers its subversive potential to have a much wider scope: “It is from the 
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eccentric positionality occupied by the queer subject,” he states, “that it may become possible to 
envision a variety of possibilities for reordering the relations among sexual behaviors, erotic 
identities, constructions of gender, forms of knowledge, regimes of enunciation, logics of 
representation, modes of self-construction, and practices of community – for restructuring, that 
is, the relations among power, truth, and desire” (62). As Cathy Cohen demonstrates in “Punks, 
bulldaggers, and welfare queens” (1997) however, “these intersecting systems of power” can 
only be restructured if we understand queer to lie outside not simply heterosexuality, but rather, 
outside the “dominant constructed norm of state-sanctioned white middle- and upper-class 
heterosexuality” (441). Sexuality is not the only domain in which norms function to maintain a 
certain structure of power, since the construction of normative sexuality is also intricately 
entwined with the construction of normative racial, class, and national identities. As such, 
queerness becomes manifest in the domain of race, socio-economic class, and statehood, as well 
as sexuality. 
And just as there is no true consensus on how to define queer, there is no true consensus 
on how, and what, to queer. For Monique Wittig, it comes down to the presumed opposition 
between the male sex and the female sex. In The Straight Mind and Other Essays (1992), she 
argues that the category of sex, like that of gender, has been socially constructed. “For there is no 
sex,” she explains, “There is but sex that is oppressed and sex that oppresses. It is oppression that 
creates sex and not the contrary” (2). Heterosexuality, which Wittig characterizes as a social 
system based on the oppression of women by men, justifies this oppression through the doctrine 
of the difference between the sexes. And so, liberation from this oppression requires “destroying 
the categories of sex, ending the use of them, and rejecting all sciences which still use these 
categories as their fundamentals” (20). As a literary writer of experimental fiction, Wittig takes 
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on this task in the domain of language, where she focuses on one element in particular – 
grammatical gender. She argues that it is through the existence of grammatical gender that sex 
“permeates the whole body of language and forces every locutor, if she belongs to the oppressed 
sex, to proclaim it in her speech” (79). In heavily gendered languages like French, when a 
woman speaks, she must speak as a woman; language has delineated her subjectivity in advance, 
and it can only ever be a sexed subjectivity. For this reason, Wittig works to destroy the category 
of gender in language, an objective that inspires and structures her novels L’Opoponax (1964), 
Les Guérillères (1969), and Le Corps lesbien (1973). 
Judith Butler builds upon Wittig’s belief that the opposition of the sexes is not the origin 
of oppression but the mark of it, and she transfers this contrary perspective to the realm of gender 
identity. In Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), Butler explains 
that gender is not expressive, but performative. That is to say, gender attributes “effectively 
constitute the identity they are said to express or reveal” (141). In this sense, “gender is an 
identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition 
of acts” (140). These acts can manifest discursively, behaviorally, physically, etc., and it is their 
enforced repetition in culturally recognizable and accepted ways that constitutes the subject.1 
There is no subject that exists outside this stylized repetition of acts and the gender identities that 
they construct. And so, Butler argues, it is not possible to simply destroy sex or gender 
categories by refusing to use them or participate in them. For this reason, she proposes “a 
thoroughgoing appropriation and redeployment of the categories of identity themselves” (128). 
“If,” Butler writes, “repetition is bound to persist as the mechanism of the cultural reproduction 
 
1 See Judith Butler’s “Critically Queer,” particularly pp. 21-23, for discussion of the compulsory 
nature of this repetition. 
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of identities, then the crucial question emerges: What kind of subversive repetition might call 
into question the regulatory practice of identity itself?” (32). In turning to the realm of language, 
Butler gives the example of the discursive resignification of the word “queer.” By systematically 
appropriating and redeploying the queer identity, those labeled as such have reversed its de-
sanctioning power in order “to sanction a contestation of the terms of sexual legitimacy” 
(“Critically Queer” 23).  
 For Lee Edelman, a proponent of the “anti-social thesis” in queer theory, we should not 
be attempting to sanction anything. In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004), 
Edelman takes issue with the particularly pervasive norm of the invaluable Child. “Historically 
constructed […] to serve as the repository of various sentimentalized cultural identifications,” 
Edelman explains, “the Child has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and come 
to be seen as the one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust” (10-11). This social order 
prioritizes the interests and wellbeing of its figurative, future, ideal citizen, often over the 
interests and wellbeing of its actual, current citizens, by constructing a social reality “operating 
in the name and in the direction of a constantly anticipated future reality” (8-9). Edelman 
proposes that we refuse to participate in this “Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism” that “only 
ever invests us as subjects insofar as we invest ourselves in it, clinging to its governing fictions, 
its persistent sublimations as reality itself” (4, 18). And the only position allowing for such a 
refusal, Edelman explains, is the position of the queer, particularly as it is characterized by the 
conservative right – a threat to reproduction and to the perpetuation of the social order as we 
know it.  
For Edelman, the queer is to the social order as the death drive is to Jacques Lacan’s 
symbolic order: “As the constancy of a pressure both alien and internal to the logic of the 
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Symbolic, as the inarticulable surplus that dismantles the subject from within, the death drive 
names what the queer, in the order of the social, is called forth to figure: the negativity opposed 
to every form of social viability” (9). The queer, for Edelman, “exposes the obliquity of our 
relation to what we experience in and as social reality,” and if we are to intervene in the 
reproduction of such a reality, we must embrace heteronormativity’s ascription of negativity to 
the queer (6-7). Rather than queering heteronormative ideologies in an attempt to sanction queer 
subjectivities within the social order, we should be queering the driving ideology of the social 
order at large – that of reproductive futurism, which is reinforced through an idealization of the 
figure of the Child.  
But if reproductive futurism “only ever invests us as subjects insofar as we invest 
ourselves in it,” how does this queer non-subject manifest? In no specific way. It is simply a 
place holder that various illegitimate identities will likely occupy at various times. But its nature 
and function can be conceptualized in linguistic terms: The death drive, Edelman explains, 
“holds the place of what meaning misses in much the same way that the signifier preserves at the 
heart of the signifying order the empty and arbitrary letter” (9). And through its alignment with 
the death drive, the queer functions in a similar manner. In the realm of language, the queer is the 
arbitrary letter, the empty place holder that has no inherent meaning, yet upon which we have 
constructed an entire system of meaning – much like the social order. It is this ultimate 
meaninglessness that has the potential to undermine the reality we have constructed upon it.  
The queer theories of Wittig, Butler, and Edelman differ in significant ways. While 
Wittig turns her attention to undermining the use of gender in language in order to destroy the 
categories of sex in society, Butler does not believe such a goal is possible. If gender in fact 
constitutes the subject whose sex it claims to express, one must continue to perform a gender in 
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order to remain a subject. Our agency therefore lies in our ability to subversively perform gender 
in order to resignify what is meant by “feminine” and “masculine.” And for Edelman, we should 
not be striving to remain subjects at all because the social order is a constructed reality that only 
invests us as subjects if we invest in its premise of reproductive futurism by prioritizing the well-
being of the figurative Child.  
But these theories also intersect with and parallel one another in important ways. Wittig, 
Butler, and Edelman all contextualize their theories within a discussion of the nature and 
function of language. And the larger underlying mechanism of each of their theories is the same: 
Wittig aims to challenge heterosexuality by destroying sex as an identity category. Butler aims to 
challenge heteronormativity by resignifying gender through a process of subversive repetition. 
And Edelman aims to challenge what he terms “reproductive futurism” by calling for us to not, 
in fact, fight for the Child. Each theorist has taken issue with a hegemonic ideology, turned 
toward one of its principal norms, and proposed a method for undermining this norm. While their 
methods may differ (with Wittig preferring to destroy the norm, Butler to resignify it, and 
Edelman to oppose it), their theories all aim to undermine this norm in such a way as to 
challenge the hegemonic ideology that it serves to reinforce.  
Given the dynamic nature of the term queer, I work with a definition that is both practical 
and theoretical. In a practical sense, I use it to refer to poets who do not appear to conform to 
either historical or modern-day conceptions of normative gender identifications or sexual 
orientations. And in a more theoretical sense, I use the term to refer to something that challenges 
a hegemonic ideology by undermining one or more of its norms. Since undermining a norm is 
not necessarily the same thing as differing or deviating from that norm, this theoretical 
conception of queer is more specific than most current conceptions, which do not adequately 
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distinguish between “different,” “deviant,” and “queer.” At the same time, this definition is more 
flexible than most current definitions because it is not limited to the specific ideology of 
heteronormativity. It can operate to undermine ideologies that intersect with heteronormativity, 
such as those maintained by normative constructions of race, class, or statehood; it can 
undermine ideologies that are even more encompassing than heteronormativity, like the ideology 
of sexualnormativity2; and it can challenge dominant ideologies that function in domains 
seemingly far removed from that of gender and sexuality, such as the domain of literature.  
  
New Pathways 
 
By defining queer in terms of its engagement with ideologies and their norms, I am able 
to extract it from its conventional engagement with social norms and transpose it into an 
engagement with literary norms, a contextual shift that opens new pathways for critical 
applications of queer theory and critical approaches to poetry. Queer theory has lost some of its 
edge in recent years. As queer has become a buzzword in literary studies, undiscerning 
applications of the term have somewhat diluted the concept, confounding it most frequently with 
“deviance” or simply with “difference.” The application of queer theory to literary norms and 
ideologies, however, can renew its critical edge, since the task of extracting queerness from its 
social context and transposing it into a literary context requires identifying and articulating, in 
theoretical terms, what exactly makes something queer and what exactly constitutes an act of 
queering. And while the notion of literary queering can involve purely formal elements of 
literary texts, it is by no means transhistorical. Much like social norms, literary norms change 
over time, as do the ideologies that they serve to enforce. The queerness of a given poem 
 
2 Sexualnormativity is reinforced by the norm of allosexuality, which assumes that all subjects 
must have a sexual orientation. 
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therefore depends in large part on the historical context in which it is written and read, on the 
poem’s relation to poetic convention, and on its engagement with the lyric tradition. 
Current critical approaches to queer poetry do not incorporate this level of contextualized 
reading. This is likely due to the assumption that a poem’s queerness derives solely from the 
identity of its author or the nature of its subject-matter, hence the reliance upon primarily 
biographical and thematic readings. While such readings provide important insight into poets’ 
expressions of gender identity or sexual orientation, they do not consider queerness in its 
theoretical sense, and they do not account for the particularly poetic nature of such expressions. 
When working with a theoretical understanding of queer, however, a poem’s queerness can arise 
from other aspects of the poetic act, as well. The text’s visual presentation on the page, the poet’s 
manipulation of certain formal elements, or the destabilizing readings that the poem produces 
can all contribute to a poem’s queerness if they undermine an established literary norm in such a 
way as to challenge an accepted truth about the nature and function of poetry. In this sense, a 
poem like Stéphane Mallarmé’s “Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hasard” (“A Throw of the 
Dice Will Never Abolish Chance”), which has neither a queer author (presumably) nor a queer 
subject-matter, could nonetheless be considered queer. Literary forms of queering therefore call 
into question current conceptions of “queer poetry,” a literary category that is perhaps much 
larger and more diverse than we currently assume. 
 In this vein, I incorporate a large variety of poets and their works into my examination of 
the intersections between poetry and queerness. The first chapter looks at queerness in relation to 
the figure of the poet. Throughout history, poets have been characterized in various ways, from 
social anomalies to social anomies, from enlightened individuals to monstrous individuals. And 
in nineteenth century France, these characterizations began to consolidate, appearing consistently 
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enough in literary discourse to form identifiable poet “types.” I ask if there is anything queer 
about French cultural conceptualizations of the poet during this time. Further, I consider whether 
any particular poet types might have influenced, or been influenced by, cultural 
conceptualizations of sexual types, which began to appear at or around the same time. Drawing 
from Alfred de Vigny’s Stello, I compare his characterization of the poète maudit (accursed poet) 
with Marcel Proust’s characterization of the sexual invert in La Race maudite (The Accursed 
Race) to reveal the similarities between their anomalous statuses in society. My analysis of the 
poète voyou (delinquent poet) draws from poetic works by Paul Verlaine and Pierre François 
Lacenaire to explore how the poet, conceived as social anomy and functioning in deliberate 
disaccord with societal norms and values, recalls queer theory’s deconstructive drive to 
denaturalize dominant social classifications and destabilize normative social order. I turn to 
Arthur Rimbaud’s description of the poète voyant (enlightened poet) to examine the queer 
potential of a poetic vision that disrupts meaning, transcends the ideologies that inform it, and 
imagines an alternative reality. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the femme poète 
(poet woman). Drawing from publications by various male critics, as well as poetic works by 
Renée Vivien and Charles Baudelaire, I examine how the figure of the “poet woman” relates to 
the concurrently developing notion of a “third sex” and how Sappho, as a particularly lesbian 
poet figure, relates to Baudelaire’s poetic ideal.  
 The second chapter looks at queerness in relation to the lyric “I.” Centuries of lyric 
tradition have shaped this lyric “I,” which, by the nineteenth century, comes to have a 
particularly constraining effect on the poetic subject that it precedes and conditions. As Judith 
Butler argues in “Critically Queer” (1993), “Where there is an ‘I’ who utters or speaks and 
thereby produces an effect in discourse, there is first a discourse which precedes and enables that 
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‘I’ and forms in language the constraining trajectory of its will” (18). In this second chapter, I 
examine how certain poets, over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
succeeded in forging a new trajectory, one that created space for the expression and formation of 
a queer subjectivity. Drawing from Butler’s theory of subversive repetition as a way to “work the 
weaknesses” in a given norm, I discuss poets who took up the highly conventionalized lyric “I” 
in somewhat destabilizing ways, and I examine how this destabilizing use of the lyric “I” leads to 
a variety of queer readings. The chapter begins with an analysis of the poetry of Marcel Proust, 
whose inconsistent use of the first-person pronoun renders it referentially ambiguous and 
challenges normative conceptions of both poetic and gay subjectivity. I then turn my attention 
toward the lyric “I” in the context of translation to analyze how Renée Vivien’s use of 
transcreation, Pierre Louÿs’s pseudo-translation, and Marceline Desbordes-Valmore’s possible 
enactment of auto-translation blur the distinction between author and translator, a hierarchical 
binary traditionally conceptualized in heteronormative terms. The chapter concludes with a look 
at certain poets’ destabilizations of the lyric “I” in the context of the French love lyric tradition, a 
literary domain that has been firmly intertwined, historically and structurally, with 
heteronormative constructions of identity and desire. I analyze how Paul Verlaine’s use of a 
plural feminine first-person pronoun and Renée Vivien’s use of an explicitly androgynous first-
person pronoun destabilize the foundational structure of the love lyric paradigm, which relies on 
the binary opposition of lyric “I” and lyric “you,” subject and object, male and female, self and 
other. 
The third and final chapter looks at queerness in relation to the poetic line. Over the 
course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, poets manipulated the poetic line on a 
semantic, metric, and visual level. I ask how such manipulations might have facilitated 
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expressions of queerness, might constitute forms of literary queering, and might aid in new 
conceptualizations of queerness. The chapter begins by approaching the poetic line from a 
semantic perspective. In my analysis of poetic texts by Marcel Proust, Renée Vivien, and Paul 
Verlaine, I examine how the poetic line can express queerness both verbally and non-verbally, 
and I consider what kinds of interpretive issues arise when reading queerness through a line’s 
non-verbal elements such as meter, rhyme scheme, or form. I also analyze Mallarmé’s “Sonnet 
in -x” to determine if its cultivation of meaninglessness represents a form of queer negativity. I 
then approach the poetic line from a metric perspective to examine if and how Victor Hugo’s 
“dislocated alexandrine,” Marie Krysinska’s free verse, and Charles Baudelaire’s prose poems, 
might constitute literary forms of queerness. And I conclude the chapter by approaching the 
poetic line from a visual perspective. At the end of the nineteenth century, and at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, poets began to attribute substance and plasticity to the poetic line – a 
previously transparent structural framework – by visually manipulating it and repositioning it 
upon the page. I analyze one of Guillaume Apollinaire’s calligrams and Stéphane Mallarmé’s “A 
Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance” to explore how their experimental presentations 
of the poetic line upon the page might help us visualize beyond the heteronormative paradigm 
and conceptualize new directions for queer theory.  
With each of these chapters, I intend to provide a different perspective on the relation 
between the poetic and the queer in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France. And by 
demonstrating the intimateness and the intricateness of this relation, I hope to accomplish three 
critical aims: First, to highlight French lyric poetry’s pivotal role in the period’s discursive 
production of queerness, a role that has been largely neglected in both literary studies and 
LGBTQ+ studies; second, to thoroughly examine the nature of queerness and the critical 
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potential of queer theory; and third, to challenge current conceptions of, and critical approaches 
to, queer poetry – a literary category that has the potential to be much larger and more complex 
than we currently assume.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE POET TYPE 
 
Over the course of French literary history, the poet has been characterized in a variety of 
ways from prophet to bohemian to rabble-rouser. And in nineteenth century France, such cultural 
characterizations of the poet figure arise frequently enough in literary discourse to constitute 
identifiable poet “types.” This chapter examines the nature of these types, focusing specifically 
on the poète maudit (accursed poet), the poète voyou (delinquent poet), the poète voyant 
(enlightened poet), and the femme poète (poet woman). It considers the queerness of such poetic 
identities and explores the relation between their formation and the formation, shortly afterward, 
of novel sexual types. And it concludes with a discussion of male poets’ identifications with the 
figure of Sappho, who re-emerged during the nineteenth century as a definitively lesbian figure, 
and whose lesbianism became closely tied to Charles Baudelaire’s poetic ideal.  
 
Section 1: The Poète Maudit 
 
The eponymous character of Alfred de Vigny’s Stello (1832) is a suffering poet who is 
regularly afflicted by “les coups d’une tristesse impérissable” (“episodes of endless sorrow”) 
(95).3 During one such episode, he calls on the aid of a certain Docteur Noir, with whom he has a 
long discussion concerning the nature of poets and the misfortune that has beleaguered them 
throughout history. Over the course of this discussion, the doctor and Stello develop and present 
a theory of the poet as maudit (accursed). How does this characterization of the poet relate to 
characterizations of the sexual invert, which emerged a little later in the period? And how does it 
correspond to more modern conceptions of queerness? 
 
3 All translations are my own unless otherwise stated. 
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 The Docteur Noir reflects upon the suffering and unhappiness that has afflicted poets 
since the age of Homer, remarking that “les Poètes […] forment, de son temps au nôtre, une 
chaîne presque sans interruption de glorieux exilés, de courageux persécutés, de penseurs affolés 
par la misère” (“Poets have formed, from the time of Homer to our present day, an almost 
continuous line of glorious exiles, courageous martyrs, and tortured philosophers”) (247). Why 
such exile, persecution and misery? Stello attributes this fate to the poet’s being essentially 
different from, and superior to, the masses. In one sense, poets are looked down upon as useless 
to the functioning and progress of the state (242). And in another, they are resented for their 
genius and fame: “Multitude sans nom ! Vous êtes née ennemie des noms !” (“Nameless 
populace! You were born an enemy of the renowned!”), exclaims Stello, “à peine avez-vous fait 
une gloire, vous la trouvez trop haute et vous la minez sourdement, vous la rongez par le pied et 
la tête jusqu’à ce qu’elle retombe à votre niveau” (“no sooner have you created a hero than you 
find him too revered and you quietly begin to undermine his fame, eroding it from both ends 
until he falls back down to your level”) (243). The doctor adds to these reasons the fact that the 
poet is fundamentally at odds with those members of society occupying positions of power and 
authority. Referring to the poet Gilbert in particular, he notes that “du jour où il sut lire il fut 
Poète, et dès lors il appartint à la race toujours maudite par les puissances de la terre” (“from the 
moment he knew how to read, he was a Poet, and he belonged, from that point onward, to the 
race of individuals cursed by those in power”) (120). “Le Pouvoir est une science de convention” 
(“Power is a matter of convention”), he explains, adding that “tout ordre social est basé sur un 
mensonge plus ou moins ridicule” (“every social order is founded upon a more or less absurd 
lie”) (249). “Les beautés de tout art” (“The delicacies of every art”), on the other hand, “ne sont 
possibles que dérivant de la vérité la plus intime” (“can only derive from the most intimate of 
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truths”), and for this reason, “le Pouvoir, quel qu’il soit, trouve une continuelle opposition dans 
toute œuvre ainsi créée” (“Power, in whatever form, finds itself in perpetual opposition to any 
such work of art”) (249-50). As speakers of truth, poets are a threat to the carefully disguised lies 
upon which the power structures of society are based. Subject, for these reasons, to an 
“ostracisme perpétuel” (“continuous ostracism”), the poet lives a life of social alienation, 
persecution, and unhappiness (243). 
A century later, in the opening pages of Sodome et Gomorrhe (1921), Marcel Proust 
elaborates his theory of the sexual invert. Punctuated with allusions to the poetry of Alfred de 
Vigny, these opening pages establish a very particular literary framework within which to 
understand this newly emerging sexual type. Having developed the notion of the poète maudit in 
Stello, de Vigny serves as an important reference for Proust, who draws from such a 
characterization of the poet when developing his own characterization of the sexual invert. And 
in Proust’s earlier elaboration of this theory, the similarity between poet and sexual invert 
emerges in much more explicit terms. This initial elaboration can be found in the chapter of 
Contre Sainte-Beuve (Against Sainte-Beuve) entitled “La race maudite” (“The Accursed Race”).  
Recounting the various hardships afflicting members of this accursed race, Proust 
explains that the sexual invert will suffer, 
 
[…] jusqu’au jour infaillible où tôt ou tard il sera dévoré, comme le poète reçu dans tous 
les salons de Londres, poursuivi lui et ses œuvres, lui ne pouvant trouver un lit où 
reposer, elles une salle où être jouées, et après l’expiation et la mort, voyant s’élever sa 
statue au-dessus de sa tombe, obligé de travestir ses sentiments, de changer tous ses mots, 
de mettre au féminin ses phrases, de donner à ses propres yeux des excuses à ses amitiés, 
à ses colères, plus gêné par la nécessité intérieure et l’ordre impérieux de son vice de ne 
pas se croire en proie à un vice que par la nécessité sociale de ne pas laisser voir ses 
goûts ; (258) 
 
([…] until the inevitable day when, sooner or later, he will be devoured, like the poet 
who, received in all the salons of London, is nonetheless prosecuted on account of his 
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work, unable to find a room for the night or an audience to hear his work, and after his 
expiation and death, sees a statue of himself erected at the head of his tomb, obligated to 
disguise his feelings, to change all of his words, to make his sentences grammatically 
feminine, to make excuses for his friendships, his frustrations, even more troubled by his 
internal urges, and by the natural imperative of his vice to not see himself as having any 
vice, than by the social imperative to not let his personal tastes show;) 
 
 
The similarity between the experience of the sexual invert and that of the poet is reinforced by 
the ambiguous syntax of Proust’s comparison, which progresses seamlessly from a description of 
the poetic identity to a description of the sexual identity, leaving it unclear at which point Proust 
ceases to enumerate the hardships of the poète maudit and begins to enumerate those of the race 
maudite. 
 Proust explains that the sexual invert’s unhappiness has two principal sources – first, a 
certain “infortune innée” (“innate misfortune”) that predisposes this individual to various 
“malheurs injustes” (“unjust hardships”), and second, a life of persecution in which this 
individual is subjected to society’s active scorn and reprobation (259). The first source of 
unhappiness arises from the inevitable difficulties experienced by the sexual invert in the domain 
of attraction and love. Proust remarks that while love can be a difficult venture for any 
individual, “pour cet être à qui la nature fut si … la difficulté est centuplée. L’espèce à laquelle il 
appartient est si peu nombreuse sur la terre qu’il a des chances de passer toute sa vie sans jamais 
rencontrer le semblable qu’il aurait pu aimer” (“for this individual to whom nature has been so 
… the difficulty is hundredfold. The species to which he belongs is so small in numbers 
throughout the world that he may very well live his entire life without meeting an individual of 
similar disposition and whom he could have loved”) (260). The resulting isolation of the sexual 
invert is then enhanced by society’s failure to understand his true nature. Like the poète maudit, 
deemed either useless or elitist by the masses, the sexual invert is “[l’]objet tantôt d’une 
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méconnaissance aveugle qui ne les aime qu’en ne les connaissant pas, tantôt d’un dégoût qui les 
incrimine dans ce qu’ils ont de plus pur, tantôt d’une curiosité qui cherche à les expliquer et les 
comprend tout de travers […]” (“either subject to a general disgust that incriminates such 
individuals on account of their purest attribute, or subject to a general curiosity, which, in 
attempting to explain these individuals, understands nothing of their true nature”) (256). And in 
addition to living in isolation, the sexual invert lives through persecution. As Proust explains, 
this “race maudite, persécutée comme Israël et comme lui ayant fini, dans l’opprobre commun 
d’une abjection imméritée, par prendre des caractères communs, l’air d’une race” (“this accursed 
race, persecuted like the Jews of Israel, and like them, faced with the general scorn of an 
unmerited abjection, having taken on the common airs and characteristics of a race”), is not only 
subject to, but also defined by, society’s active scorn and reprobation (256). Persecuted by 
society and isolated from the masses, the sexual invert appears to suffer the same sources of 
unhappiness as the poète maudit. And so, it is entirely possible that nineteenth century 
characterizations of this particular poetic identity served as a model for Proust’s twentieth 
century characterization of this particular sexual identity. 
 But the poète maudit resembles contemporary conceptions of a queer identity as well. In 
a chapter of The Straight Mind (1992) entitled “On the Social Contract,” Monique Wittig 
discusses the marginalized position of lesbians within society. “To live in society is to live in 
heterosexuality,” she argues, since “social contract and heterosexuality are two superimposable 
notions” (40). Given the all-encompassing nature of heterosexual ideology, perhaps the poète 
maudit, as an identity set apart from society, carves out a space for queerness to manifest. 
Michael Warner’s characterization of society points to a similar possibility. In Fear of a Queer 
Planet (1993), he understands Wittig’s comment in a more materialist context: 
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Het[erosexual] culture thinks of itself as the elemental form of human association, as the 
very model of intergender relations, as the indivisible basis of all community, and as the 
means of reproduction without which society wouldn’t exist. Materialist thinking about 
society has in many cases reinforced these tendencies, inherent in heterosexual ideology, 
toward a totalized view of the social. (xxi)  
 
 
According to Warner, heterosexual ideology appropriates, as one of its central values, the notion 
of reproduction. In a similar way, bourgeois society of nineteenth-century France promoted, as 
one of its central values, the notion of production. And as Jean-Luc Steinmetz has remarked in 
“Du poète malheureux au poète maudit” (“From the Unfortunate Poet to the Accursed Poet”), the 
social alienation and persecution experienced by the poète maudit was also historically founded 
in “l’ostracisme que la Révolution (ou les Encyclopédistes) fit subir à l’artiste considéré comme 
inacceptable, inassimilable, à moins qu’il ne joue les utilités” (“the ostracism that the Revolution 
(or the Encyclopedists) imposed upon the artist viewed as inacceptable, inassimilable, unless he 
served some useful function”) (83). If the poet’s ostracism stemmed from the fact that he did not 
“serve some useful function,” where this appearance of usefulness was determined primarily by 
bourgeois society’s socio-economic values, as Steinmetz explains, it may be because the poet’s 
perceived lack of productive value was considered as disadvantageous to society as the 
homosexual’s perceived lack of reproductive value.  
 In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004), Lee Edelman discusses the 
more disquieting implications of non-production in a society that shapes its entire politics around 
a narrative of “reproductive futurism.” Embracing the larger political and social capacities of the 
queer, Edelman argues that, “Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable 
political future […], the queer comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the 
resistance, internal to the social, to every social structure or form” (4). In this sense, a lack of 
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productive utility (in whatever form it may take) implies a more threatening and pervasive 
defiance of society – a counter to the perpetuation of society as we know it and to all that it 
views as valuable. The poète maudit caused similar concerns. Steinmetz concludes that, while 
society disapproved of the poet’s inutility within a socio-economic framework, the poet’s 
ostracism “s’explique aussi par l’anomie qu’il représente” (“can also be explained by the anomy 
that he constituted”) (83). The poet was not only alienated from society; he was also a threat to it. 
And as Steinmetz remarks, “Toute forme de totalitarisme ne pourra qu’éliminer ceux qui 
opposent aux cadences sociales le rythme de leur cœur” (“Any form of totalitarianism can only 
eliminate those whose heart beats to a different social cadence”) (83). This observation accounts 
for nineteenth-century French society’s ostracism of the poet figure as much as it does 
contemporary society’s oppression and repression of the non-heterosexual. From anomaly to 
anomy, the poet came to represent a source of social instability, much like Edelman’s 
characterization of the queer individual.   
 
Section 2: The Poète Voyou 
 
The notion of anomy is more explicitly associated with characterizations of the poète 
voyou (delinquent poet), a type of poet who actively cultivates a certain incompatibility with 
society, functioning in deliberate disaccord with its norms and values. This section will focus on 
two poets in particular, Paul Verlaine and Pierre François Lacenaire, who succinctly capture the 
characteristics of the poète voyou in both their poetic works and their personal lives.   
Verlaine’s first published poem is entitled “Monsieur Prudhomme” (“Mister Wiseman”). 
Inaugurating, so to speak, Verlaine’s role as poet, the sonnet serves to characterize this poetic 
identity by contrasting it with that of the gentleman named in the poem’s title – Monsieur 
Prudhomme:   
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 Monsieur Prudhomme 
 
Il est grave : il est maire et père de famille. 
Son faux-col engloutit son oreille. Ses yeux 
Dans un rêve sans fin flottent, insoucieux, 
Et le printemps en fleurs sur ses pantoufles brille. 
 
Que lui fait l’astre d’or, que lui fait la charmille 
Où l’oiseau chante à l’ombre, et que lui font les cieux, 
Et les prés verts et les gazons silencieux ? 
Monsieur Prudhomme songe à marier sa fille 
 
Avec monsieur Machin, un jeune homme cossu. 
Il est juste-milieu, botaniste et pansu. 
Quant aux faiseurs de vers, ces vauriens, ces maroufles, 
 
Ces fainéants barbus, mal peignés, il les a 
Plus en horreur que son éternel coryza, 
Et le printemps en fleur brille sur ses pantoufles. 
 
 
(Mister Wiseman 
 
He is solemn: he is a mayor and the family’s father. 
His detachable collar swallows his ear. His eyes swim 
Unconcerned in an endless dream 
And flowering spring shines on his slippers. 
 
What is the golden star to him, what is the arbor 
Where the bird sings in the shade, what to him 
Are skies and green meadows and lawns’ calm? 
Mister Wiseman considers marrying his daughter 
 
To Mister Whatsit, politically middle-of-the-road, 
A young man of means, a botanist, potbellied. 
As for these rogues and good for nothing 
 
Versifiers, these bearded idlers dressed so ill, 
He dreads them more than his head cold, which is perpetual, 
And on his slippers shines flowering spring.)4 
 
 
 
4 Translation by Karl Kirchwey. 
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The Monsieur Prudhomme (Mister Wiseman) described in the poem was most likely inspired by 
the fictional character of the same name, created in 1830 by Henry Monnier as a caricature of the 
bourgeois individual. This character figured in several of Monnier’s works, up through Monsieur 
Prudhomme chef de brigand in 1860. In Property is Theft! A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
Anthology, editor Iain McKay describes the character as “plump, foolish, conformist and 
sententious,” noting that “he was called by Honoré de Balzac ‘l’illustre type du bourgeois de 
Paris’ (‘the renowned bourgeois Parisian’)” (782).   
Verlaine’s sonnet continues this characterization. Its first two stanzas are dedicated to a 
description of Monsieur Prudhomme, depicting him as a typically bourgeois member of society 
whose appearance and thoughts reveal his concern with material wealth and social status. As 
“maire et père de famille” (“mayor and head of the family”), he is a patriarchal figure of both 
public and domestic spheres. His “faux-col” (“detachable collar”) and “pantoufles” (“slippers”) 
signal his adherence to the norms of materialist fashion and to notions of presentability. And, 
untouched by even the most romantically poetic nature of his surroundings, his reveries concern 
only his immediate social establishment. His daydreams culminate in the realization of a central 
institution of heteronormative society: marriage. In the next stanza, we read that Monsieur 
Prudhomme dreams of marrying his daughter to Monsieur Machin (Mister Whatsit), an equally 
“proper” young man whose resemblance to his future father-in-law will conserve and perpetuate 
this model of patriarchal bourgeois society. Like Monsieur Prudhomme, whose very name 
encapsulates his normative nature, Monsieur Machin bears the name of an equally generalizable 
identity.   
As the next lines make clear, however, poets constitute a different type of individual.  
Described from the perspective of Mister Wiseman, these poets do not possess such a universal 
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or valid identity type. They are not named, but disparagingly paraphrased as “faiseurs de vers” 
(“versifiers”). Lying outside normative and identifiable social roles as “vauriens” (“rogues”), 
“maroufles” (“good-for-nothings”), and “fainéants barbus” (“unshaven idlers”), they are 
characterized not only as economically unproductive, but also as socially offensive, without 
scruples or conscience. In a word, they are voyous (delinquents). Characterized in this way, the 
poet figure creates space for queerness to manifest within the heteronormative bourgeois society 
of nineteenth-century France. As Verlaine’s poem reveals, this poet type exists in strict 
opposition to the bourgeois ideals of Mr. Wiseman and Mr. Whatsit, and in stark contrast to the 
heteronormative society that Mr. Wiseman dreams of perpetuating.  
While Verlaine’s sonnet highlights the perceived disaccord between poet and normative 
society, Lacenaire’s poem, entitled “Pétition d’un voleur à un roi voisin” (“A Thief’s Petition to 
a Neighboring King”), works with this disaccord to destabilize notions of socially acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviors. After committing a number of thefts, frauds, and murders, this infamous 
“poet-assassin” wrote the majority of his poetry in prison during the years leading up to his final 
conviction and execution in 1836. Lacenaire wrote this particular poem in 1833, while 
incarcerated at La Force Prison. By calling into question the social distinction between thief and 
king, the poem destabilizes conventional identity categories and challenges the value that we 
conventionally assign to them:   
 
Pétition d’un voleur à un roi voisin 
 
Sire, de grâce, écoutez-moi : 
Sire, je reviens des galères … 
Je suis voleur, vous êtes roi, 
Agissons ensemble en bons frères. 
Les gens de bien me font horreur, 
J’ai le cœur dur et l’âme vile, 
Je suis sans pitié, sans honneur :  
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Ah ! faites-moi sergent de ville. 
 
Bon ! je me vois déjà sergent : 
Mais, sire, c’est bien peu, je pense. 
L’appétit me vient en mangeant : 
Allons, sire, un peu d’indulgence. 
Je suis hargneux comme un roquet, 
D’un vieux singe j’ai la malice ; 
En France, je vaudrais Gisquet : 
Faites-moi préfet de police. 
 
Grands dieux ! que je suis bon préfet ! 
Toute prison est trop petite. 
Ce métier pourtant n’est pas fait, 
Je le sens bien, pour mon mérite. 
Je sais dévorer un budget, 
Je sais embrouiller un registre ; 
Je signerai : « Votre sujet », 
Ah ! sire, faites-moi ministre. 
 
Sire, que Votre Majesté 
Ne se mette pas en colère ! 
Je compte sur votre bonté ; 
Car ma demande est téméraire. 
Je suis hypocrite et vilain, 
Ma douceur n’est qu’une grimace ; 
J’ai fait … se pendre mon cousin : 
Sire, cédez-moi votre place. 
 
 
(A Thief’s Petition to a Neighboring King 
 
Sire, give grace and hear me: 
Sire, I return from the galleys… 
I am a thief, you are a king, 
Let us act together as brothers. 
I cannot bear those men of good will, 
My heart is cold, and my soul is vile, 
I am without pity and without honor: 
Ah! Make me the bailiff of the city. 
 
Good! I see myself as bailiff already: 
But sire, this is not much, I think. 
My appetite is growing now: 
Come, sire, a little indulgence. 
I am as vicious as a little dog,  
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 As malicious as a monkey; 
 In France, I’m a veritable Gisquet: 
 Make me the police commissioner. 
 
 Great gods! I am a good commissioner! 
 No prison is large enough. 
 I feel, however, that I can do better still. 
 My merits far exceed this. 
 I know how to blow a budget, 
 I know how to jumble the records; 
 I will sign off as “Your subject,” 
 Ah! Sire, make me minister. 
 
 Sire, Your Majesty 
 Do not grow angry! 
 I am counting on your goodness; 
 For my request is quite audacious. 
 I am hypocritical and foul, 
 My sweetness is but a grimace; 
 I had … my cousin hanged: 
 Sire, concede to me your place.) 
 
 
In the first stanza, the thief directly addresses the king. After establishing their strikingly 
different social positions (“Je suis voleur, vous êtes roi” (“I am a thief, you are a king”)), the 
thief proceeds to his proposition that they nonetheless act “ensemble en bons frères” (“together 
as brothers”). The following lines reveal what this cooperation entails – that the king make the 
thief “sergent de ville” (“the city bailiff”). Leading up to this direct request, the thief gives a 
description of himself as having “le cœur dur et l’âme vile” (“a cold heart and a vile soul”), and 
as being “sans pitié” (“without pity”) and “sans honneur” (“without honor”). Lacenaire’s 
rhetorical use of the colon after the description of these voyou qualities, however, implies a 
logical conclusion: The thief has these qualities, ergo, he should hold this social position. In this 
case, his cold heart, vile soul, and lack of pity and honor render him most suitable for the 
position of city bailiff. 
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Continuing this rhetorical structure throughout the poem, Lacenaire relates increasingly 
powerful and admirable social positions to increasingly voyou qualities. Having been made 
bailiff, the thief demands to be made police commissioner on account of his viciousness, malice, 
and likeness to the zealot commissioner, Henri Gisquet. After acquiring this function, he then 
requests that of minister, given his ability to blow a budget and mismanage public records. And 
finally, citing his hypocritical and villainous nature, and the specific deed of having his cousin 
hanged, the thief proposes taking the place of the king himself. While presented in opposition to 
the king at the beginning of the poem, by the end, the thief is depicted as his equal, not only in 
terms of their position on the social hierarchy, but in terms of their very nature. A so-called 
exemplary member of society has become interchangeable with a so-called delinquent one.  
Lacenaire’s defiance of society’s values and laws, paired with his bourgeois background 
and literary interests, rendered him a source of curiosity for the nineteenth century French public 
and media, who closely followed his murder trial. But the poet-assassin also exemplified the 
poète voyou’s ability to function as a source of social instability. As sociologist and queer 
theorist Adam Green has demonstrated, it is this capacity for destabilization that underpins 
modern conceptions of queerness. In his 2007 article, “Queer Theory and Sociology,” Green 
concludes that the major strains of queer theory can be unified “by a deconstructive raison d’être 
that aims to ‘denaturalize’ dominant social classifications and, in turn, destabilize the social 
order” (28). Through his deliberate transgression of society’s laws and his literary subversion of 
society’s identity categories and power structures, Lacenaire’s enactment of the poet as voyou 
did exactly this.   
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Section 3: The Poète Voyant 
 
“The theory of the poet as seer, as prophet and interpreter of the gods, as one endowed 
with supernormal powers, may accurately be called the perennial philosophy of poetry,” notes 
Gwendolyn Bays, who, in 1967, traces this poetic identity from its emergence in Ancient Greece 
to its rebirth in nineteenth century France (17). This characterization of the poet has adopted 
various forms throughout history, especially over the course of the nineteenth century. Victor 
Hugo, for example, viewed the poet as a type of prophet figure endowed with the power of 
foresight and the responsibility of relaying this enlightened perspective to those around him. In 
“La fonction du poète” (“The Purpose of the Poet”), published in 1840, he writes: 
 
Le poète en des jours impies 
Vient préparer des jours meilleurs. 
Il est l'homme des utopies, 
Les pieds ici, les yeux ailleurs. 
C'est lui qui sur toutes les têtes, 
En tout temps, pareil aux prophètes, 
Dans sa main, où tout peut tenir, 
Doit, qu'on l'insulte ou qu'on le loue, 
Comme une torche qu'il secoue, 
Faire flamboyer l'avenir ! (lines 81-90) 
 
(The poet in unholy times, 
Arrives to make for better days. 
He is a man of utopia, 
His feet on Earth, his eyes elsewhere. 
It is he who, over many heads, 
In every era, like every prophet, 
In his hand, which holds all, 
Must, be he cursed or praised, 
Like the torch he grasps and waves 
Light up with flames the future.) 
 
 
Alphonse de Lamartine saw the poet as a more terrestrial visionary figure, one whose work 
inspires others to realize their dreams of a better society. In Des destinées de la poésie (The Fate 
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of Poetry) (1834), the poet praises the progressive possibilities of Romantic poetry, “qui plane 
sur la société et qui la juge, et qui, montrant à l’homme la vulgarité de son œuvre, l’appelle sans 
cesse en avant, en lui montrant du doigt des utopies, des républiques imaginaires, des cités de 
Dieu, et lui souffle au cœur le courage de les tenter et l’espoir de les atteindre” (“which soars 
over society and judges it, and which, in revealing to man the crudeness of his work, calls him 
endlessly forward, directing him toward utopias, imaginary republics, and cities of God, and fills 
his heart with the courage to pursue them and the hope of achieving them”) (82). He remarks, 
however, that the average person needs an interpreter to understand such urgings, and so 
declares: “c’est à nous de lui en servir, et de lui expliquer, par ses sentiments rendus dans sa 
langue, ce que Dieu a mis de bonté, de noblesse, de générosité, de patriotisme et de piété 
enthousiaste dans son cœur” (“It is our responsibility to fulfill this role, and to explain to him 
through his feelings rendered into words, the goodness, nobility, generosity, patriotism, and 
enthusiastic piety that God has placed within his heart”) (83). This “nous” (“us”) of course refers 
to the poets, who put such visions into words and communicate them to the people.   
Gérard de Nerval can also be characterized as an enlightened poet, but one whose 
visionary ability manifests in the form of hallucinations and dream-like states. In Aurélia : Ou le 
rêve et la vie (Aurelia: The Dream and the Life) (1855), Nerval states that “Le rêve est une 
seconde vie” (“A dream is an alternate life”), and describes it as “un souterrain vague qui 
s’éclaire peu à peu, et où se dégagent de l’ombre et de la nuit les pâles figures gravement 
immobiles qui habitent le séjour des limbes” (“an indistinct underworld that grows gradually 
clearer, where the solemnly still, pale figures of the other world emerge from the shadows and 
the darkness”) (Œuvres 3: 695). This world is obscure at first, he explains, “Puis le tableau se 
forme, une clarté nouvelle illumine et fait jouer ces apparitions bizarres : – le monde des Esprits 
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s’ouvre pour nous” (“Then the scene takes shape, a new sense of intelligibility illuminates these 
bizarre apparitions and brings them to life: – the Spirit world opens up to us”) (3: 695). It is 
during “l’épanchement du songe dans la vie réelle” (“the dream’s effusion into real life”), 
however, when this dreamworld overflows into the real world, that the poet experiences truly 
visionary abilities (3: 699). Nerval recounts that when this began to happen to him, “tout prenait 
parfois un aspect double – et cela sans que le raisonnement manquât jamais de logique, sans que 
la mémoire perdît les plus légers détails de ce qui m’arrivait” (“everything would start to appear 
doubled  – but without my reasoning becoming any less logical, without my memory losing the 
slightest detail of what was happening to me”) (3: 699).  
Rather than inhibiting the poet’s understanding of reality, such an experience enhanced it 
by allowing him to view two realities at once. Since he remained lucid and rational during these 
visionary experiences, Nerval hesitates to consider them a form of infirmity. “La science a le 
droit d’escamoter ou réduire au silence tous les prophètes et voyants prédits par l’Apocalypse, 
dont je me flattais d’être l’un !” (“Science is able to skirt around or silence all of the prophets 
and seers foretold by the Apocalypse, of which I was one!”), he exclaims in a letter to Mme 
Alexandre Dumas, shortly after his release from hospital (Œuvres 1: 1383). “Comme il y a ici 
des médecins et des commissaires qui veillent à ce qu’on n’étende pas le champ de la poésie aux 
dépens de la voie publique” (“Since there are doctors and officials here whose role it is to ensure 
that one does not expand the poetic domain at the expense of the beaten path”), he explains, “on 
ne m’a laissé sortir et vaguer définitivement parmi les gens raisonnables que lorsque je suis 
convenu bien formellement d’avoir été malade, ce qui coûtait beaucoup à mon amour-propre et 
même à ma véracité” (“they would not let me officially leave and mingle with the public again 
until I formally agreed to having been infirm, which cost me a lot of self-respect and even 
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truthfulness”) (Œuvres 1: 1383). As Nerval resolves in Aurélia: “je crois que l’imagination 
humaine n’a rien inventé qui ne soit vrai, dans ce monde ou dans les autres, et je ne pouvais 
douter de ce que j’avais vu si distinctement” (“I believe that the human imagination has never 
invented anything that is not true, in this world or in others, and I could not doubt what I had so 
distinctly seen”) (Œuvres 3: 717).   
This section will focus on Arthur Rimbaud’s conception of the poète voyant since he 
developed his poetic theory around the identity and discussed it explicitly in two letters – his 
letter to Georges Izambard on May 13, 1871, and his letter to Paul Demeny on May 15, 1871. 
Rimbaud’s theory of voyance (poetic vision) and his method for attaining it have produced a 
variety of critical interpretations over the last few decades: Gwendolyn Bays, writing in the 
1960s, understands Rimbaud’s poetic vision in psychoanalytic terms, focusing on its relationship 
to dreams and the unconscious (21). In a more Marxist approach, Anna Louise Ortiz, writing in 
the 1980s, understands Rimbaud’s poète voyant as envisioning “a brotherhood of men” and an 
ideal form of social progress (107). And in a different sense again, writing in the late nineties, 
James W. Brown focuses on the poète voyant as a “disembodied voice” who sees reality directly, 
rather than as a prophetic figure who sees visions or has hallucinations (99). In “‘Voix et 
Voyance’ in Rimbaud’s ‘Départ’,” Brown explains that in most cases, “we perceive not directly 
but through image, language, mental constructs and ideas, all of which belong to the past and the 
known” (95). For this reason, Rimbaud’s poète voyant reaches the “unknown” through the 
experience of “egolessness,” where the poet is free from the interference of bodily and 
intellectual perceptions of reality (98).  
In the wake of Brown’s post-modernist approach to notions of voyance, queer theory also 
provides a productive framework for understanding Rimbaud’s conception of the poet as voyant. 
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Rimbaud writes to Izambard on May 13, 1871 that in order to render oneself voyant, “il faut être 
fort, être né poète” (“you must be strong, be born a poet”), to which he adds definitively: “et je 
me suis reconnu poète” (“and I have acknowledged that I am a poet”) (249). He clarifies that 
voyance is inherently linked to the poetic identity, which certain individuals, like himself, 
inevitably occupy. In his letter to Demeny on May 15, 1871, he elaborates on this idea, adding 
that in the process of becoming voyant, the poet “devient entre tous le grand malade, le grand 
criminel, le grand maudit, – et le suprême Savant – Car il arrive à l’inconnu !” (“becomes, 
among all things, the great madman, the great criminal, the great accursed one, – and the ultimate 
Savant – For he arrives at the unknown!”) (251). In this sense, the poet as voyant appears in 
correlation with other poet types of the period, with “le grand malade” (“the great madman”) 
recalling the malédiction du poète (affliction of the poet), and “le grand criminel” (“the great 
criminal”) recalling the poète voyou. Arriving at the end of the list, after the “grand maudit” (“the 
great accursed one”), is the “suprême Savant” (“the ultimate Savant”) – he who has seen all and 
knows all. Situating the voyant within the same trajectory as the maudit and the voyou, Rimbaud 
implies that it is through first becoming these other poetic types that the poet eventually arrives 
at the unknown and becomes the “ultimate Savant.” The queerness of the poète maudit manifests 
in terms of an isolating disconnect with society, and the queerness of the poet as voyou manifests 
as a deliberate cultivation of a lifestyle apart from, and against, society. Considering the voyant 
within the same trajectory, the queerness enabled by this identity differs slightly again. Rather 
than failing to assimilate into society, and rather than taking a stand against its norms, the poète 
voyant is capable of seeing beyond social norms and realities altogether in order to imagine, find, 
or create an alternative to society as it currently exists, or as it is currently perceived.   
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Queer theorist Nikki Sullivan points to a correspondence between this type of vision and 
queerness. In A Critical Introduction to Queer Theory (2000), she notes that queer theory’s 
deconstructive component is important because in deconstructing presumed oppositions such as 
homosexuality and heterosexuality, the unnatural and the natural, “it enables us to acknowledge 
the constructedness of meaning and identity and thus to begin to imagine alternative ways of 
thinking and of living” (51). This is similar to what Lee Edelman claims in No Future, when he 
suggests that “queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as 
social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging 
those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures, that shape them” (7). Endowed 
with a queer vision, then, a person could “see” the constructed nature of society and imagine 
alternatives to that which appears as an inevitable and natural social reality.   
Could this type of vision be at work in conceptualizations of the poet as voyant? This 
possibility becomes most evident through an understanding of voyance that tends toward James 
Brown’s interpretation. As mentioned above, Brown understands voyance in Eastern 
philosophical terms, as a form of direct seeing that takes place beyond the conceptual realm (96). 
He explains that “What prevents the ordinary mind from seeing basic reality, the ‘what is,’ may 
be defined in Buddhist terms as defilement and distortion brought about by ignorance, greed, 
desire, anger and a host of other intervening personal (egoic) factors” (95). And he adds that 
“Another impediment to seeing reality directly is the thought process itself and the formation of 
concepts, opinions and values about what one is perceiving” (95). Brown distinguishes this 
notion of vision from what he considers the more Western notion, which entails a visionary state 
brought about by distortions, such as dreams or hallucinations. 
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In Rimbaud’s own writings however, Brown sees some ambiguity and overlap with 
respect to the poet’s methods and is not sure that they clearly coincide with either Western or 
Eastern notions of seeing. He states that “Rimbaud’s ‘long, immense et raisonné dérèglement de 
tous les sens’ (‘long, immense, and reasoned disruption of all the senses’) in order to arrive at the 
unknown, was an unusually drastic means of going beyond normal perception and entering the 
visionary state. And whether or not the young poet knew so at the time, it certainly did not 
correspond with Eastern traditions for attaining enlightenment, wherein visions and 
hallucinations would be viewed as obstacles to clear and direct seeing” (96). In this case, 
Rimbaud’s method seems to entail something more than what would be necessary for entering a 
hallucinatory state, but also something ineffective for attaining a form of direct seeing in the 
Eastern sense. It is what such a method implies regarding the role of ideologies, however, that 
points to a queer understanding of voyance.   
In his May 15 letter, Rimbaud explains that after implementing this systematic method of 
“dérèglement” (“disruption”) and after becoming all of the poet types mentioned above, the poet 
arrives “à l’inconnu, et quand, affolé, il finirait par perdre l’intelligence de ses visions, il les a 
vues !” (“at the unknown, and when, crazed, he finally loses the intelligence of his visions, he 
will have seen them”) (251). It is only once the poet has lost the meaning of his visions, once 
they have become unintelligible to him, that he has truly seen. Voyance in this sense also implies 
a shedding of ideologies, which inform our knowledge systems, lead us to “make sense” of what 
we see, and ultimately shape our perceptions of reality. This corresponds to Brown’s 
understanding of voyance, which he sees as uninfluenced by “the known.” But the role of 
ideologies in impeding voyance also points to an alternative interpretation of Rimbaud’s “long, 
immense et raisonné dérèglement de tous les sens” (“long, immense and reasoned disruption of 
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the senses”) (251). If the poet must lose the intelligibility of what he sees, this approach does not 
only pertain to disrupting sensory perceptions. “Sens” can be read for its additional definition – 
that of “meaning” itself, so that by disrupting “tous les sens,” the poet is also disrupting “all of 
the meanings” created by knowledge systems like language and culture, which shape our 
perception of reality.   
Adam Green points to the pervasive role of such knowledge systems in making society 
appear inevitably heteronormative, and he explains queer theory’s function in disrupting this 
appearance: 
 
As a deconstructionist framework trained on denaturalization, queer theory is something 
of a wrench wedged in the performative interval, laying bare the genealogy of a given 
discourse and its institutional, political, and collective effects, including its pedagogical 
and diagnostic manifestations, its role in moral campaigns, its consequences for 
governmentality, and, broader still, the limits of social ontology. (43) 
 
 
In this sense, queer theory functions in much the same way as Rimbaud’s “disruption” of our 
perceptions of reality. And in the same way that Rimbaud’s method might aim to disrupt 
meaning or intellectual as well as sensory perceptions, so queerness, according to Carla Freccero, 
also serves to disrupt the intelligibility of the “known.” In Queer/Early/Modern (2006), Freccero 
focuses on meaning as it is created through texts and language, noting that the “Queer is what is 
and is not there, what disaggregates the coherence of the norm from the very beginning and is 
ignored in the force to make sense out of the unintelligibilities of grammar and syntax” (18).   
Her characterization of queer as “what is and is not there” is interesting with respect to 
the question of social ontology that Adam Green raises, as well as the question of vision, more 
generally. As something which “is and is not there,” where and how does queerness exist in 
relation to society? And to whom, and under what circumstances, does the queer manifest as 
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visible? As Freccero’s comment indicates, queer can be understood in Derridean terms as the 
“always already there”; and with respect to the question of social ontology, it can be understood 
as an alternative way of being that has always existed, but is ignored, silenced, or rendered 
invisible by the ideologies that shape our perception of reality as heteronormative. At the end of 
his May 15 letter to Demeny, Rimbaud concludes: “Les seconds romantiques sont très voyants: 
Théophile Gautier, Leconte de Lisle, Théodore de Banville. Mais inspecter l’invisible et entendre 
l’inouï étant autre chose que reprendre l’esprit des choses mortes, Baudelaire est le premier 
voyant, roi des poètes, un vrai Dieu” (“The second wave of romantics are very enlightened: 
Théophile Gautier, Leconte de Lisle, Théodore de Banville. But since examining the invisible 
and hearing the unheard is not the same thing as reviving the spirit of dead things, Baudelaire is 
the first voyant, king of poets, a true God”) (253). If Baudelaire is the “first voyant, king of 
poets” on account of his ability to see the unseen and hear the unheard, as a true poète voyant, he 
may indeed be well suited to see that which is and is not there: “the unknown,” the queer.   
Whether “the unknown” at which Rimbaud’s poète voyant finally arrives is a vision of an 
alternative reality, a utopian vision of the way things could be, or a vision unimpeded by 
obstructive ideologies, it is a space par excellence for queerness to manifest. The poète voyant’s 
desire to reach “the unknown” was a desire to go beyond “the known” – and the ideologies that 
inevitably informed it – to a place where meaning had been disrupted and the poet could finally 
perceive an alternative way of being or thinking, one that was perhaps always already there, but 
simply ignored, “invisible” or “unheard.” 
 
Section 4: The Femme Poète 
 
In La petite sœur de Balzac (Balzac’s Younger Sister) (2015), Christine Planté traces the 
emergence of the femme auteur (author woman) in nineteenth century France. She discusses the 
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historical reasons leading to an increase in women writers at this time and considers the social 
and literary implications of the woman as author. A central premise of her study is that the 
“author woman” can be understood in terms of a myth or type: “la femme auteur, dont il sera 
question dans ces pages, et dans les textes du XIXe siècle que j’y évoquerai, n’existe pas, 
j’entends, comme réalité historique. Il y a des femmes qui écrivent […] Mais la femme auteur 
est un personnage, un type, où s’investissent les idéologies et les fantasmes du XIXe siècle, qui 
l’a inventée” (“the author woman, as she appears in these pages and in the nineteenth-century 
texts that I will invoke, does not exist, that is, as a historical reality. There are women who write 
[…] But the author woman is a characterization, a type, who incarnates the ideologies and the 
fantasies of the nineteenth century, which invented her”) (13). This section explores society’s 
attitudes toward the most troubling sub-category of the femme auteur – the femme poète. It 
examines similarities between representations of this particular poetic identity and 
representations of the poet as maudit, voyou, or voyant. And considers how the femme poète as 
an identity type might relate to another sexual identity that was emerging in France at the same 
time – the “third sex.” 
It was in society’s refusal to value, or even accept, female subjectivity that the notion of 
femme auteur emerged as a type. Planté explains that the generalizing discourse of the period’s 
literary criticism “ne veut voir en elle que la représentante d’une espèce trop dangereuse pour 
qu’on ne cherche pas à l’étiqueter, afin de mieux la cerner et l’isoler” (“saw her as nothing but 
the representative of a species too dangerous to not label, in order to better grasp it and contain 
it”) (29). The danger that she was seen to pose was pervasive and even catastrophic: “Il n’est pas 
question pour les intellectuels de (se) représenter la condamnation des femmes écrivains comme 
une petite affaire de défense de leur identité et de leurs privilèges” (“For these intellectuals, it 
 43 
was not simply a question of representing this condemnation of women writers as a defense of 
their own identity and their own privilege”), Planté observes. “C’est la défense de la famille, de 
la nation, du genre humain qui se trouve invoquée” (“They did so in defense of the family, of the 
nation, of humankind”), she explains, noting that “on brandit une fois de plus la menace de la 
décadence” (“the threat of decadence was once again invoked”) (110-11).  
What made the femme auteur such a threat? And what was her relation to decadence? 
One reason for this judgment is the fact that, by publishing their work, literary women were 
entering into the public sphere. In The Gendered Lyric, Gretchen Schultz has explained that, 
normally restricted to the private sphere of the home, “for a woman to publish, to place herself in 
public view, was either a monstrous or an indecent act,” where “women poets were frequently 
accused of a figurative kind of exhibitionism, summed up by the epithet monstre, derived from 
the Latin monstrare, meaning ‘to show’” (37). But the immodest exhibitionism perpetrated by 
the femme auteur is not the only characteristic that leads to the epithet monstre. The term has 
several significations, one of which the Trésor dictionary defines as “Chose (abstraite) qui 
provoque l’étonnement ou la désapprobation par son caractère incohérent ou hors des normes” 
(“(Abstract) thing provoking surprise or disapproval through its disjointed or non-normative 
nature”) (“Monstre” 1030). The femme auteur was a monster in this sense as well. By pursuing a 
literary career, she was perceived by society as neglecting the familial sphere and rejecting the 
normative female role of wife and mother: “Que viendrait faire ici une femme écrivain?” (“What 
was a woman writer up to?”), asks Planté, “D’abord, on le sait, perturber l’harmonieux 
fonctionnement de la famille, où elle refuserait de se plier à l’humble rôle de l’épouse. Mais 
aussi mettre en question des différences et des catégories trop élémentaires pour qu’il soit 
question de les interroger et d’accepter leur brouillage” (“First, as we all know, she came to 
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trouble the harmonious functioning of the family, in which she refused to bow to the humble role 
of wife. But also, she called into question differences and categories that were considered too 
fundamental to be questioned or blurred”) (Petite sœur 110). These differences and categories 
were those of sex and gender. With respect to the binary division of gender and its associated 
gender roles, blurring the distinction between writer, on the one hand, and wife/mother on the 
other, appeared so unquestionable that adherence to one implied rejection of the other. And with 
respect to the traditionally unquestioned alignment of sex with gender, the woman writer’s 
combination of female sex with a masculine gender role was seen as inherently incoherent. The 
femme auteur was a monster because she was “incoherent” and “not within norms.” As such, she 
created a space for queerness to manifest by calling into question the supposedly essentialist 
categories of sex and gender and by destabilizing their organization.  
  In La loi du genre (The Law of Gender) (2006), Laure Murat traces the concept of a 
troisième sexe (third sex), focusing on its construction through various discourses (primarily 
police, medical, and literary) in the period ranging from 1835 to 1939. This “third sex,” which 
ultimately comes down to an incoherence of sex and gender alignment, has existed since ancient 
times, but it became a much discussed and newly theorized concept in the nineteenth century. 
Murat remarks that, “Si l’expression remonte à Platon, il est d’usage de dater l’acceptation 
moderne de troisième sexe de l’époque romantique. En 1834, Balzac introduit un personnage lié 
à bien des égards à l’émergence du concept” (“Whereas the expression dates back to Platon, it is 
common practice to trace the modern understanding of third sex back to the Romantic era. In 
1834, Balzac introduced a character that is in many ways linked to the emergence of this 
concept”) (31). This character is Vautrin, who first appeared unambiguously as a homosexual 
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figure in Le Père Goriot (Father Goriot) (1835).5 Later, in Splendeurs et misères des courtisanes 
(The Splenders and Miseries of Courtisans) (1838-47), Balzac referred to this homosexual 
manifestation of the third sex with the colloquialism “tante” (“aunty”), inspiring Proust’s initial 
writings on la race des tantes (the race of Aunties), upon which he eventually based his concept 
of la race maudite (the accursed race).6  
Laure Murat observes that, “En théorie, le « vice » de cette « race maudite » repose sur 
un axiome, une loi: l’inversion du genre par rapport au sexe” (“In theory, the ‘vice’ of this 
‘accursed race’ was based on an axiom or law: the inversion of one’s gender with respect to 
one’s sex”) (321). In the case of Proust’s and Balzac’s use of the third sex, this inversion 
manifested in terms of non-heterosexuality, but the expression can refer to other misalignments 
of sex and gender, such as the many domains in which “active” women began to transgress their 
assigned gender roles and adopt activities deemed masculine. Murat discusses the transgressions 
of such women, who either worked, rode the bicycle, wore pants, or who wrote and published. 
She concludes that while “La femme de sport peut choquer, la femme de lettres, elle, exaspère. 
Objet de sarcasmes, cette précieuse ridicule indigne du nom d’intellectuelle défierait plus que 
toute autre femme active la différence des sexes, dont elles s’excluraient d’emblée en prenant la 
plume ou le stylo, qui aurait tout d’un instrument phallique” (“the sportive woman was shocking, 
the literary woman – she was infuriating. Subject to many a sarcastic remark, this pretentious 
young lady, who did not merit the label of intellectual, defied, more than any other active 
 
5 See Honoré de Balzac. Le Père Goriot, La Comédie humaine, edited by Pierre-Georges Castex, 
vol. 3. Gallimard, 1976, p. 192. 
 
6 See Honoré de Balzac. Splendeurs et misères des courtisanes, La Comédie humaine, edited by 
Pierre-Georges Castex, vol. 6. Gallimard, 1976, p. 840; See also Laure Murat. La Loi du genre. 
Paris: Fayard, 2006, p. 321 for a discussion of this genesis.  
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woman, the difference of the sexes, from which she excluded herself entirely by picking up the 
quill or pen, the most phallic of instruments”) (367). With the literary domain considered to be 
the most masculine of these gendered activities, its penetration by women constituted the most 
transgressive of acts.  
Within the nineteenth century French literary domain, there exists various literary genres, 
each also gendered in a hierarchy from feminine to masculine. Planté delineates these 
categorizations: “les plus femmes des genres-femmes: roman, lettres, journal intime, et les plus 
hommes des genres-hommes : l’histoire et la poésie” (“the most womanly of the woman-genres: 
the novel, letters, diary entries, and the most manly of the man-genres: history and poetry”) 
(Petite sœur 231). She specifies that “Le débat concerne d’ailleurs davantage les sujets, autorisés 
ou interdits, que les genres, sauf pour la poésie, qui se voit, elle, interdite aux femmes en tant que 
quintessence de l’art et création par excellence” (“The conflict arose more from the subject 
matter, whether permitted or prohibited, than from the genres themselves, except in the case of 
poetry, which, as the essence of art and the act of creation par excellence, was naturally 
forbidden to women”) (231). So, while the femme auteur was the most transgressive of the 
period’s increasingly active women figures, the femme poète, writing in the most quintessentially 
masculine genre of an already masculine domain, was the epitome of abnormality, incoherence, 
and monstrosity. 
It is in part this incoherence and resulting monstrosity, that Renée Vivien addresses in her 
poem, “Enseignement” (“The Teaching”), which was published in Sillages in 1908. The poem 
describes the art and nature of witches, figures often viewed as monstrous, and always distinctly 
feminine. It begins with the stanza: 
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Tu veux savoir de moi le secret des sorcières ? 
J’allumerai pour toi leurs nocturnes lumières, 
Et je t’apprendrai l’art très simple des sorcières. 
 
(You want to learn from me the secret ways of witches? 
I will illuminate for you their nocturnal source of light, 
And I will teach you the art, most simple, of witches.) 
 
 
The poem continues, stating that witches live during the night and sleep during the day, and that 
celestial bodies are more familiar to them than earthly spectacles, before recounting their 
persecution by those who do not understand them, as well as their general indifference to this 
world and their solitary and hidden existence.   
Several readings of the text are possible. One pertinent interpretation views the 
description of the witches’ existence as a metaphorical description of the lesbian’s existence.  
Vivien often referrs to female same-sex love in her poetry, and this interpretation could explain 
the poem’s references to an “inverted” and hidden way of life, where the witches live at night 
and sleep during the day, and where “Elles savent cacher au dur regard du jour / Leur cœur, leur 
haine triste et leur si triste amour” (“They know to hide from the harsh gaze of day / Their heart, 
their sad hatred and their sorrowful love”) (lines 28-29). More pertinent to the question at hand, 
another interpretation reads the witches as metaphorical representations of women poets, an 
identity that Vivien also frequently addresses in her poetry. This interpretation sees in the witch 
figure’s association with witchcraft and spells a particularly feminine form of the poet as voyant, 
whose divinatory or occult powers manifest as the ability to create reality through a magical use 
of words and language. But either way, read as metaphors for women loving women, or for 
women as poets, the witches embody the sexual or gender transgressions associated with those of 
“the third sex.”  
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As verses four through seven reveal, these witches also occupy a position of otherness 
not dissimilar to the otherness of the poète maudit and the poète voyou:  
 
On les craint, on les chasse, on ne les aime pas. 
Elles ont fui l’auberge et le commun repas. 
Elles n’ont point compris, on ne les comprend pas. 
 
Cependant elles sont très simples… On doit naître… 
Pour les comprendre, il faut quelque peu les connaître 
Et savoir qu’elles ont le droit d’être et de naître… 
 
Chacun parle très haut et du bien et du mal. 
L’on sait que c’est un tort grave d’être anormal, 
Leur cœur inoffensif n’a point conçu le mal. 
 
Mais ces femmes sont les maudites étrangères. 
Car dans un monde épais leurs âmes sont légères, 
Et ses lois leur seront à jamais étrangères. (lines 10-21) 
 
 
(They are feared, they are hunted, and liked they are not. 
They have fled the homestead and the communal table. 
They have not understood, and understood they are not.  
 
They are, however, simple … they were at one time born … 
If you know them in the slightest, you will understand their ways 
And realize that they have the right to be and to be born … 
 
We all speak so much about the good and the bad. 
We all know what an error it is to be abnormal, 
Yet their innocent hearts have known no bad. 
 
But these women remain accursed and foreign. 
Because in a crude world, their souls are light, 
And to them, forever its laws will be foreign.) 
 
 
As a result of their “tort grave d’être anormal” (“grave error of being abnormal”), the women are 
viewed as incomprehensible and threatening. They are foreigners in this crude world, whose 
laws, whether natural or societal, will remain just as foreign to them.  
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 The question of otherness finds an interesting variation in a final characteristic of the 
femme poète. In addition to occupying a position of other in relation to society and its laws, the 
woman poet more monstrously, and equally queerly, occupied a position of otherness with 
respect to herself. This monstrosity concerned the nature of her physical being. As literary critic 
Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly declares in Les Bas-bleu (The Blue Stockings) in 1878, “les femmes qui 
écrivent ne sont plus des femmes. Ce sont des hommes, - du moins de prétention, - et manqués !” 
(“women who write are no longer women. They are men, - or at least they desire to be, - and are 
failed versions at that”) (xi). This is why he preferred to refer to women writers by the term 
“Bas-bleus,” whose masculine grammatical gender accentuated the fact that such individuals 
could no longer be identified as female. “Les Bas-bleus ont, plus ou moins, donné la démission 
de leur sexe” (“The Blue Stockings have, more or less, abdicated their sex”), according to the 
critic (xi). No longer female, yet not successfully male, the femme auteur was a kind of hybrid of 
the two. As Planté concisely states: “Mi-femmes mi-hommes, ni femmes ni hommes, des 
monstres, des êtres hybrides” (“Half-women half-men, neither women nor men, they were 
monsters, hybrid creatures”) (Petite sœur 269).   
Some critics of the period, like Edmond de Goncourt, depicted this hybrid creature as 
intersex. On December 8, 1893, Goncourt wrote in his Journal: “[…] si on avait fait l’autopsie 
des femmes ayant un talent original, comme Mme Sand, Mme Viardot, etc., on trouverait chez 
elles des parties génitales se rapprochant de l’homme, des clitoris un peu parents de nos verges” 
(“If an autopsy of such original women as Mrs Sand and Mrs Viardot, etc., had been performed, 
it would have shown genital organs more similar to those of a man, a clitoris much like our 
penis”) (197). Other critics, however, depicted a more amalgamate collection of physical 
attributes. In his 1905 publication, Le mensonge du féminisme (The Sham of Feminism), 
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Théodore Joran recounts the opinion of his friend, Léon H., who believed that “Georges [sic] 
Eliot avait le visage d’un homme, la tête énorme, les cheveux désordonnés, un gros nez, les 
lèvres épaisses, les moustaches bien prononcées, les mâchoires volumineuses, le visage 
chevalin” (“George Eliot had the appearance of a man, a large head, unruly hair, a large nose, 
thick lips, a noticeable mustache, a square jawline, and a horselike face”), and that “George Sand 
avait la voix d’un homme et portait volontiers le costume masculin” (“George Sand had the 
voice of a man and readily donned masculine clothing”) (403). He also believed that “Mme de 
Staël avait le visage (ajoutons-y: et le style) d’un homme” (“Mme de Staël had the appearance 
(and let’s not forget: the style) of a man”), and concluded that “Presque toutes les femmes 
géniales de l’Amérique et de l’Angleterre en ces dernières années avaient la mandibule forte 
comme l’homme” (“In recent years, almost all of the brilliant women of North America and 
England have had the strong jawline of a man”) (403). His depiction of such supposed 
“monsters” recalls the more common definition of the term, which the Trésor describes as a 
“créature légendaire, mythique, dont le corps est composé d’éléments disparates empruntés à 
différents êtres réels, et qui est remarquable par la terreur qu’elle inspire” (“mythical creature 
inspiring terror, whose body is comprised of disparate elements borrowed from other beings”) 
(“Monstre” 1030). While she did not quite inspire terror, the “type” that came to depict women 
authors and poets in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries monstrously combined – in the 
eyes of male critics – seemingly incongruous attributes and qualities that belonged to two 
distinctly different “espèces” (“species”) – the masculine man and the feminine woman.   
As Planté observes, these hybrid creatures became increasingly frequent in the 
intellectual discourses of the Third Republic, a frequency witnessed by a proliferation of 
different names used to designate them:    
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Pour résister à la confusion qui s’instaure en eux-mêmes et exorciser le danger de 
brouillage, les polémistes recourent à la magie des noms, et ne tarissent pas d’invention 
verbale pour désigner et flétrir, à la suite des bas-bleus, des viragos et des vieilles filles 
desséchées qui mènent cette sarabande infernale, les femmelins, les hommes-femmes, les 
travestis, les invertis, les Chérubins et filles-pages, les prodigieuses coquettes et les 
vieilles coureuses de sabbat du romantisme. (Petite sœur 111-12) 
 
(In order to combat the confusion created by these women and to exorcize the danger of 
their categorical transgressions, polemicists turned to the magic of naming, and the well 
did not run dry when it came to their verbal creativity in designating and debasing, after 
the blue stockings, the viragos and dried up spinsters that conducted this infernal song 
and dance, the femlings, the women-men, the cross-dressers, the sexual inverts, the 
cherubs and page-girls, the prodigious coquettes and the old witches of romanticism.) 
 
 
This phenomenon was part of a widespread increase in discourses related more generally to “the 
third sex.” While “l’idée d’un troisième sexe transcendant les genres traverse et hante toutes les 
époques, sans exception” (“the notion of a gender-transgressing third sex spanned and haunted 
every era, without exception”), notes Laure Murat, “Le siècle compris entre 1835 et 1939, si 
prodigue en figures nouvelles, discours et théories, aura constitué l’un des chapitres les plus 
bavards et les plus prometteurs de son histoire : entre ces deux dates, le troisième sexe a été 
inventé et s’est inventé en tant que sujet” (“the century stretching from 1835 to 1939, prolific in 
its production of new identities, discourses and theories, constitutes one of the most verbose and 
auspicious chapters in the history of the third sex: between these two dates, the third sex was 
invented – and invented itself – as a subject”) (397-98). And along with this invention emerged 
the conception of the woman poet as a particular type of individual. Writing in the most 
masculine genre of the already masculine literary domain, the femme poète constituted, for 
nineteenth-century French society, an especially monstrous individual in several senses of the 
term, from indecent exhibitionist to incoherent anomaly to amalgamate hybrid creature. As a 
result, she occupied a position of otherness similar to that of previously mentioned poet types – 
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an otherness with respect to the laws of society, its norms, mores, and ideologies. But she also 
occupied a position of otherness regarding the so-called laws of nature, with her existence lying 
somewhere outside nature’s apparently inviolable organization into two distinct sexes and 
genders. Queerness can be found in these positions of “monstrous other,” which open up a space 
of incoherence and hybridity, of combinations and misalignments of distinct sexes and their 
correspondingly distinct gender roles. 
Such combinations of masculine and feminine gender qualities were not always 
considered monstrous, however. This honorable qualification was reserved for the woman poet. 
For the male poet in the nineteenth century, incorporating feminine qualities into his male 
subjectivity was the sign of a quintessentially Romantic genius. In a 1907 article about Anna de 
Noailles’s Les éblouissements, Proust compares Anna de Noailles to a male poet depicted in one 
of Gustave Moreau’s paintings. Describing this painting, Proust remarks:   
 
 […] on se demande, à le bien regarder, si ce poète n’est pas une femme. Peut-être 
Gustave Moreau a-t-il voulu signifier que le poète contient en lui toute l’humanité, doit 
posséder les tendresses de la femme ; […] S’il avait voulu peindre son poète à notre 
époque et dans nos pays et l’entourer cependant d’une beauté précieuse, il aurait été 
obligé d’en faire une femme. Même en Orient, d’ailleurs, même en Grèce, il s’y est 
souvent décidé. Alors, c’est une poétesse qu’il nous montre […]. (534-35) 
 
([…] one wonders, when looking carefully, if this poet is not in fact a woman. Perhaps 
Gustave Moreau wished to signify that the poet embodies all of humanity, and therefore 
must also possess the tenderness of a woman; […] If he had wanted to depict this poet in 
our own time and place, while still surrounding him with precious beauty, he would have 
been obliged to make him a woman. Even when set in the Orient, incidentally, or even 
when set in Greece, his poet is often depicted as such. It is, then, a poetess that he 
presents us with […].) 
 
 
Proust does not elaborate on this conception of the poet as an ideal combination of both man and 
woman, beyond remarking that Anna de Noailles, as a female poet, has the advantage of 
incorporating her own feminine beauty into her poetry, as opposed to depicting the beauty of a 
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separate object, such as a muse. As he remarks, she is “à la fois l’auteur et le sujet de ses vers” 
(“both the author and the subject-matter of her verse”) (536). But he does consider the 
significance of such a sexually ambiguous representation of the poet: “Je ne sais si Gustave 
Moreau a senti combien, par une conséquence indirecte, cette belle conception du Poète-femme 
était capable de renouveler un jour l’économie de l’œuvre poétique elle-même” (“I do not know 
if Gustave Moreau was aware of the extent to which, by indirect consequence, this beautiful 
conception of the Woman-Poet would one day revitalize the economy of the poetic work itself”) 
(535). His crediting the poet’s gender androgyny with the renewal of poetry itself no doubt refers 
to the remarkable revitalization of the lyric tradition at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
where the Romantic poet figure adopted and exploited particularly feminine qualities.  
In The Gendered Lyric, Gretchen Schultz addresses the literary combination of qualities 
deemed masculine and feminine over the course of the nineteenth century, particularly in the 
Romantic, Parnassian, and Symbolist movements. She remarks that Romanticism, which 
launched lyric poetry’s revival at the beginning of the century, was curiously linked with cultural 
concepts of femininity, which Parnassian poetry would later counter with a more virile ideal. 
This Romantic femininity stemmed from the aesthetics of spontaneity and emotive effusion 
articulated by Germaine de Staël, one of the founders of French Romanticism.7 And it was 
elaborated in the movement’s incorporation of qualities such as sentimentality, fecundity, 
fluidity, and diffusion.8 Writing within such an aesthetic, the male poet was often seen to 
 
7 See Madame de Staël, De l’Allemagne, edited by Simone Balayé. Garnier-Flammarion, 1968, 
particularly Chapiter X “De la poésie” and Chapter XI “De la poésie classique et de la poésie 
romantique,” pp. 205-214. 
 
8 See Gretchen Schultz, The Gendered Lyric. Purdue University Press, 1999, particularly 
Chapters 1 and 6, for examples of these qualities. 
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embody these feminine qualities in a sort of hybrid nature, both genius and sentimental, beholder 
of both worldly knowledge and intimate subjectivity. In this sense, as Schultz has observed, “the 
Romantics participated in a historical moment that reimagined the author as one having access to 
a wide range of gendered attributes” (21).   
At the same time, the literary tradition also rediscovered Sappho as a poetic figure. 
Sappho has appeared on and off in French literature from about the mid sixteenth century 
through the twenty-first century. And literary and cultural representations of her have ranged 
from lover of women, to lover of men, to chaste virgin, to prostitute, to teacher.9 In Fictions of 
Sappho 1546-1937 (1989), Joan DeJean traces the evolution of Sapphic fictions in French 
literature throughout these periods, noting that, “In the course of the nineteenth century in 
France, Sappho leaves behind the often modest and always timid heterosexuality in which she 
had been disguised for nearly a century to reemerge as a figure of highly charged sexuality, first 
a courtesan, later a (sometimes depraved, sometimes oversexed) lesbian” (13). While the 
reemergence of Sappho as a poet of deviant female sexuality can be attributed to several factors, 
one important reason is the “otherness” that such a figure represented to contemporary male 
authors and poets.10 In DeJean’s opinion, “Historically, the most influential fictions of Sappho 
and her poetry have been conceived by those male authors somehow able to identify with the 
original woman writer, to succeed in a special variant of what Froma Zeitlin calls ‘playing the 
other,’ in this case, re-voicing a most problematic other: a woman who wrote of a woman’s 
desire for women” (7-8).   
 
9 See Catharine Stimpson’s foreword to Joan DeJean’s Fictions of Sappho, particularly page xiv, 
for an overview of Sappho’s various depictions throughout history. 
 
10 See Gretchen Schultz, Sapphic Fathers. University of Toronto Press, 2014, particularly 
Chapter 1, for a discussion of this phenomenon. 
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So how does this otherness of the Sapphic poet figure relate to poetic manifestations of 
queerness? Initially, and most obviously, given the evolution of Sappho’s representation, a poet’s 
identification with the poet figure during this period came to entail an identification with a 
person of queer sexuality in a legitimized literary context. Paul Verlaine perhaps put it most 
concisely in his “Ballade Sappho” (“Sappho Ballad”) by ending each stanza and refrain with the 
declaration, “Je suis pareil à la grande Sappho” (“I am just like the great Sappho”): 
 
Ma douce main de maîtresse et d’amant 
Passe et rit sur ta chère chair en fête, 
Rit et jouit de ton jouissement. 
Pour la servir tu sais bien qu’elle est faite. 
Et ton beau corps faut que je le dévête 
Pour l’enivrer sans fin d’un art nouveau 
Toujours, dans la caresse toujours prête. 
Je suis pareil à la grande Sappho. (lines 1-8) 
 
(My gentle hand of mistress and lover 
Flows and laughs over your cherished skin 
Laughs and enjoys your own delectation. 
To serve you, for this you know it was made. 
And your beautiful body I must unclothe  
To intoxicate it fully with an art always new  
Always ready and willing, and quick to caress. 
I am just like the great Sappho.) 
 
 
As this first stanza suggests, however, Verlaine’s identification with Sappho was not limited to 
questions of queer sexuality; it was also linked to a more aesthetic concept, underlined by the 
stanza’s rhyme scheme, which pairs the “la grande Sappho” (“the great Sappho”) with “un art 
nouveau” (“a new art”).   
 In order to consider this more aesthetic relation between Sappho and a new form of art, a 
closer look at Charles Baudelaire’s treatment of the Sapphic poet figure proves useful. 
Baudelaire was the first of the period’s poets to shape Sappho’s emergence as a primarily lesbian 
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figure. According to DeJean, “Baudelaire’s portrait of Sappho is most striking because, alone 
among contemporary men of letters, he makes her Sapphic. And this homosexual Sappho is the 
key to Baudelaire’s redefinition of literary lesbianism” (271). His three long poems treating the 
subject of Sapphic sexuality form one of the earliest sections of his 1857 Fleurs du Mal (Flowers 
of Evil), a collection whose original title, incidentally, was Les lesbiennes (The Lesbians). But 
beyond Baudelaire’s inclusion of such Sapphic figures into his poetry, it is his poetic 
identification with Sappho and her fellow inhabitants of Lesbos that reveals a much more 
intricate connection between the poetic and the lesbian identity.  
In “Lesbos,” the first of Baudelaire’s three “lesbian poems,” the poet depicts the island of 
Lesbos as a locus of exotic voluptuousness. But he also describes it as a place of sadness and 
regret as it laments the suicide of its inhabitant, Sappho, who threw herself into the ocean after 
having blasphemously offered her body to a man. The first seven stanzas of the text form an 
extended apostrophe to the island itself, but in the eighth stanza, the poet introduces his own 
presence into the text through the pronoun “nous” (“us”). After asking which of the gods could 
possibly condemn Sappho, the poet asks more generally: 
 
Que nous veulent les lois du juste et de l’injuste ? 
Vierges au cœur sublime, honneur de l’archipel, 
Votre religion comme une autre est auguste, 
Et l’amour se rira de l’Enfer et du Ciel ! 
Que nous veulent les lois du juste et de l’injuste ? (lines 36-40) 
 
(What do we care for the laws of right and wrong? 
Maidens of highest heart, pride of the land, 
As worthy as another’s is your creed, 
And love will laugh at Heaven and at Hell! 
What do we care for the laws of right and wrong?)11 
 
 
 
11 Translation by James McGowan. 
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By including himself among those who are subject to the laws of the “just” and “unjust,” the poet 
reveals that he is also familiar with such judgment, and he questions its legitimacy. He, along 
with the inhabitants of Lesbos, considers their “religion” as righteous as any, their heart as 
sublime, and the nature of love as indifferent to such places of judgment as Hell and Heaven.   
 Baudelaire further developed his identification with the lesbians of Lesbos in “Femmes 
damnées” (“Damned Women”). In this text, the poet does not mention Sappho specifically, but 
describes the troubled pleasure characterizing the experience of women who, like Sappho, love 
and live with other women. After describing the “douces langueurs” (“sweet languor”) and the 
“frissons amers” (“shudders of pain”) experienced by these Sapphic women, the poet ends the 
text with another apostrophe: 
 
Ô vierges, ô démons, ô monstres, ô martyrs, 
De la réalité grands esprits contempteurs, 
Chercheuses d’infini, dévotes et satyres, 
Tantôt pleines de cris, tantôt pleines de pleurs, 
 
Vous que dans votre enfer mon âme a poursuivies, 
Pauvres sœurs, je vous aime autant que je vous plains, 
Pour vos mornes douleurs, vos soifs inassouvies, 
Et les urnes d’amour dont vos grands cœurs sont pleins ! (lines 21-28) 
 
 
(O maidens, demons, monsters – martyrs all, 
Spirits disdainful of reality, 
Satyrs and seekers of the infinite, 
With rain of tears or cries of extasy, 
 
You whom my soul has followed to your hell, 
Poor sisters, let me pity and approve – 
For all your leaden griefs, for slakeless thirsts, 
And for your hearts, great urns that ache with love!)12 
 
 
 
12 Translation by James McGowan. 
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Described in this way, the Sapphic women appear to embody the same sense of otherness that 
serves to marginalize the poet figure of the nineteenth century.   
Like the poète maudit, these ostracized martyrs are also “damned,” living as monstrous 
others, alone on their island. Joan DeJean, commenting on Baudelaire’s representation of the 
Sapphic figure throughout the three poems, believes that this maudit quality contributes to the 
originality of his literary incorporation of Sappho: 
 
Baudelaire is the first French lyric poet to reject simple adaptation of the Sapphic 
original, à la Catullus or Ronsard, in favor of a highly original personal fiction of Sappho. 
He presents Sappho as the classical model for his ideal of modern heroinism: female 
mannishness (mascula Sappho), a woman devoting herself to intellectual creativity, a 
woman perpetually virginal because she refuses men access to her body. Such a woman 
was “lamentable,” was of necessity “damned,” that is, would, in his fiction of her, 
inevitably be ostracized.” (274) 
 
 
To this comment she adds: “That the ‘sublimity’ of Sapphic ‘sterility’ would be threatening to 
civic values was inevitable: the notes Baudelaire prepared for his lawyer for the 1857 trial about 
the Les fleurs du Mal’s obscenity reveal that it did not occur to him to try to contest this” (274). 
And so, by representing Sappho and her fellow inhabitants of Lesbos as “sublimely sterile,” as 
well as living apart in a colony for women, a fact which he knew to be threatening to civic 
values, Baudelaire depicts the Sapphic figure in terms reminiscent of the poète voyou (delinquent 
poet) as well, given the threats that this poet type poses to contemporary social structure and 
values. In her 2008 article, “Gender, Sexuality and the Poetics of Identification,” Gretchen 
Schultz comes to a similar conclusion regarding the otherness of Baudelaire’s Sappho. She notes 
that, “Ultimately, Baudelaire’s lesbian poetry permits an identification with what he saw to be 
the poet’s and the lesbian’s shared social and moral abjection, rather than with women or love 
for the same” (97).  
 59 
In “Lesbos,” however, Sappho appears closely linked not only with the otherness of the 
poet as maudit or voyou, but also with Baudelaire’s notion of voyance (poetic vision). And in this 
case, the poet’s identification with Sappho is, in fact, based on her specifically lesbian “love for 
the same.” After inserting himself into the poem through his use of the pronoun “nous” (“us”) 
and his questioning of the “lois du juste et de l’injuste” (“laws of the just and the unjust”), the 
poet continues in the next stanza: 
 
Car Lesbos entre tous m’a choisi sur la terre 
Pour chanter le secret de ses vierges en fleurs, 
Et je fus dès l’enfance admis au noir mystère 
Des rires effrénés mêlés aux sombres pleurs ; 
Car Lesbos entre tous m’a choisi sur la terre. (lines 41-45) 
 
(Since I am Lesbos’ choice from all on earth 
To sing the secret of her flowering maids, 
And I from childhood worshipped in the cult 
Of frenzied laughter mingled with somber tears –  
Since I am Lesbos’ choice from all on earth,)13 
 
 
As the speaker states, he, as poet, was admitted early on into the “noir mystère” (“dark mystery”) 
of the inhabitants’ woman-loving lifestyle on Lesbos. The dark mysteriousness attributed to this 
existence recalls the impenetrability and incomprehensibility that often shrouded female same-
sex relations during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially from the perspective 
of the desiring male gaze.14 Baudelaire’s characterization of the lesbian experience in this way 
recalls the literary period’s various characterizations of l’Inconnu (the Unknown): In “Femmes 
damnées” (“Damned Women”), Baudelaire refers to the lesbian women as “chercheuses d’infini” 
 
13 Translation by James McGowan. 
 
14 See Laure Murat. La Loi du genre. Paris: Fayard (2006), p. 326 for a discussion of this 
phenomenon in Marcel Proust’s La Recherche (In Search of Lost Time).  
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(“seekers of the expanse”) (line 23). And in “Femmes damnées: Delphine et Hippolyte” 
(“Damned Women: Delphine and Hippolyte”), after making love to Delphine, the young 
Hippolyte feels “un abîme béant” (“a gaping abyss”) (line 76) growing inside her, “profond 
comme le vide” (“deep as the void”) (line 77). In response to this reaction, the poet interjects, 
telling both women to plunge “au plus profond du gouffre” (“to the depths of the abyss”) (line 
87) and to flee “l’infini” (“the expanse”) (line 104) that they carry within them. It is in the poem 
“Lesbos,” however, that we see the poet penetrating the otherwise impenetrable abyss, void, or 
expanse of lesbian love. Not only is the poet admitted into the “dark mystery,” but, as he 
explains in the same stanza, he is chosen out of everyone else on Earth “pour chanter le secret de 
ses vierges en fleurs” (“to sing the secret of Lesbos’s virgins in bloom”). This ability to sing, or 
verbally interpret, the unspoken secret of Lesbos’s flowering virgins, the original flowers of evil, 
recalls the poetic ideal so longingly described in the last lines of “Élévation” (“Elevation”), 
where the poet imagines the happiness of the enlightened individual “qui plane sur la vie, et 
comprend sans effort / le langage des fleurs et des choses muettes!” (“who soars above life and 
understands with ease / the language of flowers and of speechless things”).   
The state of voyance depicted in “Élévation” is reinforced in the imagery of “Lesbos” as 
well. After describing his admission into the mystery of female same-sex love, which has given 
him the ability to sing the secret of this existence, the poet continues in the next stanza: 
 
Et depuis lors je veille au sommet de Leucate, 
Comme une sentinelle à l’œil perçant et sûr, 
Qui guette nuit et jour brick, tartane ou frégate, 
Dont les formes au loin frissonnent dans l’azur ; 
Et depuis lors je veille au sommet de Leucate, (lines 46-50) 
 
(I spend my time on watch from Leucas’ peak, 
A sentinel with sure and piercing eye, 
Who searches night and day for sail or hull, 
 61 
The distant forms that tremble in the blue; 
I spend my time on watch from Leucas’ peak)15 
 
 
Like the skylark of “Élévation” that hovers over the land, effortlessly seeing and interpreting all 
that lies below, the poet in “Lesbos” also becomes all-seeing, describing himself as a sentinel 
with clear and certain vision, who oversees the vast azure of the surrounding sea from high 
above, on the summit of Leucadia. And it is his identification with a specifically lesbian 
representation of the poet figure Sappho that facilitates his approach to such a poetic ideal.   
  
 
15 Translation by James McGowan.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE LYRIC “I” 
 
In “Critically Queer” (1993), Judith Butler argues that “there is no ‘I’ who stands behind 
discourse and executes its volition or will through discourse” (18). Subjectivity is discursively 
produced, and for this reason, the subject is shaped by the constraints of language, which 
precedes and conditions its social recognition (18). “Where there is an ‘I’ who utters or speaks 
and thereby produces an effect in discourse,” explains Butler, “there is first a discourse which 
precedes and enables that ‘I’ and forms in language the constraining trajectory of its will” (18).  
How, then, does one succeed in forging a new trajectory, one that enables, for example, the 
formation and expression of a queer subjectivity?   
Butler points to the opportunity created by the “instability and incompleteness of subject-
formation” (18). Performed through the compulsive repetition of discursive norms, subject-
formation remains an on-going process and implies the impossibility “of ever fully inhabiting the 
name by which one’s social identity is inaugurated and mobilized” (18). This impossibility 
constitutes a weakness in the discursive norm. And this weakness can be worked – that is to say, 
exploited for its queer potential. In order to work the weaknesses inherent in discursive subject-
formation, Butler proposes a form of “discursive resignification,” through which certain norms 
of language can be “redeployed, twisted, queered from prior usage,” much like the strategic 
appropriation and resignification of the term “queer,” itself (19). In this sense, the constraining 
effects of discourse “mark at once the limits of agency and its most enabling conditions,” since 
the norms that shape the expression and identity of the subject are subject themselves to a 
strategic re-appropriation and re-articulation, a process that can lead to their eventual 
resignification (20). As Butler concludes, “The resignification of norms is thus a function of their 
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inefficacy, and so the question of subversion, of working the weakness in the norm, becomes a 
matter of inhabiting the practices of its rearticulation” (26).   
Can a subversive re-articulation of lyric norms forge a new trajectory within poetic 
discourse, one that enables the formation of a queer subjectivity and the expression of a queer 
desire? The lyric tradition, whose oldest and most defining feature is perhaps the centrality of the 
first-person pronoun – the so-called “lyric ‘I’” – has a particularly constraining effect on the 
poetic subject that it precedes and conditions. Centuries of discursive repetition have shaped this 
lyric “I,” which, by the nineteenth century, can be safely assumed to represent a cisgender, 
masculine, heterosexual subject. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
however, certain poets succeed in destabilizing this normative conception of the lyric “I” by 
working particular weaknesses in its norms. This section will explore such poets’ subversive re-
articulations of the first-person pronoun in various contexts and consider the queering effects of 
such a destabilized lyric “I.”  
 
Section 1: The Autobiographical Lyric “I” 
 
In the poem, “Two Loves,” written by Lord Alfred Douglas in 1892, the poet makes 
reference to a “love that dare not speak its name,” a phrase that has since been adopted as a 
euphemism for homosexual love. It was made famous by Oscar Wilde’s trial, during which the 
prosecutor attempted to prove Wilde’s homosexuality by asking him to explain what was meant 
by the expression and to give his reaction to Lord Alfred’s poem as a whole. Despite Wilde’s 
eloquently phrased response, his ultimate conviction and imprisonment for gross indecency on 
account of his relations with Lord Alfred Douglas reveals one of many reasons why such love 
would dare not speak its name. Male homosexuality remained a crime in Britain throughout the 
nineteenth century and the majority of the twentieth century. It was not decriminalized in 
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England and Wales until 1967, and in Scotland until 1980.16 In France, same-sex relations were 
decriminalized much sooner, with the new penal code of 1791. But as Laure Murat notes in La 
loi du genre (The Law of Gender), same-sex relations, especially between men, remained in the 
opinion of the public and the police, “la plus ignoble des passions” (“the most revolting of 
passions”) and a threat to societal structure and mores (27-28). And in the literary domain, this 
legal and social condemnation of homosexuality found an equally powerful effector in the 
period’s predilection for literary censure.  
How, then, does one speak of a love that, for various reasons, dare not speak its name? 
This question becomes especially pertinent for lyric poets, whose literary form, which is centered 
on intimate expressions of the self and the self’s desires, so directly implicates its author in any 
such expressions. As Ross Chambers remarks in his 2004 article, “Four Ways to Meddle with 
Subjectivity,” the lyric poem has historically been, and often continues to be, governed by the 
assumptions of autobiography. He refers to what he calls the “lyric pact,” where “an equivalence 
is assumed between the identity of the poet, as the agent responsible for writing the poem, and 
that of the lyric subject that is produced by the language of the poem […] as the ‘I’ who speaks 
in the poem” (220). This perceived transparency between the lyric “I” and the poet-author can be 
traced back to the poetry of the Renaissance, where Petrarch’s sonnets or Ronsard’s odes, for 
example, were considered deeply personal expressions of the poets’ own feelings and desires 
(Whidden 38-39).   
With the emergence of the Romantic movement in France, the autobiographical nature of 
the lyric “I” was actively promoted as a defining feature of lyric poetry. As literary critic Mme 
 
16 See Jeffrey Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain from the Nineteenth Century 
to the Present. Quartet Books, 1990, p. 11. See also Jeffrey Weeks, Sex, Politics and Society: 
The Regulation of Sexuality since 1800. Routledge, 1981, pp. 106-109. 
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de Staël notes in De l’Allemagne (1839), “La poésie lyrique s’exprime au nom de l’auteur même 
; ce n’est plus dans un personnage qu’il se transporte, c’est en lui-même qu’il trouve les divers 
mouvements dont il est animé” (“Lyric poetry is the direct expression of the author himself; he 
no longer speaks through the words of a character, having discovered within himself the various 
modulations that animate him”) (206). Poets also frequently alluded to such a characteristic. 
Lamartine, in the 1849 preface to his Méditations, distances himself from previous lyric 
conventions when he famously declares: “Je suis le premier qui ai fait descendre la poésie du 
Parnasse, et qui ai donné à ce qu’on nommait la muse, au lieu d’une lyre à sept cordes de 
convention, les fibres mêmes du cœur de l’homme” (“I am the first to have dismounted poetry 
from its Parnassian summit, and to have given our so-called muse not the conventional seven 
strings of the lyre, but the very fibers of the human heart”) (145). The poet explains that when 
writing his Méditations, he endeavored to produce a deeply personal and individual literary 
work: “je m’exprimais moi-même pour moi-même” (“I was expressing myself for myself”), he 
states, adding that “Ce n’était pas un art, c’était un soulagement de mon propre cœur, qui se 
berçait de ses propres sanglots” (“It was not an art, it was a respite for my own heart, which 
soothed itself with its own tears”) (151). He claims that, for this reason, with the publication and 
first appearance of his Méditations, “le public entendit une âme sans la voir, et vit un homme au 
lieu d’un livre” (“the public heard a soul without seeing it, and saw a man instead of a book”) 
(151-52).   
The Romantic ideal of a truly subjective poetry is challenged in various ways over the 
course of the century, but the autobiographical assumption underlying the lyric’s use of the first-
person pronoun is never truly eliminated. Dominique Combe discusses the persistence of this 
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convention in comparison to the function of the first-person pronoun in other genres, such as 
prose: 
 
La poésie lyrique pose en définitive […] les mêmes problèmes que n’importe quel genre 
à la première personne – que le roman, en particulier : Du côté de chez Swann et Les 
Fleurs du mal sont composés à la première personne, sans pour autant ressortir à 
l’autobiographie. Il est aujourd’hui communément admis comme une évidence qu’un 
roman ou un récit écrit à la première personne n’a pas pour autant nécessairement une 
valeur autobiographique. La distinction méthodologique fondamentale de la narratologie 
est ainsi celle du narrateur et de l’auteur, et l’usage de la première personne ne constitue 
aucunement une garantie d’« authenticité », c’est-à-dire de référentialité, et peut 
s’inscrire dans le cadre de la fiction. On peut donc se demander pourquoi, dans le cas de 
la poésie lyrique, aujourd’hui encore, le lecteur continue spontanément à identifier le 
sujet de l’énonciation au poète comme personne. (52) 
 
(Ultimately, when it comes to first-person narration, lyric poetry poses the same problems 
as any other genre – as the novel, in particular: Swann’s Way and The Flowers of Evil are 
written in the first person, but they do not for that reason constitute autobiographies. It is 
considered self-evident nowadays that a novel or a text written in first person does not for 
that reason carry any autobiographical value. The fundamental methodological distinction 
of narratology is therefore the separation of narrator and author, and the use of the first 
person provides no guarantee of “authenticity,” which is to say, of referentiality; it can be 
inscribed in the domain of fiction. And so one wonders why, in the case of lyric poetry, 
the reader continues to this day to automatically associate the subject of the enunciation 
with the poet as person.) 
 
 
Given the persistence and pervasiveness of the lyric’s autobiographical assumption, any poetic 
attempt to express, in the first person, a love that dare not speak its name, must negotiate and 
mitigate the implications of this assumption.   
 
Marcel Proust’s Referential Ambiguity 
 
In À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time) (1913-27), Marcel Proust 
thoroughly explores, through the use of a first-person narrator, the question of inversion as a 
sexuality and identity. But in addition to his monumental prose work, Proust has also produced a 
significant amount of poetry, some of which dates back to his adolescence and involves first-
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person expressions of queer desire. The majority of these queer poems were never intended for 
publication, and it is perhaps for this reason that their expressions of queer desire are at times 
much more explicitly and passionately declared than any such expressions in his great novel. A 
concise example is Proust’s first known poem, which he wrote in 1888 when he was 17 years 
old, and which he dedicated to Daniel Halévy, his classmate at the time: 
 
Pédérastie 
 
Si j’avais un gros sac d’argent d’or ou de cuivre 
Avec un peu de nerf aux reins lèvres ou mains 
Laissant ma vanité – cheval, sénat ou livre, 
Je m’enfuirais là-bas, hier, ce soir ou demain 
 
Au gazon framboisé – émeraude ou carmin ! –  
Sans rustiques ennuis, guêpes, rosée ou givre 
Je voudrais à jamais coucher, aimer ou vivre 
Avec un tiède enfant, Jacques, Pierre ou Firmin. 
 
Arrière le mépris timide des Prud’hommes ! 
Pigeons, neigez ! Chantez, ormeaux ! blondissez, pommes ! 
Je veux jusqu’à mourir aspirer son parfum ! 
 
Sous l’or des soleils roux, sous la nacre des lunes 
Je veux … m’évanouir et me croire défunt 
Loin du funèbre glas des Vertus importunes ! 
 
 
(Pederasty 
 
If I had money from a boundless mint 
and sinew enough in hands, lips, loins, 
I’d shun the vanity of politics and print, 
and leave – tomorrow? No, tonight! – for lawns 
 
luminous with artificial green 
(without the rustic flaws of frost and vermin), 
where I’d forever be sleeping with one 
warm child or other: François, Firmin? … 
 
For what is manly mockery to me? 
Let Sodom’s apples burn, acre by acre, 
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I’d savor still the sweat of those sweet limbs! 
 
Beneath a solar gold, a lunar nacre, 
I’d … languish (an ars moriendi of my own), 
deaf to the knell of dreary Decency!)17 
 
 
Even though the poem was written at the end of the nineteenth century, it is strongly reflective of 
Romantic themes and images. Its idealization of a rustic nature retreat, free from the constraints 
of society, as well as its colorful expression of the poet’s intense emotions and desires, reflect 
some typical Romantic and lyric characteristics. Of course, what differentiates the poem from 
conventional Romantic and lyric themes is the confession of a particularly queer romantic and 
erotic desire. The poet (whether or not he can be conflated with Proust) reveals himself as 
masculine through his use of the adjective “défunt” (“dead”) in line 13, and he rather clearly 
states in the second quatrain his desire to forever sleep with, make love with, or live with the 
warm body of a young man – a Jacques, Pierre, or Firmin. 
Reading “Pédérastie” in relation to Proust’s other first-person poems, however, reveals 
some incongruences in his use of the lyric “I.” These incongruences call into question the 
referential nature that relates the first-person pronoun to the poet, and the poet to the author. The 
following text provides an example. Like “Pederasty,” it also deals with the subject of 
homosexuality, but in a less personal and more humorous way. Harold Augenbraum speculates 
in his editorial notes that the poem could be alluding to Russia’s dominance over Bulgaria 
through reference to the rumored homosexuality of Ferdinand de Bulgarie (304): 
 
On prétend qu’un russien, digne que Dieu le garde, 
Sut éveiller encor un dernier sentiment 
(En y laissant son corps glisser jusqu’à la garde) 
Au cul pourtant tanné du pauvre Ferdinand. 
 
17 Translation by Richard Howard. 
 69 
 Que la flamme éparpille et arde 
 Jusqu’à ma dernière harde 
 J’évoquerais si j’étais barde 
 Devant une foule hagarde 
 L’inimaginable instrument 
Plus dur en vérité qu’un métal de Dinant 
Plus pressé qu’un foireux qui tarde 
 Plus léger qu’un flocon qu’on carde 
 Cinglant plus fort qu’une nasarde 
 L’insensible paroi qu’il larde, 
 Y virant comme une guimbarde, 
 Tel le bateau lorsqu’il embarde 
 Et le frôlant plus tendrement 
 Que telle lèvre papelarde, 
Le tout sans réveiller le moine Ferdinand. 
Pourtant au sein d’un songe il crut qu’il sentait là 
Le membre aimé jadis de … d’Antoine Sala 
Ô souvenir exquis de la vingtième année 
Il pressait d’un doigt lourd cette verge veinée 
Que le sperme argentait comme un ruisseau d’avril 
« Veux-tu que je t’enfile Antoine », ainsi dit-il. 
Répondit en chrétien le fils de Coralie : 
Je ne veux qu’un échange, Ô toi (…) 
Tu me (…) à l’Infante Elchie. 
 
(They say a Russian, may God preserve his soul, 
Managed to rouse a flutter of sensation 
In Ferdinand’s leathery, tanned, and well-worked hole 
By slipping in up to the hilt his brave baton. 
 May fire consume to ash and coal 
 My last rags and belongings all: 
 If I were a poet, I would tell 
 To a wide-eyed crowd the marvel 
 Of this flabbergasting tool 
Harder, I swear, than Dinant’s well-forged iron, 
Malingering like a coward from his battalion, 
Lighter than fluffy carded wool, 
Lashing that insensate wall 
It greases harshly with its drool, 
Swiveling there like an ancient wagon 
Or tilting like a heeling yawl 
And brushing it more tenderly than 
A touch from the lips of a cardinal. 
 All this without waking monkish Ferdinand. 
 Yet in dream he thought he was feeling – ooh la la! –  
 The once-beloved member of – Antoine Sala. 
 70 
 O exquisite memory of his twentieth year 
 When he pressed that veiny want with heavy finger 
 And spurted out silver sperm like an April brook. 
 “Shall I screw you now, Antoine?” ’Twas thus he spoke. 
 To hear that good Christian, Coralie’s son, reply: 
 “I want only one exchange, Ferdinand --- i.e.: 
 that you --- me to the Infanta Elchie.”)18 
 
 
The poem provides an interesting example of Proust’s use of homosexuality as a source of 
mockery. But with respect to the question of the lyric “I,” lines 7-9 stand out: “J’évoquerais si 
j’étais barde / Devant une foule hagarde / l’inimaginable instrument” (“If I were a bard, I would 
tell / To a wide-eyed crowd the marvel / Of this flabbergasting tool”). This peripheral statement 
suddenly throws into question the identity of both the speaking “I” and the poet, as well as their 
relation to Proust as author. Does the use of the imperfect tense (“If I were a bard”) imply that 
the speaker is not in fact a poet? The continuation of the poem seems to contradict this 
hypothetical statement as the “I” does, in fact, go on to evoke the instrument, in great detail, for 
the next seven or eight lines: “Plus dur en vérité qu’un métal de Dinant […] tel le bateau 
lorsqu’il embarde” (“Harder, I swear, than Dinant’s well-forged iron […] Or tilting like a heeling 
yawl”) (lines 10-16). Do these lines imply that it is Proust, rather than the “I,” who is not a poet? 
Where is the poet in this poem? Or who is the poet? Or rather, who is the “I”? 
 In another of Proust’s texts, the first-person pronoun is feminine. Presented as a prose 
poem, it begins with the paragraph: 
  
Pourquoi j’aime tant les chèvrefeuilles ? C’est parce que mon bien-aimé a planté un 
chèvrefeuille, sous la fenêtre de ma chambre afin qu’à mon réveil la grisante odeur de ses 
fleurs me dise : « Toute la nuit les pensées de ton bien-aimé n’ont cessé d’exhaler vers toi 
leur plus doux parfum d’amour. » 
 
 
18 Translation by Rosanna Warren. 
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(Why do I so love the honeysuckle? It is because my beloved has planted a honeysuckle 
under my bedroom window so that when I wake, the intoxicating smell of its flowers will 
say to me: “All night long, the thoughts of your beloved have ceaselessly exhaled to you 
their sweetest scent of love.”)19 
 
 
Each successive verse begins with a similar question referring to different kinds of flowers and is 
followed by an explanation recounting the suffering and eventual suicide of the male lover who 
offered them. The poem ends with the following stanza: 
 
Non, mon cœur ne lui a jamais appartenu quoique le sien fut bien à moi.  Mon cœur 
n’appartiendra jamais à personne et je ne sais seulement si j’ai un cœur ; mais je sais bien 
qu’aucun amour ne saura prendre ma vie car je suis une honnête petite femme ; une 
honnête petite femme ne doit pas aimer : elle doit faire rire, pleurer et mourir les autres : 
mais son cœur à elle doit ignorer toute souffrance.   
 
(No, my heart never belonged to him, though his heart was certainly mine. My heart will 
never belong to anyone and I don’t even know if I have a heart; but I know well that no 
love will be able to take my life because I am a decent little woman; a decent little 
woman does not have to love: she must make others laugh, cry, and die: but her own 
heart must be unacquainted with all suffering.)20 
 
 
In his editorial note, Harold Augenbraum indicates that, “At the end of this prose poem 
Proust noted ‘H. Heine trad. M. P.’,” to which he adds, “An endnote in the Francis and Gontier 
collection says that ‘this piece was translated from a German version at the Lycée Condorcet.’”  
Augenbraum also explains that “Fortini omits it from his Italian translation because ‘it seems to 
be a translation from Heine.’” He concludes the editorial note by stating: “I have not been able to 
locate anything in Heine that approximates it” (280). The only indication that this poem is a 
translation of another text seems to be Proust’s endnote referencing H. Heine. If it is a 
translation, however, this raises a different set of questions regarding Proust’s relation to the text:  
 
19 Translation by Lydia Davis. 
20 Translation by Lydia Davis. 
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What about this particular poem makes Proust copy it out and translate it into his own words? 
Does he identify with it in some way? If so, could it be in terms of his own understanding of 
homosexuality as inversion, where a gay man is, in a sense, a woman on the inside?21 Or could it 
be a “straight” identification with the male lover, who is in turn imagining and bitterly 
ventriloquizing the thoughts of an indifferent woman? In any case, presented as a poetic text, 
there is no narrative framework to contextualize the poem’s discursive act and to situate the 
poem’s “I.” Once again, Proust’s relation to the first-person pronoun cannot simply be read in 
accordance with the genre’s autobiographical assumption. 
 Proust is by no means the first or only poet to have written with a lyric “I” whose referent 
is not clearly the poem’s author. In “La pipe,” for example, Baudelaire writes with an “I” that 
belongs to an author’s pipe, which in turn describes the thoughts and feelings of its author, who 
takes up the position of object in this literary dynamic. And the more definitively Romantic poet, 
Victor Hugo, also produced quite a few poems that call into question the identity and nature of 
the lyric “I.” In the first poem of his “Livre Lyrique” (“Lyric Book”) in Les quatre vents de 
l’esprit (The Four Winds of the Spirit) (1881), the “I” equates itself with the poet, but also with 
various inanimate objects. This objectification occurs in contrast to the earthly phenomena, such 
as the thunder and darkness, which are in turn personified:   
 
Je suis fait d’ombre et de marbre. 
Comme les pieds noirs de l’arbre, 
Je m’enfonce dans la nuit. 
J’écoute ; je suis sous terre ;  
D’en bas je dis au tonnerre : 
Attends ! ne fais pas de bruit. 
 
Moi qu’on nomme le poëte, 
 
21 See Karl Ulrichs’s The Riddle of Man-Manly Love, in which he describes a homosexual man 
as “the soul of a woman in the body of a man.” 
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Je suis dans la nuit muette 
L’escalier mystérieux ; 
Je suis l’escalier Ténèbres ; 
Dans mes spirales funèbres 
L’ombre ouvre ses vagues yeux. 
 
[……………………………] (lines 1-12) 
 
 
(I am made of shadow and marble. 
Like the dark feet of the tree, 
I dig down into night. 
I listen; I am underground; 
And from there I say to the thunder: 
Just wait! Don’t make a sound. 
 
I whom others call the poet, 
I am in the night so silent 
The impenetrable staircase; 
I am the staircase of Darkness; 
In my funereal spiral, 
The shadow opens its hazy eyes.) 
 
 
Given the defining status of the autobiographical lyric “I” during the Romantic period, and the 
persistence of the autobiographical assumption in the lyric tradition, how does one explain the 
incongruences of the lyric “I” highlighted by such poems? In some ways, they might be 
considered weaknesses in the norm. In a Romantic or lyric tradition that promotes a truly 
subjective poetry, this ideal can only be maintained by overlooking these weaknesses. They can 
be read simply as exceptions, or, more particularly, explained away as examples of poetic license 
or as purely figurative representations. The very need for such explanations, however, hints at 
the idealized nature of this norm and the inefficacy that haunts it. 
Proust’s poetry constitutes a collection of texts that work these weaknesses. The 
incongruences in the nature and function of his lyric “I” create a certain ambiguity regarding its 
referential nature. This ambiguity undermines the autobiographical assumptions that would 
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otherwise underlie our readings, creating a space of plausible deniability for the author. What is 
to prevent the “I” in “Pédérastie,” for example, from also being read as a purely figurative 
representation of Proust, or as an imitation of someone else, or as the adoption of another 
perspective? Such plausible deniability is advantageous in mitigating the implications of the 
lyric’s autobiographical assumption, especially in articulations of a love that dare not speak its 
name.    
But in addition to the practical advantages of cultivating such ambiguity, Proust’s poetry 
reveals its more subversive effects. By cultivating the ambiguity surrounding the lyric’s first-
person pronoun, Proust destabilizes the ways in which we, as readers, make sense of poetic texts 
within the lyric tradition, as well as the ways in which we understand sexualities as distinct, pre-
determined subjectivities. The following poem, entitled “Je contemple souvent le ciel de ma 
mémoire” (“I Often Contemplate My Memory’s Skies”), provides an example of such queering 
effects. Despite the “je” (“I”) in the poem’s title, the first-person pronoun is consistently 
presented in its plural form, “nous” (“we”), throughout the body of the text. It is in large part the 
ambiguity concerning the referents of this “we” that destabilizes our interpretations of the poem 
and its subjectivity, as well as our conceptions of Proust’s identity and sexuality. Over the course 
of the following pages, I will trace the first-person pronoun throughout the poem, proposing 
possible readings of the text and revealing how these unstable readings change as the poem 
progresses.  
The text begins with the following two stanzas: 
 
Le temps efface tout comme effacent les vagues 
Les travaux des enfants sur le sable aplani 
Nous oublierons ces mots si précis et si vagues 
Derrière qui chacun nous sentions l’infini. 
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Le temps efface tout il n’éteint pas les yeux 
Qu’ils soient d’opale ou d’étoile ou d’eau claire 
Beaux comme dans le ciel ou chez un lapidaire 
Ils brûleront pour nous d’un feu triste ou joyeux.  
 
 
(Time erases all just as the waves 
Efface the children’s castles on the beach 
We’ll forget these words so precise, so vague 
Still sensing the infinite behind each. 
 
Time effaces all it does not erase the eyes 
Be they of star, clear water, or opal 
As rich in the skies or on the jeweler’s table 
They flame for us, joyous or sadly wise.)22 
 
 
Who is the “nous” (we) that will be forgetting “ces mots si précis et si vagues” (“these words so 
precise and so vague”), and remembering only “les yeux” (“the eyes”), whose memory will burn 
“d’un feu triste ou joyeux” (“as a solemn or joyous fire”)? Given the poet’s admiration of the 
eyes as a focal point of beauty and desire, in addition to the traditionally Romantic theme of 
tempus fugit, which is established by the anaphora “le temps efface tout” (“time erases 
everything”), we might assume the poem to be about the memory of lost love between the poet 
and the poet’s beloved (in the style of Alphonse de Lamartine’s “The Lake,” for example). In 
this sense, the poet as lover could be reassuring a beloved that although time erases everything, 
“il n’éteint pas les yeux” (“it does not dull the eyes”) and so the image of each other’s eyes will 
live on in each other’s memory. There are no contextual or grammatical indications in these 
stanzas as to the gender of the poet or of the assumed loved one, so it is not yet possible to 
determine much about the identity of these subjects composing the “we” and the nature of their 
relationship.   
 
22 Translation by Cole Swensen. 
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The ambiguity continues in the next two stanzas, which provide a description of the 
various eyes that remain in the poet’s memory: “Les uns joyaux volés de leur écrin vivant […] 
D’autres doux feux ravis encor par Prométhée” (“With some like gems snatched from their living 
casing […] And others soft fires still held by Prometheus”) (lines 4-8). As these lines reveal, 
there seems to be quite a lot of eyes burning in the poet’s memory, so it becomes less likely that 
the poem’s “we” implies a sort of reassuring pact between the poet and a current loved one. 
While the referents of the “we” remain uncertain, the next stanza in the poem does provide 
clarification with respect to the nature of these many lost loves. In this stanza, the poetic subject 
temporarily leaves the plural first person “we” to take up the singular first person “I” in an 
apostrophe to the shining eyes:  
 
Constellez à jamais le ciel de ma mémoire 
Inextinguibles yeux de celles que j’aimai 
Rêvez comme des morts, luisez comme des gloires 
Mon cœur sera brillant comme une nuit de Mai. 
 
(Constellate ever my memory’s skies 
Dream like the dead and gleam like the day 
To all whom I loved for your endless eyes 
My heart will shine like a night in May.)23 
 
 
As the use of the accentuated pronoun “celles” (“those” – grammatically feminine) indicates, the 
eyes of the poet’s past loves are the eyes of women, and only women. This of course raises 
several questions with respect to Proust’s sexuality and his relation to the lyric “I.” I will return 
to these issues after discussing the remaining stanzas of the poem, where additional readings of 
the poet’s subjectivity continue to emerge in relation to the ambiguity of the pronoun “we” and 
its referents.   
 
23 Translation by Cole Swensen. 
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This ambiguity becomes particularly destabilizing in stanzas 7-9, which focus on the 
memory of two individual women. In the seventh stanza, the “we” now appears to encompass the 
poet and one of these women in a more personal scene, describing an intimate evening that the 
two spent together: 
   
Le temps efface tout l’intimité des soirs 
Mes deux mains dans son cou vierge comme la neige 
Ses regards caressants mes nerfs comme un arpège 
Le printemps secouant sur nous ses encensoirs. 
 
(Time erases the closeness of evening 
My hands on her neck as virgin as snow 
Her gaze down my nerves in an arpeggio 
As over us spring sets its censors swinging.)24 
 
 
The eighth stanza then provides a description of the second woman, who had eyes filled with 
mystery and sadness. By the ninth stanza, however, the reading of “nous” (“us”) as the poet 
referring to himself and a past lover no longer seems plausible. The first line of the stanza 
finishes up the description of the second woman, before the rest of the stanza returns to a 
reflection on the various eyes of past lovers in general: 
 
Et son cœur était vain comme un regard joyeux. 
D’autres comme la mer si changeante et si douce 
Nous égaraient vers l’âme enfouie en ses yeux 
Comme en ces soirs marins où l’inconnu nous pousse. 
 
(And her heart as empty as her look was gay 
Others as soft and shiftless as the sea 
Led us to soul in her eyes astray 
As through a maritime twilight, the unknown leads.)25 
 
 
 
24 Translation by Cole Swensen. 
25 Translation by Cole Swensen. 
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At this point, the referent of the “nous” (“us”) once again becomes less clear – a confusion 
compounded by the slippery syntax of the two middle lines. The poem’s subject no longer seems 
to be identifying as a lover recalling his relationship with a woman. Rather, this subject seems to 
be identifying with some other subject in relation to a woman. If it is not a woman, then, who is 
the other subject included with the poet in the pronoun “nous”– a “nous” that was led toward the 
soul hidden in the sea’s eyes and pushed along, like a boat in the wind, by the unknown? Another 
man, perhaps? Or as the allusion to the driving force of the “inconnu” (“unknown”) suggests, 
another poet? 
 The next stanza continues the maritime imagery as it describes this “nous” navigating a 
sea of eyes, driven by desire and forgetful of previous sufferings: “Le désir gonflait nos voiles si 
rapiécées / Nous partions oublieux des tempêtes passées” (“Desire launching our ragged sails 
aloft / Unminded of previous storms, we set off”) (lines 38-39). And the poem then concludes 
with the following three stanzas: 
 
Tant de regards divers, les âmes si pareilles 
Vieux prisonniers des yeux nous sommes bien déçus 
Nous aurions dû rester à dormir sous la treille 
Mais vous seriez parti même eussiez-vous tout su 
 
Pour avoir dans le cœur ces yeux pleins de promesses 
Comme une mer le soir rêveuse de soleil 
Vous avez accompli d’inutiles prouesses 
Pour atteindre au pays de rêve qui, vermeil, 
 
Se lamentait d’extase au-delà des eaux vraies  
Sous l’arche sainte d’un nuage cru prophète  
Mais il est doux d’avoir pour un rêve ces plaies 
Et votre souvenir brille comme une fête.  
 
 
(The gazes so varied, yet the souls all one. 
Old prisoners of eyes, we were roundly deceived 
We should have stayed under arbors, soundly asleep 
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Though had you known, you still would have gone 
 
To have such promising eyes in your heart 
Like an evening sea dreaming up the sun 
You’ve skillfully practiced your pointless arts 
To reach rosy lands of dreams that moan 
 
Beyond the true waters in ecstasy aloud 
Below the holy ark of a prophetic cloud 
How sweet, instead of dreams, these wounds laid bare 
And your memory blazing like country fair.)26 
 
 
Through Proust’s use of the past participle “parti” (“gone” – grammatically singular and 
masculine), the first of these concluding verses definitively reveals the other subject in the 
“nous” (“we”) to be a masculine individual. So, in what way is the poet or the “I” paired with 
him? As the other lines in the verse indicate, both subjects are disappointed or disillusioned 
prisoners of the eyes that burn as images in their memories. In this sense, they could be 
experienced suitors taunted and haunted by the remaining images of past women; they could be 
two young men who set out in search of love, or in pursuit of their desire, but who returned with 
only memories of ephemeral encounters.   
 At the moment that the “nous” (“we”) becomes clearer in its referents, however, the 
second of these stanzas shifts our concentration to the “vous” (“you” – grammatically singular 
and masculine) established in the previous stanza. In doing so, it implies that the poet is no 
longer talking about both of them collectively, but only about the other, masculine subject. This 
other subject alone has accomplished ultimately useless romantic exploits in order to reach the 
“pays de rêve” (“land of dreams”), since the speaker no longer seems to be including himself in 
these lines. The implication of a shared experience only returns in the second to last line of the 
 
26 Translation by Cole Swensen. 
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poem, where the impersonal “il” (“it”) of the observation, “Mais il est doux d’avoir pour un rêve 
ces plaies” (“But it is comforting to have such wounds as a dream”), seems to imply a general 
truth that the poet himself also understands. But the poem’s last line returns again to the singular 
pronoun “you,” as it remarks that this other subject’s own memory shines like a festive 
celebration. In this way, Proust concludes the text with a focus on the other subject’s experience, 
and not on the collective first-person experience of the “we” that he had been describing over the 
course of the poem.   
Given the insistent use of the plural first person throughout the poem, why conclude the 
text by splitting this collective pronoun into its two composing subjects? And why conclude the 
text by describing the memory of only the other person, rather than the memory of the “I” 
mentioned in the poem’s title, “Je contemple souvent le ciel de ma mémoire” (“I Often 
Contemplate My Memory’s Skies”)? Is there enough of an equivalence between the poet’s 
memory and the other subject’s memory to merit describing one for the other? Or rather, is there 
enough of a distinction between each of their memories to require separating the two? Answers 
to these questions ultimately depend on the nature of the poet’s relation to the other subject 
included in the “we.” And they ultimately lead to a consideration of how we as readers interpret 
this plural first person with respect to the text, the author, and the lyric tradition: As the 
progression of the poem reveals, the poet’s “I” is not functioning in a relation of desire to the 
corresponding “vous” as love object. It is instead functioning in a relation of identification with 
this “you.” So, what is the nature and extent of this identification? Given the masculine gender of 
the “vous,” the poet could be identifying with this other subject as a fellow man who also recalls 
the eyes of the beloved women he has pursued. Or, the poet could be identifying not simply with 
another man, or with men in general, but more particularly with another poet, or with poets in 
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general – poets who, in accordance with lyric norms, are expected to be heterosexual men. In this 
sense, the poem takes on another level of signification and becomes not only a poem about self 
and desire, but simultaneously a poem about the lyric tradition itself.   
This additional reading is reinforced through the poem’s imagery, themes, and 
intertextuality. The text does not express very specific individual sentiments or experiences of 
desire. The love objects are treated in an abstract sense, often in the plural, and the poet’s focus 
on their eyes seems to function more as a poetic metaphor than anything else, especially in their 
description as gems, clear water, or stars. With respect to the poem’s maritime imagery, the text 
reads at other times like a kind of epic recalling Homer. And at others still, it invokes additional 
historic poetic traditions, like the medieval trope of douce souffrance (sweet suffering) or mal 
d’amour (love sickness) in the second-to-last line. Similarly, regarding more specific instances of 
intertextuality, certain lines recall well-known expressions or imagery from other poets such as 
Proust’s influential model, Charles Baudelaire. In stanza 8, for example, Proust’s otherwise 
“joyeuse femme” (“joyous woman”) has eyes of sorrow “vastes et noirs” (“vast and dark”), 
recalling Baudelaire’s poem, “Harmonie du soir” (“Evening Harmony”), which describes “un 
cœur tendre, qui hait le néant vaste et noir” (“a gentle heart that hates the vast and dark 
oblivion”) (line 13), and whose last line, “Ton souvenir en moi luit comme un ostensoir” (“Your 
memory in me glistens like a monstrance”), reflects on the luminous force of memory, much like 
Proust’s last line, “Et votre souvenir brille comme une fête” (“And your memory glistens like a 
festive gala”). Through these conventional images and this intertextuality, Proust draws attention 
to the fact that his poem, like most poetry, is to a certain extent inevitably a citation of other 
poems. His recuperation of specific, recognizable lines by Baudelaire renders this fact more 
explicit, and his incorporation of historically poetic themes and imagery reminds us that he is 
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writing within a genre and a tradition that has been formed through the repetition of established 
norms.   
So how does Proust’s poetic subject fit into this tradition? In this particular poem, his 
ambiguous use of the plural first person “we” problematizes the question of poetic subjectivity 
and its function within such an imitative form and tradition. Writing with a “we,” Proust shows 
that he is including himself, and/or his poetic persona, in a collective poetic subjectivity. But 
perhaps the separation of this “we” into its discrete composing subjects – the “I” and the “you” – 
in the final stanzas, points to the limits of this collective experience and memory. The poem’s 
conclusion seems to show a deviation between the first-person subject and the other subject with 
which it was, until the final two stanzas, identifying. And it is this other individual’s subjectivity 
that is ultimately expressed by the poem, whose concluding lines focus not on the personal 
experience and personal memory of the poem’s “I,” as the title would imply, but solely on the 
experience and memory of this other subject with whom Proust’s poetic subject is inconsistently 
and ambiguously identifying.   
In a poem calling to the fore the inevitably imitative nature of the poetic genre and lyric 
tradition, this conclusion also highlights the similarly imitative nature of poetic subjectivity and 
the lyric “I.” Proust is writing within a tradition constructed through the accumulation of many 
first-person expressions of self and desire, which form a sort of collective poetic subjectivity.  
Much like the composition of his collective first person “we,” there is a poetic subject that exists 
already within lyric discourse, which Proust can either identify with or not. But in any case, it is 
this poetic subject that is ultimately articulated with every use of the lyric “I,” and Proust’s 
poetic subjectivity is formed through his repetition of this “I” and in accordance to its established 
norms. This fact recalls Judith Butler’s notion of subjectivity in discourse, a discourse that 
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“precedes and enables the ‘I,’ and forms in language the constraining trajectory of its will” 
(“Critically Queer” 18). When Proust produces a poetic text, he is writing or speaking with a 
first-person pronoun that is, according to theses lyric norms, the “I” of a male poet in relation to 
a female beloved.   
So how does one create or articulate a queer subjectivity from within such a tradition?  
Like the selection of poems above shows, one possibility could be to work the weaknesses in 
these norms by exploiting the ambiguities and incongruences surrounding the pronoun’s 
idealized transparent nature (in which the “I” refers to the speaker, poet, and author as one and 
the same). By accentuating the incongruences inevitably present in this idealized norm, an 
ambiguous use of the first-person pronoun can then exploit such weaknesses in order to facilitate 
a closeted expression of queer desire. The poetic subject of this desire deviates slightly from 
tradition, but this deviation could ultimately be explained away, much like other incongruences, 
as purely figurative representations, as the adoption of imagined perspectives, or as citations of 
another’s declarations, etc. But perhaps by writing more strictly and noticeably within this 
tradition, like he appears to do in this particular poem, Proust can work the weaknesses in the 
norm in a more subversive way to destabilize the nature and function of normative subjectivity 
altogether.   
Proust most noticeably adopts the conventional lyric “I” in stanza 5, which is the only 
stanza in which he writes with the singular first person “je,” rather than the plural “nous” or the 
“vous.” When he writes in this stanza, “Constellez à jamais le ciel de ma mémoire / 
Inextinguibles yeux de celles que j’aimai” (“Constellate forever the skies of my memory / 
Inextinguishable eyes of those that I loved”) (lines 17-18), the unavoidably feminine gender of 
the past beloveds (referred to with the grammatically feminine and plural “celles”) inevitably 
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raises the question: “Is this Proust’s ‘I’?” Of course, the primary reason this question presents 
itself is because such a first-person declaration of love for women seems incongruous with our 
modern-day conceptions of Proust as a gay subject. As a result, the stanza destabilizes the 
supposed logic of either lyric subjectivity or gay subjectivity, if not both. If we are to assume any 
level of lyric correlation between the author and an “I” who claims to have loved many women, 
we must reexamine not only Proust’s relation to the pronoun “I,” but also his relation to the 
category of “gay” and our conception of what that means.   
With respect to our conception of gay subjectivity, an attempt to make sense of stanza 5 
leads to several important considerations, starting very simply with the question: Was Proust 
gay? Could he have been bi? Could he have been gay at one time and straight at another? If he 
was gay, does that imply that he could not love women in any way? And if he in fact did not love 
women in any way, could he write as if he did? Perhaps a simpler form of this last question 
would be: If Proust did not love women in any way, why write as if he did? With respect to our 
conception of lyric subjectivity, this question is most easily answered by the fact that Proust is 
writing within a lyric tradition whose subject position is that of a male poet expressing desire for 
a female love object. Proust can either identify with or deviate from this subject, just as he does 
with the “vous” in the poem’s conclusion. And it is perhaps this act of identification that is 
shaping his expression of self and desire. As Judith Butler explains, if a performative use of 
language succeeds, “it is not because an intention successfully governs the action of speech, but 
only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the 
repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices (“Critically Queer” 19). For 
Proust’s poetic subject to be recognized as such, he must appear to write in accordance with the 
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lyric conventions that define it as a coherent male subjectivity in a relation of desire with a 
female beloved or beloveds.   
In appearing to do so, however, Proust inevitably calls into question the Romantic 
tradition’s transparent subject and its supposedly sincere and intimate expression of self and 
desire. As readers having established Proust as a gay subject, we cannot help but ask if he is 
being sincere in referencing his love for women, or if he is simply performing an obligatory role.  
And if he is in fact “simply” imitating a normative poetic subjectivity, does this matter? Or is all 
poetic subjectivity simply an imitation, a constantly rearticulated performance of norms? Is it 
possible to produce a truly sincere and intimate lyric expression of one’s self and desire? In this 
sense, Proust’s lyric “I” calls into question our conceptions of both gay subjectivity and lyric 
subjectivity. By working the weaknesses in the norms establishing the lyric “I” as a coherent and 
transparent subject, Proust succeeds in forging a new, queer trajectory for his poetic subject.  
This trajectory still exists within the conventions of the lyric, but it deviates enough to make us, 
as readers, question our conceptions of lyric and gay subjectivities, and in doing so, it opens up a 
space for queer subjectivity to emerge.   
 
Section 2: The Translated Lyric “I” 
 
 In Histoire des traductions en langue française: XIXe siècle (2012), Christine Lombez 
notes that the nineteenth century marks a pivotal point in the history of French poetic translation 
(438). “On y voit émerger de plus en plus nettement une réelle volonté de renouvellement de la 
part des poètes et des traducteurs, même si ce désir vient encore souvent se heurter aux réalités 
des traditions et de l’académisme” (“We witness, at this time, the increasingly distinct 
emergence of a spirit of renewal on the part of poets and translators, even if this interest still 
often finds itself at odds with traditional and academic practices”), she explains (438). As they 
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moved away from the tradition of imitation, poets of the period turned more and more frequently 
toward the project of literal and literary translation (349). René de Chateaubriand translated John 
Milton’s Paradise Lost into French; Gérard de Nerval produced his translation of Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe’s Faust, and both Charles Baudelaire and Stéphane Mallarmé became 
interested in translating the poetry of Edgar Allan Poe. In this section, I focus on three less 
frequently discussed translator-poets from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Renée 
Vivien, Pierre Louÿs, and Marceline Desbordes-Valmore. Each of these poets produced 
translated texts that stretch or challenge our conception of translation in different ways. I analyze 
how their respective use of transcreation, pseudo-translation, and auto-translation works the 
weaknesses inherent to certain translational norms in a way that reveals the potential of the 
translated lyric “I” to create space for queer subjectivity. 
 
Renée Vivien and Transcreation 
 
In 1903, Renée Vivien published the first edition of her collection of poems entitled 
Sapho. As the title’s subheading indicates, the collection is intended as a “Traduction nouvelle 
avec le texte grec” (“New Translation with the Greek Text”) – in other words, a new translation 
of Sappho’s lyric poetry, accompanied by the fragmentary remains of the Ancient poet’s 
compositions in their original Greek. At the beginning of the collection, Vivien also includes a 
short biography of Sappho, where she highlights how little we know of the Ancient poet, and 
provides a few facts gathered from other references regarding Sappho’s family members and her 
departure from the city of Mytilene for Sicily. As for the reason behind this departure, Vivien 
admits that we know nothing, but makes a point to stipulate that “Ce ne fut assurément point la 
poursuite de Phaon, comme l’assurent certains auteurs, qui détermina la Tisseuse de violettes à 
quitter les musiques et les sourires de Mytilène” (“It was assuredly not in pursuit of Phaon, as 
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certain authors would have us believe, that the Weaver of Violets left the smiles and music of 
Mytilene”) (ix). This is because, Vivien affirms, “Phaon n’est qu’un mythe créé par quelques 
écrivains d’après la tradition populaire” (“Phaon is nothing other than a myth created by a few in 
accordance with popular tradition”) (ix). She explains that “Cette erreur grossière a été mise en 
crédit par plusieurs autres historiens peu soucieux de vérifier l’exactitude de leurs affirmations” 
(“This most basic mistake has been repeated by various other historians paying little heed to the 
accuracy of their statements”) (ix-x). Vivien considers it essential to dispel this incorrect aspect 
of Sappho’s biography because it contributes to what she has termed “la tradition, aussi erronée 
qu’universelle, de l’amour de Psappha pour Phaon” (“The tradition, as erroneous as it is 
universal, of Sappho’s love for Phaon”) (x). The tradition that Vivien wants to preserve, of 
course, is that of Sappho as a lover of women.   
The preservation and promotion of this particular tradition could be one of the reasons 
Vivien chose to translate Sappho’s lyric poetry in the first place. As she explains later in the 
biography section, our only image of Sappho comes from her surviving verse: “En face de 
l’insondable nuit qui enveloppe cette mystérieuse beauté, nous ne pouvons que l’entrevoir, la 
deviner à travers les strophes et les vers qui nous restent d’elle” (“Faced with the immeasurable 
darkness that surrounds this mysterious beauty, we can only glimpse her, surmise her through the 
stanzas and lines that remain of her”) (x). It is Sappho’s own words that provide us with our 
fragmented image of the poet as a woman and lover, and as Vivien concludes regarding these 
words, “nous n’y trouvons point le moindre frisson tendre de son être vers un homme” (“we do 
not find in them the slightest flicker of affection toward a man”) (x). So, it was in order to bring 
the literary fragments of the poet’s queer identity and desire to light, and to continue their 
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transmission to those of her own time and culture, that Vivien took on the project of literary 
translation.  
But in addition to facilitating the transmission of Sappho’s queer identity and desire, 
Vivien’s translations of Sappho’s verse helped forge a space for her own queer poetic expression 
within a traditionally masculine and heteronormative lyric tradition. As a woman, lesbian, and 
poet, Vivien could identify with the figure of Sappho on several levels. Sappho’s enduring 
legacy as a recognized literary figure established a valid western lyric tradition into which Vivien 
could more easily insert herself and provided an admirable poetic predecessor with which Vivien 
could identify. This identification has manifested perhaps most clearly in the epithet adopted by 
literary historian André Billy, who famously referred to Vivien as “Sapho 1900, Sapho cent pour 
cent” (“Sappho 1900, Sappho one hundred percent”) (Albert, Lesbian Decadence 36). But it is 
through the questionable nature of some of her translated lyric texts that Vivien’s identification 
with Sappho unfolds in more subversive ways. These translated texts range from what could be 
considered “traditional” or “faithful” translations to what seem like purely creative inventions. 
And the ranging degrees of license and creativity that Vivien employs from one translation to 
another contributes to her ultimate destabilization of the lyric “I,” in which she intertwines and 
confounds her voice and subjectivity with Sappho’s. 
The following poem is one of the more conventional translations among Vivien’s 
collection. Frequently referred to as “Fragment 31,” it is one of the best-known remnants of 
Sappho’s poems. After Sappho’s text, I have included Anne Carson’s English translation for 
reference, followed by Vivien’s translation into French: 
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Fragment 31 (Original by Sappho): 
 
φαίνεταί μοι κῆνος ἴσος θέοισιν 
ἔμμεν’ ὤνηρ, ὄττις ἐνάντιός τοι 
ἰσδάνει καὶ πλάσιον ἆδυ φονεί- 
σας ὐπακούει 
 
καὶ γελαίσας ἰμέροεν, τό μ’ ἦ μὰν 
καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν· 
ὠς γὰρ ἔς σ’ ἴδω βρόχε’, ὤς με φώναί- 
σ’ οὐδ’ ἒν ἔτ’ εἴκει, 
 
ἀλλά κὰμ μὲν γλῶσσα †ἔαγε†, λέπτον 
δ’ αὔτικα χρῷ πῦρ ὐπαδεδρόμηκεν, 
ὀππάτεσσι δ’ οὐδ’ ἒν ὄρημμ’, ἐπιρρόμ- 
βεισι δ’ ἄκουαι, 
 
κὰδ’ δέ ἴδρως κακχέεται, τρόμος δὲ 
παῖσαν ἄγρει, χλωροτέρα δὲ ποίας 
ἔμμι, τεθνάκην δ’ ὀλίγω ‘πιδεύης 
φαίνομ’ ἔμ’ αὔτᾳ. 
 
ἀλλὰ τὰν τόλματον, ἐπεὶ καὶ πένητα… 
 
 
Fragment 31 (Translated by Anne Carson): 
 
He seems to me equal to gods that man 
whoever he is who opposite you 
sits and listens close 
 to your sweet speaking 
 
and lovely laughing – oh it 
puts the heart in my chest on wings 
for when I look at you, even a moment, no speaking 
 is left in me 
 
no: tongue breaks and thin 
fire is racing under skin 
and in eyes no sight and drumming  
fills ears 
 
and cold sweat holds me and shaking 
grips me all, greener than grass 
I am and dead – or almost 
 I seem to me. 
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But all is to be dared, because even a person of poverty 
 
 
Fragment 31 (Translated by Renée Vivien): 
 
Ode à une femme aimée  
 
L’homme fortuné qu’enivre ta présence 
Me semble l’égal des Dieux, car il entend 
Ruisseler ton rire et rêver ton silence, 
 Et moi, sanglotant, 
 
Je frissonne toute, et ma langue est brisée :  
Subtile, une flamme a traversé ma chair, 
Et ma sueur coule ainsi que la rosée 
 Apre de la mer ; 
 
Un bourdonnement remplit de bruits d’orage 
Mes oreilles, car je sombre sous l’effort, 
Plus pâle que l’herbe, et je vois ton visage 
 A travers la mort. 
 
 
The most immediately noticeable difference between Vivien’s translation and Sappho’s original 
is that Vivien’s text bears the title, “Ode à une femme aimée” (“Ode to a Beloved Woman”).  
The syntax of the verses and the order of the descriptions also differ a little from the original, but 
this is not unusual, especially in poetry, where the consideration of factors such as a consistent 
rhyme scheme and meter might also shape the translated text. In fact, Vivien’s translation is 
written in an 11-syllable meter, which is uncommon for French prosody, but reflects the meter in 
which Sappho frequently wrote – now termed the “Sapphic meter.” In terms of tone, content, and 
imagery, the translated poem remains relatively similar to the original. And with respect to the 
question of whose subjectivity it presents – Vivien’s or Sappho’s – the reader would probably 
understand it to present Sappho’s: these are Sappho’s thoughts, feelings, and experiences, which 
she has described through the words of her poetic composition in Greek. As translator, Vivien’s 
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part in this poetic act is to provide the equivalent and appropriate French words for conveying 
Sappho’s first-person lyric expression to French speakers. So, although Vivien writes the “I” in 
“Ode to a Beloved Woman,” the “I” belongs to Sappho. Vivien as a subject is “transparent,” and 
Sappho speaks through her by means of this translated lyric “I.”  
The concept of transparency has long held ground as the guiding principle of 
conventional translation.27 Translation theorist Theo Hermans explains that under the regime of 
transparent translation, “Translators are good translators if and when they have become 
transparent, invisible, when they have spirited themselves away” (“Translator’s Voice” 44). The 
notion of transparency is valued in this context because “only a translator who speaks ‘under 
erasure’ can be trusted not to violate the original” (44). Theorist Brian Harris details the 
characteristics of such an approach to translation when he describes the corresponding idea of an 
“honest spokesperson norm” (118). In the domain of translation and interpretation, this norm 
“requires that people who speak on behalf of others […] re-express the original speakers’ ideas 
and the manner of expressing them as accurately as possible and without significant omissions, 
and not mix them up with their own ideas and expressions” (118). It is for this reason that we are 
able to, and tend to, overlook the translator’s presence and voice when reading a translation. In 
response to the question, “whose voice comes to us when we read a translated novel?” for 
example, Hermans points to common usage as an indication: “We tend to say that we are reading 
Dostoyevsky,” he notes, “even when we are reading not Russian but English or French or 
Spanish words” (“Translator’s Voice” 26). We read a translation with the understanding that it 
 
27 See Lawrence Venuti. The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation. 2nd ed., 
Routledge, 2008, for a discussion of the role of transparency in conceptions of translation. 
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provides us access to the voice, thoughts, experiences, and general subjectivity, not of the 
translator, but of the original author.   
As closer consideration of this assumption reveals, however, the notion of transparency is 
an illusion. Hermans remarks that “translated texts – like other texts, only more so – are always, 
inherently, plural, unstable, de-centered, hybrid. The ‘other’ voice, the translator’s voice, is 
always there” (“Translation’s Other”). As much as the reader might value the idea of an invisible 
or transparent translator, it remains an ideal that can never be fully realized. So, in order to make 
this idealistic conception of translation the norm, we as readers willfully maintain the illusion of 
transparency by systematically, even if unconsciously, overlooking the presence and role of the 
other voice in the translated text – the voice of the translator.   
There are, however, occasional moments where it becomes impossible to ignore this 
additional voice and the illusion fails. In translated prose, such moments emerge as textual 
incongruences, involving what Hermans has termed “performative self-contradiction” 
(“Translator’s Voice” 27). He explains that in these instances, “the Translator’s self-denial runs 
into obvious, textually traceable contradictions” (27). This situation occurs, for example, in the 
final paragraph of René Descartes’s Discours de la méthode (Discourse on Method), when the 
author is explaining why he wrote the text in French instead of Latin, stating, “Et si j’écris en 
français, qui est la langue de mon pays, plutôt qu’en latin, qui est celle de mes précepteurs, c’est 
à cause que […]” (“And if I write in French, which is the language of my country, rather than in 
Latin, which is that of my tutors, it is because […]”) (144-45).28 With respect to translating this 
 
28 See Jacques Derrida’s Du droit à la philosophie, particularly pp. 283-342, for his discussion of 
this same passage in Descartes, which he labels a form of “suicide by translation” (309).  
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paragraph, Hermans highlights the textual incongruences created by the instance of linguistic 
self-referentiality, and considers their effects on the reader’s response: 
 
When the English version has: “And if I write in French … rather than in Latin … it is 
because …” […], the anomaly of reading an English text which declares, in English, that 
it is actually in French creates a credibility gap which readers can overcome only by 
reminding themselves that this is, of course, a translation. But in doing so, those readers 
also realize that the voice producing the statement cannot possibly belong to Descartes, or 
to Descartes alone. (“Translator’s Voice” 30) 
 
 
Since the lyric “I’ does not usually function within the same narrative context and framework as 
the first-person pronoun does in prose, many of the examples provided by Derrida and Hermans 
do not manifest in the same way in translated poetry. But as Vivien’s collection of translations 
demonstrates, her use of the translated lyric “I” also causes the illusion of transparency to fail by 
making it impossible for the reader to overlook the presence of another voice. Whereas Derrida’s 
and Hermans’s respective examples of credibility gaps tend to occur through the use of a 
seemingly contradictory statement or incongruent word, the credibility gap created by Vivien 
occurs more slowly over the course of the poetic collection. It manifests in a subtler yet more 
extensive and subversive way as she works the weaknesses in this norm.   
 If we are comfortable reading “Ode à une femme aimée” (“Ode to a Beloved Woman”) 
as a representation of Sappho’s subjectivity and voice (whether or not this is the case), how does 
this compare to reading “Ode à l’Aphrodita” (“Ode to Aphrodite”), Vivien’s translation of 
Sappho’s “Fragment 1”? In this poem, Sappho addresses Aphrodite, asking her to alleviate the 
suffering of her unanswered desire, and Aphrodite responds to her, asking how she might help, 
and whom she can persuade to return Sappho’s love. 
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Fragment 1 (Original by Sappho): 
 
Ποικιλόθρον᾽ ὰθάνατ᾽ ᾽Αφροδιτα, 
παῖ Δίοσ, δολόπλοκε, λίσσομαί σε 
μή μ᾽ ἄσαισι μήτ᾽ ὀνίαισι δάμνα, 
πότνια, θῦμον. 
 
ἀλλά τυίδ᾽ ἔλθ᾽, αἴποτα κἀτέρωτα 
τᾶσ ἔμασ αύδωσ αἴοισα πήλγι 
ἔκλυεσ πάτροσ δὲ δόμον λίποισα 
χρύσιον ἦλθεσ 
 
ἄρμ᾽ ὐποζεύξαια, κάλοι δέ σ᾽ ἆγον 
ὤκεεσ στροῦθοι περὶ γᾶσ μελαίνασ 
πύκνα δινεῦντεσ πτέῤ ἀπ᾽ ὠράνω  
αἴθεροσ διὰ μέσσω. 
 
αῖψα δ᾽ ἐχίκοντο, σὺ δ᾽, ὦ μάσαιρα 
μειδιάσαισ᾽ ἀθάνατῳ προσώπῳ, 
ἤρἐ ὄττι δηὖτε πέπονθα κὤττι 
δἦγτε κάλημι 
 
κὤττι μοι μάλιστα θέλω γένεσθαι 
μαινόλᾳ θύμῳ, τίνα δηὖτε πείθω 
μαῖσ ἄγην ἐσ σὰν φιλότατα τίσ τ, ὦ 
Πσάπφ᾽, ἀδίκηει; 
 
καὶ γάρ αἰ φεύγει, ταχέωσ διώξει, 
αἰ δὲ δῶρα μὴ δέκετ ἀλλά δώσει, 
αἰ δὲ μὴ φίλει ταχέωσ φιλήσει, 
κωὐκ ἐθέλοισα. 
 
ἔλθε μοι καὶ νῦν, χαλεπᾶν δὲ λῦσον 
ἐκ μερίμναν ὄσσα δέ μοι τέλεσσαι 
θῦμοσ ἰμμέρρει τέλεσον, σὐ δ᾽ αὔτα  
σύμμαχοσ ἔσσο. 
 
 
Fragment 1 (Translated by Anne Carson): 
 
Deathless Aphrodite of the spangled mind, 
child of Zeus, who twists lures, I beg you 
do not break with hard pains, 
 O lady, my heart 
 
but come here if ever before 
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you caught my voice far off 
and listening left your father’s 
 golden house and came, 
 
yoking your car.  And fine birds brought you, 
quick sparrows over the black earth 
whipping their wings down the sky 
 through midair –  
 
they arrived.  But you, O blessed one, 
smiled in your deathless face 
and asked what (now again) I have suffered and why 
 (now again) I am calling out 
 
and what I want to happen most of all  
in my crazy heart.  Whom should I persuade (now again) 
to lead you back into her love? Who, O 
 Sappho, is wronging you? 
 
For if she flees, soon she will pursue. 
If she refuses gifts, rather will she give them. 
If she does not love, soon she will love 
even unwilling. 
 
Come to me now: loose me from hard 
care and all my heart longs 
to accomplish, accomplish.  You 
be my ally. 
 
 
Fragment 1 (Translated by Vivien): 
 
Ode à l’Aphrodita 
 
Accueille, immortelle Aphrodita, Déesse, 
Tisseuse de ruse à l’âme d’arc-en-ciel, 
Le frémissement, l’orage et la détresse 
 De mon long appel. 
 
J’ai longtemps rêvé : ne brise pas mon âme 
Parmi la stupeur et l’effroi de l’éveil, 
Blanche Bienheureuse aux paupières de flamme, 
 Aux yeux de soleil. 
 
Jadis, entendant ma triste voix lointaine, 
Tu vins l’écouter dans la paix des couchants 
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Où songe la mer, car ta faveur hautaine 
 Couronne les chants. 
 
Je vis le reflet de tes cheveux splendides 
Sur l’or du nuage et la pourpre des eaux, 
Ton char attelé de colombes rapides 
 Et de passereaux. 
 
Et le battement lumineux de leurs ailes 
Jetait des clartés sur le sombre univers, 
Qui resplendissait de lueurs d’asphodèles 
 Et de roux éclairs. 
 
Déchaînant les pleurs et l’angoisse des rires, 
Tu quittas l’aurore immuable des cieux. 
Là-bas surgissait la tempête des lyres 
 Aux sanglots joyeux. 
 
Et toi, souriant de ton divin visage, 
Tu me demandas : « D’où vient l’anxiété 
A ton grave front, et quel désir ravage 
 Ton corps tourmenté ? 
 
« Qui te fait souffrir de l’âpre convoitise ? 
Et quelle Piethô, plus blonde que le jour 
Aux cheveux d’argent, te trahit et méprise, 
 Psappha, ton amour ? 
 
« Tu ne sauras plus les langueurs de l’attente. 
Celle qui te fuit te suivra pas à pas. 
Elle t’ouvrira, comme la Nuit ardente, 
 L’ombre de ses bras. 
 
« Et tremblante ainsi qu’une esclave confuse, 
Offrant des parfums, des présents et des pleurs, 
Elle ira vers toi, la vierge qui refuse 
 Tes fruits et tes fleurs. 
 
« Par un soir brûlant de rubis et d’opales 
Elle te dira des mots las et brisés, 
Et tu connaîtras ses lèvres nuptiales, 
 Pâles de baisers. » 
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With this poem, the most immediate different between Sappho’s and Vivien’s versions is 
probably the length: Sappho’s is 7 stanzas, or 28 lines, and Vivien’s is 11 stanzas, or 44 lines. 
What accounts for this discrepancy? Is it that the supposedly equivalent French words and 
expressions are lengthier than the original Greek? Although this would be a relatively simple 
explanation, it does not seem to be the case here. For fragments longer than a couple lines, 
Vivien actually provides two French translations, one in sentence or paragraph form, and another 
in verse form. Her corresponding translation in paragraph form is much closer to the original 
Greek in terms of length, order, syntax, and imagery. It appears to be during Vivien’s 
formulation of the translation into verse that it expands significantly.   
What is the nature of this expansion, and how does it affect the voice and subjectivity 
represented by its translated lyric “I”? Besides general changes in word order, which could be 
attributed in part to the accommodation of a rhyme scheme and meter, Vivien’s translated verse 
appears to deviate most in its descriptors of Aphrodite. In stanzas 2 and 3, for example, Vivien’s 
text refers to the goddess as “Blanche Bienheureuse aux paupières de flamme” (“White Cherub 
with impassioned eyes”), who comes to listen to Sappho “dans la paix des couchants / Où songe 
la mer” (“in the tranquility of setting suns / Where the sea dreams”), images which are nowhere 
to be found in Sappho’s original text. Stanzas 4 through 6 add additional details to the 
description of Aphrodite’s arrival upon the earth in her chariot, and they even appear to change 
the tone of this account by including reference to the tears and anguished laughter that Aphrodite 
causes upon her departure from the heavens. In the next part of the poem, where Aphrodite 
addresses Sappho directly, Vivien’s translation remains generally similar to the original, but still 
with a good amount of poetic license in its additional details and images. The final significant 
difference appears in the last stanza. In the original text, Aphrodite’s comforting message ends, 
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and Sappho’s voice returns to conclude the poem by asking the goddess to be her ally in all 
things love-related. In Vivien’s translation, however, the poem ends with Aphrodite’s assurance 
that Sappho will experience the kiss of her beloved; the original final lines are eliminated, and 
Sappho’s voice does not return to conclude the poem.   
 If Vivien’s translation-expansion of Sappho’s “Fragment 1” were simply a case of adding 
four additional stanzas to the original seven, it might still be possible (although the reader would 
have to have some knowledge of the original) to read certain stanzas as “Sappho’s” and the 
others as “Vivien’s.” But Vivien’s expansion is not as linear or clean-cut as this; she has 
expanded the poem from within by deleting certain aspects, adding significantly more, and 
providing a much looser recreation of Sappho’s original lyric expression overall. The length 
discrepancy, combined with our inability to easily identify and attribute the modified parts to 
Vivien, creates a credibility gap, and leaves us with an uneasy feeling toward the translation. The 
credibility gap invokes a degree of distrust regarding the translation’s so-called “accuracy” or 
“faithfulness” by calling into question the supposed transparency of Vivien as translator. As 
readers, we are forced to wonder, “who is actually speaking through this lyric ‘I’?” Vivien’s 
presence behind the translated lyric “I” cannot be overlooked as she intertwines and confuses her 
voice with Sappho’s.  
Of course, Vivien is translating poetic “fragments,” which inevitably invite some degree 
of expansion or completion, whether conscious or unconscious, on behalf of the translator and 
reader. But just how much expansion is acceptable in a translation? For short fragments, like the 
following text, can Vivien’s version still be considered a translation? And can the translated lyric 
“I” still be understood ideally to represent Sappho’s voice? 
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Fragment 160 (Original by Sappho): 
 
.     .     .    .    .    τάδε νῦν ἐταίραις  
ταὶς ἔμαις τέρπνα κάλως ἀείσω 
 
 
Fragment 160 (Translated by Carson): 
 
 these things now for my companions 
I shall sing beautifully 
 
 
Fragment 160 (Translated by Vivien): 
 
Voici maintenant ce que je chanterai bellement  
afin de plaire à mes maîtresses. 
 
Atthis aux cheveux de crépuscule, blonde 
Et lasse, Eranna, qui dans l’or des couchants 
Ranimes l’ardeur de la lyre profonde 
 Et des nobles chants, 
 
Euneika trop belle et Gurinnô trop tendre, 
Anactoria, qui passais autrefois, 
Lorsque je mourais de te voir et d’entendre 
 Ton rire et ta voix, 
 
Dika, dont les mains souples tissent les roses, 
Et qui viens offrir aux Déesses les fleurs 
Neigeant du pommier, ingénument décloses, 
 Parfums et pâleurs, 
 
Pour vous j’ai rythmé les sons et les paroles, 
Pour vous j’ai pleuré les larmes du désir, 
J’ai vu près de vous les ardentes corolles 
 Du soir défleurir. 
 
Triste, j’ai blâmé l’importune hirondelle ; 
Par vous j’ai connu l’amer et doux Erôs, 
Par votre beauté je devins immortelle, 
 Vierges de Lesbôs. 
 
 
In this translation, Sappho’s original fragment occupies the position of epigraph to a poem of 
five stanzas. But in what way do these five stanzas constitute part of the translation? Are they an 
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addition to the original fragment? Or an expansion or elaboration? The best explanation might 
view them as an inspired invention, on the part of Vivien, who used Sappho’s fragment as a 
starting point for her own poetic creation, which she then incorporated into the translation. It 
appears that, in this “transcreation,” Vivien has taken license to imagine what Sappho intended to 
sing to her companions and to give voice to this lyric “I” of the original fragment through an 
additional twenty lines of French verse.   
Who is actually speaking through the lyric “I” of this translated text? In some ways, it 
still appears to be Sappho, given the specific references to her companions as addressees, and the 
general similarity in language, images, and references between this text and Sappho’s other 
poems. But we as readers cannot possibly overlook Vivien’s voice in such a translation. We 
know that Vivien must be the author of the five stanzas, for which there is no corresponding 
source text in the original Greek fragment. Even if we are to compromise and attribute the lyric 
“I” to Sappho, but a Sappho of Vivien’s imagination and creation, incongruences regarding the 
supposed moment of enunciation call into question the time and place from which this Sappho 
appears to speak. Is the speaker of the five stanzas addressing her companions in the present, or 
from a future perspective, looking back? The first three stanzas create some confusion in this 
respect, as they alternate between past and present tenses. But stanzas 4 and 5, with their lists of 
acts carried out in the first person, are written entirely in the past tense, and the second to last 
line, “Par votre beauté je devins immortelle” (“Through your beauty I became immortal”), 
establishes an interesting point of enunciation as retrospect. Is this something that the Greek 
Sappho, as speaker of the original fragment, would have said? Or is this a statement that can only 
result from retrospect, in reference to an enduring poetic legacy of over 2000 years? In the 
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second case, a different Sappho must be speaking – a Sappho of the modern era, a “Sappho 
1900,” whose voice is inseparable from Vivien’s as creator and performer of this poetic identity.   
In her translation of Fragment 160, Vivien is not so much enabling Sappho to speak 
through her as she is allowing herself to speak through Sappho. She has appropriated Sappho’s 
voice, and is using her own words and language to produce a textual representation of what she 
considers to be the Greek poet’s subjectivity. When we stop to think about it, however, we 
realize that this is, in a way, the process underlying any translation. Vivien has simply stretched 
this process to its limit, to where the assumed “accuracy” or “faithfulness” of a representation is 
thrown into question. As a result, it becomes impossible for the reader to overlook Vivien’s 
voice as poetic subject alongside, or even in place of, Sappho’s. With such inconsistency and 
confusion regarding who is actually speaking through the translated lyric “I,” Vivien’s texts 
cause the illusion of transparency to fail. By stretching the definition of translation to its breaking 
point, her “transcreations” reveal the weaknesses in translation’s transparency norm. And in so 
doing, they create space for a queer subjectivity to emerge.   
This space opens up at the intersection of two domains – translation and gender – both of 
which are structured by similar ideologies. The ideology structuring dominant notions of 
translation enforces the transparency norm as a guiding principle because this norm maintains 
the illusion of a distinct and binary relation between author and translator, original and 
translation. As Hermans remarks, to abandon this norm “would be to upset established 
hierarchies, to deny the primacy and inviolability of the original, to stress the intertextual 
transformative streak in all writing, to assert the plurivocality of discourse. And to let in plural 
voices means destabilizing and decentring the speaking subject” (“Translator’s Voice” 44). 
Vivien’s destabilization of the translated lyric “I” results from this very process. And by calling 
 102 
into question the idealistic notion of author/poet as a centered and unified speaking subject, 
distinct from and superior to the translator, Vivien’s transcreations also call into question the 
heteronormative ideologies shaping such a concept.   
In “Gender and the Metaphorics of Translation” (1988) Lori Chamberlain discusses the 
ways in which we conceptualize translation through metaphors of sex and gender, and she 
explores the reasons behind this conceptualization. She suggests that the connection between the 
two realms results primarily from the way that society values production over reproduction. As a 
result, Chamberlain explains, “what proclaims itself to be an aesthetic problem is represented in 
terms of sex, family, and the state, and what is consistently at issue is power” (465). The 
ideologies constructing the literary hierarchies between author and translator, original and 
translation, are the same ideologies constructing the social hierarchies of heteronormativity and 
its gendered power relations. Hermans provides a detailed breakdown of these hierarchies: 
Referring to translation, he states that its relation to original writing has historically been 
expressed in terms of “stereotyped oppositions such as those between creative versus derivative 
work, primary versus secondary, unique versus repeatable, art versus craft, authority versus 
obedience, freedom versus constraint, speaking in one’s own name versus speaking for someone 
else” (“Translation and Normativity” 64). And, “in case we imagine that these are after all 
natural and necessary hierarchies,” he adds, “it will be useful to remember that our culture has 
often construed gender distinctions in terms of strikingly similar oppositions of creative versus 
reproductive, original versus derivative, active versus passive, dominant versus subservient” 
(64). Like Chamberlain, Hermans points to the reasons behind such similarities, stating that the 
connection between the two realms “is not just that the historical discourse on translation is 
sexist in casting translation in the role of maidservant, faithful and obedient wife, or ‘belle 
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infidèle.’” Rather, “it is that translation has been hedged in by means of hierarchies strongly 
reminiscent of those employed to maintain sexual power relations,” that is, the hierarchies most 
central to the ideology of heteronormativity (64).  
Given the parallel ideologies linking sex and gender hierarchies to conceptions of 
translation, does subverting one set of hierarchies in turn subvert the other? If translation is 
construed, most generally, in terms of femininity and reproduction, and original compositions in 
terms of masculinity and production, what happens when what is presented as a translation is 
actually an original composition? This is the case with Pierre Louÿs’s book of translated poems, 
Les chansons de Bilitis (The Songs of Bilitis) (1895). While Vivien stretched the definition of 
transparent translation to reveal the weaknesses in the norm that separates original and 
translation, author and translator, Pierre Louÿs, by deceptively presenting original compositions 
as translations, works these weaknesses in the norm to invert the hierarchical binaries central to 
both ideologies.   
 
Pierre Louÿs and Pseudo-translation 
 
 The first edition of Louÿs’s collected translations appeared in 1895. Its title page reads 
“Les chansons de Bilitis : Traduites du grec pour la première fois par P.L.” (“The Songs of 
Bilitis: Translated from Greek for the First Time by P. L.”). Preceding the translated texts is a 
brief biography section, entitled “Vie de Bilitis” (“Life of Bilitis”), in which Louÿs explains the 
circumstances of the poems’ discovery and gives some details about the life of this Ancient poet, 
Bilitis. “Bilitis naquit au commencement du sixième siècle avant notre ère, dans un village de 
montages situé sur les bords du Mélas, vers l’orient de la Pamphylie” (“Bilitis was born at the 
beginning of the 6th Century B.C. in a mountain village bordering Melas, to the east of 
Pamphylia”), he states (31). After recounting her early childhood in Pamphylia, Louÿs describes 
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her departure for Lesbos, where she lived among female musicians and developed a lesbian 
relationship with a girl named Mnasidika. Bilitis apparently encountered Sappho during this 
time, about which Louÿs conjectures: “Sans doute ce fut cette femme admirable qui apprit à la 
petite Pamphylienne l’art de chanter en phrases rythmées, et de conserver à la postérité le 
souvenir des êtres chers” (“It was most likely this admirable woman who taught the young 
Pamphylian the art of singing in metered verse, and the art of preserving for posterity the 
memory of cherished ones”) (33). After the biography section, Louÿs details how a German 
professor and archeologist by the name of M. G. Heim discovered the ancient tomb of Bilitis, in 
which were preserved the written traces of the poet’s compositions: “M. Heim y pénétra par un 
puits étroit comblé de terre, au fond duquel il rencontra une porte murée qu’il fallut démolir. Le 
caveau spacieux et bas, pavé de dalles de calcaire, avait quatre murs recouverts par des plaques 
d’amphibolite noire, où étaient gravées en capitales primitives toutes les chansons qu’on va lire” 
(“M. Heim entered through a narrow, caved-in shaft, at the bottom of which he found a sealed 
door that he had to break through. The spacious, low-ceilinged vault, paved with limestone slabs, 
had four walls of black amphibolite plaques, on which were engraved in crude capitalized 
lettering all of the songs that we are about to read”) (36). Louÿs then presents the French 
translations of these poems, and in subsequent editions through 1898, includes a bibliography 
referencing other translated versions and scholarly works related to the poetic texts. This 
bibliography includes such entries as the professor G. Heim’s “Bilitis’ Sämtliche Lieder, zum 
ersten Male herausgegeben und mit einem Wörterbuche versehen” (“Complete Songs of Bilitis, 
first published and provided with a dictionary”), published in Leipzig in 1894, or “Quatre 
chansons de Bilitis, traduites en suédois par Gustav Uddgren” (“Four Songs of Bilitis, translated 
into Swedish by Gustav Uddgren”), published in Stockholm in 1897.   
 105 
The subversive nature of this collection of translations, however, results from the fact that 
the translated poems, along with the biography, and much of the bibliography, are all false.  
Bilitis never existed. Louÿs invented her character and life story, and his translations of her 
poems are actually his own poetic inventions. His literary hoax fooled much of the public, 
including quite a few historians and scholars of Ancient Greece.29 This kind of translation 
trickery belongs to the category of “pseudo-translations,” which theorist Gideon Toury defines as 
“texts which have been presented as translations with no corresponding source texts in other 
languages ever having existed” (40). While pseudo-translations are typically treated as marginal 
curiosities, Toury notes, they can in fact be quite informative. He devotes a section of his book, 
Descriptive Translation Studies and beyond, to a brief discussion of the cultural significance of 
such literary hoaxes. They raise questions, for example, “as to why a disguised mode of 
presentation was selected, to begin with, and why it was this (presumed) language, or textual 
tradition, that was picked up as a ‘source,’ as well as what it was that made the public fall for it 
for a longer or a shorter period of time” (40).   
With respect to Pierre Louÿs’s Chansons de Bilitis (Songs of Bilitis), one might 
conjecture that a disguised mode of presentation was selected in order to facilitate an otherwise 
censorable or questionable expression of queer desire and identity. Louÿs appears to consider 
such a possibility when writing to his brother: “Et même je ne signerai Bilitis que de mes 
initiales, parce que la seconde partie est d’une morale très peu normale et m’attirerait 
certainement des observations au cas où le volume aurait du succès” (“I also plan to sign Bilitis 
with only my initials, because the second part is of such different morals that it would surely cost 
 
29 See Jean-Paul Goujon’s editorial notes to Les Chansons de Bilitis, particularly pp. 320-322, for 
selected correspondence between Louÿs and two of these scholars. 
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me some reprimands were the collection to have any degree of success”) (Correspondance 
croisée 1:258). As Toury remarks, “the way censorship is applied to translation has often been 
much more lenient. One reason for this difference is precisely the fact that the presumed non-
domestic origin of translations makes them look less menacing; another is that there seems to be 
no way of actually going after the ‘absent’ author, who should presumably take most of the 
blame” (42). It is “a way of hiding behind a pseudonym […] with the added value of possibly 
benefiting from the status assigned to translations at large, or, more likely, to a certain 
translational tradition, in the domestic culture” (42). The culture and writings of Ancient Greece, 
with its esteemed philosophical and literary figures and its socially condoned homosexual 
practices, provide French poets at the turn of the twentieth century a valued tradition to 
recuperate and rework when exploring literary representations of sexual inversion. Writing again 
to his brother, Louÿs comments on this tradition, stating: “Je trouve seulement qu’on répand 
aujourd’hui des idées morales absurdes, et j’essaye de donner en exemple celles d’une époque 
plus grande que la nôtre parce qu’elles me paraissent être une condition nécessaire à la 
production des belles choses” (“I just think that today we have such absurd conceptions of 
morals, and I am trying to give an example of morals from an era more civilized than our own, 
since they seem to indicate, in my opinion, a necessary condition for the production of beauty”) 
(Correspondance croisée 1:361).   
As for what made the public fall for Louÿs’s pseudo-translations, it is likely a 
combination of several factors, such as the public’s association of Ancient Greece with “freer 
sexual morals,” Louÿs’s impressive scholarly research of existing Ancient source texts, and his 
manipulation of the translational and literary conventions that shape the public’s approach to 
such texts. It is the unique tone of his presentation, however, that contributes to text’s popularity 
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and novelty. In a letter to his brother on December 22, 1897, Louÿs discusses the nature of The 
Songs of Bilitis and comments on what he considers to be the novelty of his representation of a 
lesbian subject: 
 
Je crois justement que l’originalité du livre vient de ce que la question pudeur n’est 
jamais posée. En particulier, je crois que la seconde partie semblera très nouvelle.  
Jusqu’ici, les lesbiennes étaient toujours représentées comme des femmes fatales (Balzac, 
Musset, Baudelaire, Rops) ou vicieuses (Zola, Mendès, et auprès d’eux cent autres 
moindres). Même Mlle de Maupin, qui n’a rien de satanique, n’est pourtant pas une 
femme ordinaire. « C’est la première fois » (je parle comme Landouzy) qu’on écrit une 
idylle sur ce sujet-là. (Correspondance croisée 1:525) 
 
(I actually believe that the originality of the book stems from the fact that the question of 
modesty never comes up. In particular, I believe that the second part will seem very 
modern. So far, lesbians have always been represented as femmes fatales (Balzac, 
Musset, Baudelaire, Rops) or licentious women (Zola, Mendès, and a hundred others not 
worth mentioning). Even Mademoiselle de Maupin, who is in no way fiendish, is still not 
a regular woman. “This is the first time” (I’m imitating Landouzy) that an idyll has been 
written about this subject.) 
 
 
This difference in tone can be seen in the following poem, entitled “Le Baiser” (“The 
Kiss”), which was taken from the second of the three sections comprising Louÿs’s translation.  
This second section is entitled “Elégies à Mytilène” (“Elegies at Mytilene”), and it corresponds 
to the period of Bilitis’s life in which she adopts a lesbian lifestyle on the Isle of Lesbos. In the 
poem, Bilitis is addressing her lover, Mnasidika, with a passionate description of her intended 
sensual acts: 
Le Baiser 
 
Je baiserai d’un bout à l’autre les longues ailes noires de ta nuque, ô doux 
oiseau, colombe prise, dont le cœur bondit sous ma main. 
 
Je prendrai ta bouche dans ma bouche comme un enfant prend le sein de 
sa mère. Frissonne ! … car le baiser pénètre profondément et suffirait à l’amour. 
 
Je promènerai ma langue légère sur tes bras, autour de ton cou, et je ferai 
tourner sur tes côtes chatouilleuses la caresse étirante des ongles. 
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Écoute bruire en ton oreille toute la rumeur de la mer … Mnasidika ! ton 
regard me fait mal. J’enfermerai dans mon baiser tes paupières brûlantes comme 
des lèvres.  
 
 
(I shall kiss from end to end the long black wings spreading from your 
neck, oh, gentle bird, captive dove whose heart throbs wild beneath my hand! 
 
I shall take your mouth into my mouth as the child takes its mother’s 
breast. Tremble! … for the kiss sinks deep and should suffice for love. 
 
I shall trail my light tongue along your arms and round your neck, and I 
shall drag the long drawn kiss of my nails along your tender sides. 
 
Hear roaring in your ear all the murmur of the sea … Mnasidika! the 
expression of your eyes makes me ill. I’ll clasp within my kiss your lids which 
burn as warmly as your lips.)30 
 
 
The tone of the poem appears to conform, generally speaking, to Louÿs’s characterization. But 
another significant factor enabling Louÿs to deviate from his contemporaries is the point of view 
from which the texts are written. By framing his poems as translations, Louÿs is able to write 
directly from the first-person perspective, as opposed to the more objectifying third-person 
depictions characterizing much of the period’s lesbian-themed literature. In “Le Baiser” (“The 
Kiss”), the anaphoric repetition of this first-person pronoun establishes the lesbian figure as the 
subject, not the object, of the poem. The description of a sensual scene is viewed through 
Bilitis’s subjectivity, from the perspective of her desires, her feelings, and her thoughts. And 
while it does consist of a rather erotic description of sensual acts and actions, the fact that each of 
the first-person verbs is conjugated in the future perfect tense presents these actions in their more 
internalized and subjective form – that of the subject’s intentions. Louÿs therefore situates the 
sensual acts as interior desires, experienced and voiced by Bilitis herself, in place of a purely 
 
30 Translation by Alvah C. Bessie.  
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detached and somewhat voyeuristic description of an erotic love scene. This is not to say that his 
Songs of Bilitis avoid the male gaze and an eroticizing depiction of lesbianism, but simply that, 
framed as pseudo-translations, the poems can nonetheless incorporate a higher degree of female 
and lesbian subjectivity.31 And when read in the context of all 155 poems, this subjectivity gains 
authenticity through its progressive development over the course of the poetic collection, which 
covers diverse aspects of Bilitis’s life from childhood to old age, and is not limited to scenes of 
love-making in the bedroom.   
 In response to the question, “Who is speaking through this translated lyric ‘I’?” the 
uninformed reader who approaches the text as a genuine translation would most likely answer, 
“Bilitis.” She is speaking in the first person as she recounts her personal experiences or expresses 
her thoughts and feelings. In trusting Louÿs to be a faithful – or transparent – translator, this 
reader would acknowledge his voice only as a vessel of transmission reproducing Bilitis’s poetry 
through the equivalent words in French. For the reader informed of the hoax, however, the 
answer is not so simple. We know that it is actually Louÿs behind the lyric “I,” and not as 
translator reproducing Bilitis’s words in French, but as poet-author and original producer of the 
texts. Having lost her status as poet-author, Bilitis now occupies a position approximating a first-
person narrator, or perhaps more appropriately for the context of lyric poetry, that of a fictive 
poet-speaker. Depending on the reader’s knowledge, then, the lyric “I” of Les chansons de Bilitis 
(The Songs of Bilitis) embodies up to four different voices at once – that of Louÿs as author, 
Louÿs as translator, Bilitis as author, and Bilitis as speaker. And the interchangeability of these 
 
31 See Chapter 2 of Lawrence Venuti’s The Scandals of Translation, in which he demonstrates 
that the male gaze and patriarchal perspective still reveal themselves through Louÿs’s pseudo-
translated poems. 
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four voices, in accordance with the different contextual presentations of the text, creates the 
possibility of subverting the hierarchical positions assigned to them.   
Upon learning that the translations are in fact pseudo-translations, readers must change 
their approach to the text. The translation becomes the original. The translator becomes the 
author. And the hierarchical values that have been assigned to these binaries are suddenly called 
into question. Must they also now be switched accordingly? Do the texts now deserve a higher 
valuation as original productions, as opposed to derivative reproductions? Does Louÿs now merit 
a higher valuation as author, as opposed to translator? What does this change imply with respect 
to readers’ original valuation? Was it wrong? Does it matter? Given the often frustrated or 
indignant reactions of readers upon learning the true nature of the translations, it does in fact 
seem to matter. Louÿs recounts one such instance in another letter to his brother in June of 1901.  
His friend tells him that crowds of people have been coming to the Louvre museum to see “le 
portrait de Bilitis” (“the portrait of Bilitis”) – the image that served as inspiration for the 
frontispiece of the book’s second edition. When an employee of the museum, talking to one lady 
in particular, lets slip the questionable existence of Bilitis, the lady is not happy: “[…] voilà une 
femme rouge de colère” (“now here is a woman steaming with anger”), his friend recounts; 
“‘C’est une indignité !’” (“‘This is a disgrace!’”), she declares, “‘On trompe le public! Je me 
plaindrai !’” (“‘They are misleading the public! I shall lodge a complaint!’”) (Correspondance 
croisée 2:851).   
Her indignation points to the troubling nature of such revelations and to the queering 
effect that they entail. They force us, as readers, to re-evaluate the text and to recognize that our 
initial valuation was “wrong.” We feel “mislead” because we had considered the original to be a 
translation, the author to be a translator. And we had therefore assigned the corresponding 
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hierarchical values to the wrong categories – to a fictive Bilitis as author, rather than to Louÿs, 
and to non-existent Ancient source texts, rather than to modern French poetic compositions. The 
“wrongness” of our initial reading reveals two things: First, that what we consider to be essential, 
natural, and inherently distinct binary categories – (masculine) author and (feminine) translator, 
(masculine) original and (feminine) translation – are in fact completely interchangeable and 
determined by context. And second, that our ability to assign hierarchical value to the 
appropriate category can easily be called into question.   
 
Marceline Desbordes-Valmore and Auto-translation 
 
In her first collection of literary works, Elégies, Marie, et romances (Elegies, Marie, and 
Ballads), published in 1819, Marceline Desbordes-Valmore includes two poems, side by side, 
entitled “Chanson créole” (“Creole Song”) and “Même romance” (“Same Ballad”). The first, 
“Creole Song,” is written in a French-Creole hybrid, and the second, “Same Ballad,” in standard 
French. They both present the voice of an impatient lover who is eager for a sleeping beloved to 
awaken so that the two can enjoy each other’s company: 
 
“Chanson créole”  
 
N’a plus pouvoir dormir tout près toi dans cabane, 
Sentir l’air parfumé courir sur bouche à toi, 
Gagner plaisir qui doux passé mangé banane, 
Parfum là semblé feu qui brûler cœur à moi. 
 Moi vlé z’éveiller toi. 
 
Baï moi baiser si doux, n’oser prend’li moi-même, 
Guetter réveil à toi … long-temps trop moi languir. 
Tourné côté cœur moi, rend-li bonheur suprême, 
Mirez l’aurore aller qui près toi va pâlir. 
 Long-temps trop moi languir. 
 
Veni sous bananiers nous va trouvé z’ombrage ; 
Petits oiseaux chanter pendant nous fait l’amour. 
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Soleil est jaloux moi, li caché sous nuage, 
Mais trouvé dans yeux toi l’éclat qui passé jour. 
 Veni faire l’amour. 
 
Non, non, toi plus dormir, partager vive flame, 
Baisers toi semblé miel cueilli sur bouquet fleurs. 
Cœur à toi soupirer, veni chercher mon ame ; 
Prends-li sur bouche à moi, li courir dans mes pleurs. 
 Moi mourir sous des fleurs. 
 
 
“Même romance”  
 
Sur ce lit de roseaux puis-je dormir encore ? 
Je sens l’air embaumé courir autour de toi. 
Ta bouche est une fleur dont le parfum dévore. 
Approche, ô mon trésor, et ne brûle que moi. 
 Éveille, éveille-toi ! 
 
Mais ce souffle d’amour, ce baiser que j’envie, 
Sur tes lèvres encor je n’ose le ravir ; 
Accordé par ton cœur, il doublera ma vie. 
Ton sommeil se prolonge, et tu me fais mourir. 
 Je n’ose le ravir ! 
 
Viens ; sous les bananiers nous trouverons l’ombrage ; 
Les oiseaux vont chanter en voyant notre amour. 
Le soleil est jaloux, il est sous un nuage ; 
Et c’est dans tes beaux yeux que je cherche le jour. 
 Viens donc faire l’amour ! 
 
Non, non, tu ne dors plus, tu partages ma flamme. 
Tes baisers sont le miel que nous donnent les fleurs : 
Ton cœur a soupiré, viens-tu chercher mon ame ?  
Elle erre sur ma bouche et veut sécher tes pleurs. 
 Cache-moi sous des fleurs ! 
 
 
(Same Ballad 
 
On this bed of reeds can I sleep much longer? 
I smell the fragrant air as it dances around you. 
Your mouth is a flower consumed by its scent. 
Come close, my darling, and inflame your lover. 
 Awaken from your slumber! 
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But this breath of love, this kiss that I await, 
To steal it from your lips, I dare not try 
When offered willingly, it will lengthen my life. 
Yet your sleep persists, and I think I might die. 
 I dare not try! 
 
Come now; we’ll seek shade among the banana trees; 
The birds will sing upon seeing our love. 
The sun is jealous, behind a cloud it hides; 
And the daylight I seek, I find instead in your eyes. 
 So come, now, let’s make love! 
 
You’ll sleep no more, you’ll share my flame. 
Your kisses are sweet like the honey from flowers: 
Your heart just sighed, do you search for my soul? 
It lingers on my lips and waits to dry your tears. 
 Hide me in a bed of flowers!) 
 
 
While not entirely identical, the second text is similar to the first in terms of perspective, tone, 
and content. The implied similarity between the two texts is most evident, however, in their 
titles. By naming the second poem simply “Même romance” (“Same Ballad”), Desbordes-
Valmore assigns to it the status of a copy, implying that it can be read as an equivalent to the first 
– the “same” poem, with the only significant difference presumably being that it is in standard 
French.  
This equivalence is maintained in subsequent editions of Élégies, Marie et romances. In 
the 1820 edition, the two texts appear side by side again, and with the slightly modified titles of 
“Le réveil créole” (“The Creole Awakening”) and “La même romance” (“The Same Ballad”). 
And in the 1822 edition, Desbordes-Valmore explicitly assigns the status of “translation” to the 
poem’s standard French version, with the new title, “Le réveil : Traduction” (“The Awakening: 
Translation”). But if we are to approach the two texts in terms of “original” and “translation,” an 
important question arises: Whom, exactly, is Desbordes-Valmore translating? The first two 
editions provide no indication as to the original author of the Creole text. And in later editions, 
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the Creole text disappears altogether – “Le réveil : Traduction” (“The Awakening: Translation”) 
appears alone, unaccompanied by its corresponding French-Creole hybrid, upon which the 
translation is presumably based.   
 The only contextual information that editor Marc Bertrand is able to provide regarding 
the poem is that “Le réveil créole a été évidemment dicté à Marceline par le souvenir des 
quelques mois passés à la Guadeloupe” (“The Creole Awakening was clearly inspired by the few 
months Marceline spent in Guadeloupe”) (Œuvres Poétiques 2:772). This stay in the Antilles, 
which appears to have inspired the poem, provides some possible explanations for the lack of 
precision regarding the source of the Creole text. Desbordes-Valmore stayed on the island of 
Guadeloupe from May 1802 to around September 1802, when it was a slave-based colony of 
France. Given the hierarchical structure central to French colonialism, in which the only 
legitimate subjectivity recognized is that of the French colonizer, the independence and 
subjectivity of the colonized and/or enslaved population must be systematically devalued or 
overlooked. This deliberate construction and imposition of a dominant French subjectivity has an 
effect on what voices are represented and acknowledged through literary works. As Régis 
Antoine concludes in La littérature franco-antillaise : Haïti, Guadeloupe et Martinique (Franco-
Antillean Literature: Haiti, Guadeloupe, and Martinique) (1992), “il n’y aura longtemps en ces 
territoires qu’une voix reconnue : la voix coloniale” (“For years to come, only one type of voice 
will be acknowledged in these territories: the colonial voice”) (13). This fact renders it 
ineffective, in his opinion, to try to identify authors outside the privileged class of the colonial 
era. If the author of “Chanson créole” were a member of the colonized class, then, it is possible 
that Desbordes-Valmore did not find it necessary to identify this individual or attribute authorial 
credit.   
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Another possible explanation for the unnamed author of the Creole version is that there is 
in fact no “author” at all. That is, there is no individual poetic subject who functions as an 
independent and conscious producer of “Chanson créole.” In “Polyphonie sociale dans la poésie 
créole de Saint-Domingue (Haïti)” (“Social Polyphony in the Creole Poetry of Saint-Domingue 
(Haiti)”) (2005), Deborah Jenson considers the issue of authorship within Creole societies. She 
acknowledges that while scholars such as Régis Antoine, Élodie Jourdain, and Édouard Glissant 
recognize the near impossibility of identifying individuals of the colonized classes and crediting 
them as original producers of the poems, this does not mean that we should attribute authorship, 
by default, to those of the colonizing class who publish the poems. In acknowledging the Creole 
colonial culture of production as “polyphonique, dialogique, et littéralement métissée ou en voie 
de métissage” (“polyphonic, dialogic, and literally miscegenetic or in the process of 
miscegenation”), Jenson points to the presence of a “littérature ambiante” (“ambient literature”). 
She explains that this ambient literature results from “l’omniprésence dans la vie sociale 
coloniale […] d’une oraliture poétique abondante générée par la classe des esclaves ou des 
femmes « de couleur » dans leur dialogue avec leurs maîtresses blanches” (“the omnipresence, in 
colonial social life […] of a rich poetic orality generated by the slave class or by women of color 
as they converse with their white mistresses”) (188). In this environment of racial and social 
mixing, colonizers are exposed to traditional or well-known poetry as it is sung and shared by 
slaves or Creole women of color. As a result, it is possible that “Chanson créole” is a song that 
Desbordes-Valmore heard frequently during her time in Saint-Barthelemy or Guadeloupe, and 
that she decided to transcribe, translate, and publish in order to share it with French readers in the 
Métropole.   
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 If either of these two possibilities is the case, it raises certain questions regarding modern, 
Euro-centric, and heteronormative conceptions of poetic authorship. By approaching “Chanson 
créole” as a well-known Creole song, pulled from the ambient oral literature of the colonial 
setting, for example, we must acknowledge that there is no individual “poet-author,” and no 
“original” text. Rather, the many voices that speak through the poem’s lyric “I” participate in a 
type of collective authorship and can contribute their own original modifications through 
variations in performance. This type of authorship continually both reproduces and produces the 
literary work every time it is performed, eroding the separation between author and speaker, 
production and reproduction. Similarly, if normative conceptions of authorship define the author 
as an individual, coherent, and conscious producer of an original text, how does this account for 
the attribution of authorship to a specific European colonizer, even in the absence of an 
identifiable author from the colonized class? In “Polyphonie sociale,” for example, Jenson calls 
into question the authorship of Duvivier de la Mahautière, a European colonizer who published a 
Creole poem entitled “Lisette quitté la plaine” (“Lisette Has Left the Plains”): “Personne n’a 
jamais décrit le colon Duvivier de la Mahautière comme un homme de lettres en proie au souffle 
poétique” (“No-one has ever described the colonist Duvivier de la Mahautière as a literary man 
with a proclivity for lyricism”), she remarks, highlighting his lack of literary creativity and skill 
and questioning the originality of his publication (178). Even in the absence of an identifiable 
author from the colonized class, an individual of the colonizing class who transcribes and/or 
publishes Creole texts does not necessarily possess any normative “authorial” qualities, at least 
in the domain of literature.   
 While these two possibilities call into question normative conceptions of authorship, 
there is a third possibility, which troubles our conceptions of translation, as well: that Desbordes-
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Valmore produced not only the translated version of the poem but also the original Creole 
version. Unlike the Colonist Duvivier de la Mahautière, Desbordes-Valmore was in fact a 
“[femme] de lettres en proie au souffle poétique” (“a literary [woman] with a proclivity for 
lyricism”) whose literary skills and creativity rendered her quite capable of composing the 
French-Creole hybrid, “Chanson créole.” Indeed, as Marc Bertrand remarks in his editorial notes, 
certain letters from Desbordes-Valmore’s correspondence show that she appreciated the beauty 
of the Creole language and knew how to speak it (2:772-73). She was also a reader of the Creole 
poet, Évariste de Parny, whose 1787 Chansons madécasses are French pseudo-translations of 
songs allegedly composed and performed by inhabitants of Madagascar.32 And archive material 
reveals that Desbordes-Valmore initially produced a manuscript version of “Chanson créole” that 
differs slightly from the published versions. Both the manuscript and published versions are 
composed in alexandrine, the characteristically French, twelve-syllable meter. Given such 
details, it is quite possible that “Chanson créole” is an original Romantic composition, rather 
than the transcription of an existing Creole song.33   
In the case that Desbordes-Valmore is the author of both poems, how does their paired 
presentation, as their content and titles imply, of “original” and “translation” affect the stability 
of the lyric “I” and our understanding of the texts? Returning to the question of whom exactly 
Desbordes-Valmore is translating, the answer becomes, in this case, “herself.” But this possible 
case of “auto-translation” raises several additional questions, the first being simply: can one 
translate oneself? If so, what does this entail with respect to our conceptions of translation and 
 
32 See the introduction to Selected Poetry and Prose of Évariste Parny, edited by Françoise 
Lionnet.  
 
33 For a description of the manuscript version, see Marc Bertrand’s editorial notes in Oeuvres 
poétiques, p. 772. 
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conceptions of authorial subjectivity? Should we now conceive of Desbordes-Valmore’s poetic 
subjectivity in terms of two different subjectivities, both separated by and determined by 
language? And what does it entail with respect to questions of poetic voice and the lyric “I”? Is 
the voice behind “Chanson créole” different from the voice behind “Même romance”? Is the 
lyric “I” of the Creole text the same “I” as the “I” of the standard French text, despite the 
difference in language? What voices and subjectivities are now embodied in the translated lyric 
“I” of “Même romance”?   
These questions lead back to Theo Hermans’s discussion of the voice of the translator 
and the idealized notion of transparent translation. By asking who is speaking through the 
translated “I,” Hermans encourages the reader to see past the illusion of transparency to consider 
the presence of the translator’s voice and acknowledge the plurivocality of the translated first-
person pronoun. Likewise, the possibility of Desbordes-Valmore’s auto-translation highlights the 
plurivocality of the poem’s translated lyric “I,” but in much more unstable terms: The ambiguity 
surrounding the authorial origins of “Chanson créole” already somewhat destabilizes the Creole 
poem’s lyric “I,” which must hold several possible voices and subjectivities at once: First, we are 
likely to acknowledge that the lyric “I” embodies the voice of the poem’s speaker, but this 
speaker remains ambiguous in terms of gender, class, and race. There are no gendered uses of 
grammatical or lexical constructions in either the French-Creole hybrid or the standard French 
version, and the poet’s use of Creole cannot be assumed to indicate a particular class or race. As 
Françoise Lionnet explains, in “contemporary Mauritius and Trinidad, where British colonial 
policies have been more influential, only people of mixed African ancestry are defined as 
Creole,” whereas in “the French overseas departments of the Caribbean and Reunion, by 
contrast, the word applies to all descendants of French settlers and servile populations (both 
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white and black)” (Lionnet xiv). Similarly, with respect to the poet-author, there are many 
possible sources for the creative voice behind the poem’s lyric “I.” As the discussion has shown, 
these possibilities range from the voice of an unknown or unacknowledged poet of the colonized 
class, to the voice of Desbordes-Valmore herself as poet, or, in the case of an ambient oral 
literary production, to the voice of any number of individuals performing the poem as both 
speaker and poet simultaneously. In the translated version, “Même romance,” the already 
unstable lyric “I” of “Chanson créole” must also contend with the additional voice of the 
translator, which is combined with this unspecifiable number of other voices and subjectivities. 
And in the case of auto-translation, specifically, the translated lyric “I” is destabilized in a 
particularly troubling way because it produces an ambiguous combination of the translator’s 
voice with the author’s voice, each of which is presumed to originate from a different 
subjectivity. Among the unspecifiable number of voices and subjectivities now embodied in the 
translated lyric “I” of “Même romance” lies the possible combination of Desbordes-Valmore’s 
voice as “translator” with her voice as “author.”   
This particular manifestation of the auto-translated lyric “I”’s plurivocality troubles 
normative conceptions of Desbordes-Valmore as a unified, stable, and coherent poetic subject.  
And with respect to the norms governing our conceptions of translation and authorship, it also 
destabilizes their supposedly distinct and hierarchical relation. Is it possible to maintain a clear 
distinction between poet-author and translator when their respective voices and subjectivities 
belong to the same individual? In order to circumvent this uncertainty, we could turn to the 
question of language difference, translation’s raison d’être, to help reinforce or delineate the 
distinction. But in the case of “Chanson créole” and “Même romance,” this language difference 
also breaks down upon closer examination. “Chanson créole” is written in a French-Creole 
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hybrid, first of all. And further, Creole itself is a hybrid language. The distinction between the 
languages of both poems is as unclear as the distinction between poet and translator. 
The destabilization of binary relations that results from cases of auto-translation extends 
to other, conceptually related binaries as well, such as the relation between foreign and domestic, 
same and different, self and other. But does this rippling destabilization of supposedly distinct 
categories extend to the gender and sex binaries of heteronormativity? Since Desbordes-
Valmore’s two poems do not treat gender or sexuality in a direct way, they do not produce an 
immediately noticeable effect on the ideologies supporting heteronormativity. But, given the 
correlation between the gendered hierarchies of heteronormativity and the derivatively gendered 
conceptualization of translation, as Chamberlain and Hermans have shown above, a certain 
queering effect is nonetheless possible.   
The space for queerness that opens up in the destabilized translated lyric “I” of 
Desbordes-Valmore’s “Même romance” builds upon the various destabilizations effected by 
Renée Vivien and Pierre Louÿs: Vivien’s transcreations highlight the weaknesses of the 
transparency norm by pushing to its breaking point the illusory nature of the distinction between 
author and translator, original and translation. And Louÿs’s pseudo-translations work these 
weaknesses, in their own deceptive way, to call into question the essentialist nature of such 
illusory distinctions. By effectively inverting the hierarchical positions of poet and translator, 
Louÿs’s pseudo-translated lyric “I” reveals their non-essential and interchangeable nature. 
Desbordes-Valmore’s possible use of auto-translation, however, does not rely on trickery or 
deceit to queer our readings of the texts. The ambiguity surrounding the authorial origins of 
“Chanson créole” creates the possibility that Desbordes-Valmore is in fact translating herself. In 
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this case, the auto-translated lyric “I” of “Même romance” does more than invert the gendered 
binary relations between author and translator; it collapses them.   
While the collapse of these distinctions may not lead to the immediate collapse of the 
larger, heteronormative ideology informing them, it does open up a possible space for queer 
subjectivity. As Chamberlain and Hermans have shown, the constructed distinctions between 
author and translator, original and translation (along with many other conceptually related 
categories) are manifestations of the larger, gendered hierarchies through which we 
conceptualize the heteronormative world, such as the distinction between male and female, 
production and reproduction, original and derivative, etc. And so, with every binary opposition 
that is called into question by the destabilized lyric “I” of Desbordes-Valmore’s two poems, the 
heteronormative ideology manifested by these distinctions is itself destabilized, little by little. As 
each manifestation of these heteronormative distinctions collapses within the translated lyric “I,” 
it contributes to the overall erosion of heteronormative conceptions of poetic subjectivity. And in 
doing so, it opens, in the cracks or weaknesses that result from this erosion, a space for queer 
subjectivity to emerge. 
 As Desbordes-Valmore’s poems demonstrate, queerness can manifest even in a text 
devoid of queer subject matter, particularly in the context of translation and its various 
subversions. While this section explores the influences of heteronormativity on the domain of 
translation, and the ways in which the destabilization of the translated “I” creates a space for 
queer subjectivity to take hold, the final section of the chapter turns to the more explicit 
connections between the lyric “I” and heteronormative discourse. These connections are formed 
in the context of the love lyric paradigm and tradition.   
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Section 3: The Love Lyric “I” 
 
While Arthur Rimbaud does not come immediately to mind in discussions of the love 
lyric tradition, which is the main contextual focus for this section, his conceptualization of the 
self and the first-person pronoun in relation to language provides a useful point of departure for 
approaching destabilizations of the lyric “I” within the specific structure of the love lyric. By 
analyzing Rimbaud’s declaration that “JE est un autre” (“I is another”) in relation to Paul 
Verlaine’s particular use of a plural, feminine first-person pronoun, and Renée Vivien’s use of a 
first-person pronoun that embodies both masculine and feminine genders simultaneously, this 
section explores the ways in which these poets’ respective destabilizations of the lyric “I” 
function to queer the love lyric tradition, creating a space for queer subjectivity to emerge in a 
literary domain that is firmly intertwined, historically and structurally, with heteronormative 
constructions of identity and desire. 
 
Arthur Rimbaud’s “I” as Another  
 
Between the months of April and May of 1873, Rimbaud produced the poetic collection 
now entitled Une saison en enfer (A Season in Hell). The “I” is noticeably present throughout the 
text. But the pronoun functions in a particularly unusual way in the collection’s second section, 
entitled Délires I: Vierge folle (Delirium I: The Foolish Virgin). Rimbaud presents the text in the 
form of an emotional confession by the “vierge folle” (“foolish virgin”), who recounts the 
sorrows and sufferings she has experienced on account of her relationship with “l’époux 
infernal” (“the infernal husband”). Criticism has generally agreed upon an autobiographical 
interpretation of the text, reading in it a description of the relationship between Verlaine – as the 
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foolish virgin, and Rimbaud – as the infernal spouse.34 But it has also acknowledged that this 
autobiographical approach to the text, and to the collection as a whole, is at times an uneasy one. 
As Danielle Bandelier explains in Se dire et se taire: L’écriture d’Une saison en enfer d’Arthur 
Rimbaud (To Speak and to Silence: The Writing of A Season in Hell by Arthur Rimbaud) (1988): 
“rien n’empêche de considérer cette œuvre comme autobiographique, la parenté de contenu et de 
point de vue avec les œuvres de ce genre étant évidente. Cependant, tout ce qui pourrait 
permettre d’affirmer cette appartenance, de lever le doute, est systématiquement tu – en ce qui 
concerne le pacte autobiographique – ou faussé – en ce qui concerne les « signaux » du genre” 
(“there is nothing to prevent us from reading this text autobiographically, its subject-matter and 
point of view being clearly similar to other works of this genre. However, anything that could 
serve to confirm this categorization, to remove any remaining doubt, is systematically left out – 
with respect to the autobiographical pact – or falsified – with respect to autobiographical 
‘indicators’”) (27).35 It is clear that Délires I does not satisfy all of Philippe LeJeune’s conditions 
regarding the life-related content that it addresses, but it poses problems for the definition of 
autobiography on a narrative level as well, since its characteristic first person perspective is 
skewed.   
Rimbaud’s voice as author-narrator appears in the opening sentence of the text as he 
declares: “Écoutons la confession d’un compagnon d’enfer” (“Let’s listen to the confessions of a 
comrade from hell”) (102). In this declaration, he includes himself in the plural first-person 
subject of “écoutons” (“let’s listen”). But immediately following this sentence, he gives his 
 
34 See Danielle Bandelier, Se Dire et se taire: L’Écriture d’Une Saison en enfer d’Arthur 
Rimbaud, Éditions de la Baconnière, 1988, particularly pages 124-26, for a discussion of this 
question.  
 
35 See Philippe LeJeune. Le Pacte autobiographique. Seuil, 1975, particularly Ch. 1. 
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speaking position over to this “comrade from hell” (the title’s “foolish virgin”), who 
emphatically begins:  
 
Ô divin Époux, mon Seigneur, ne refusez pas la confession de la plus triste 
de vos servantes. Je suis perdue. Je suis soûle. Je suis impure.  Quelle vie ! 
Pardon, divin Seigneur, pardon ! Ah ! pardon ! Que de larmes ! Et que de 
larmes encore plus tard, j’espère !  
Plus tard, je connaîtrai le divin Époux ! Je suis née soumise à Lui. – 
L’autre peut me battre maintenant ! (102) 
 
(O divine Husband, my Lord, do not turn a deaf ear to the confession of 
the most pitiful of your servants. I am lost. I am drunk. I am impure. What a life! 
Pardon, divine Lord, pardon! Ah! pardon! Such tears! And such tears to 
come later on, I hope! 
Later on, I will meet the divine Husband! I was born His subject. The 
other one can beat me now!) 
 
 
The “je” (“I”) in these lines is spoken not by Rimbaud, but by another – the foolish virgin, whose 
first-person discourse comprises the remainder of the text. Rimbaud, as the infernal husband, 
appears only after the foolish virgin’s multiple repetitions of “I,” and is referred to simply as 
“l’autre” (“the other one:) in her declaration, “L’autre peut me battre maintenant !” (“The other 
one can beat me now!”). 
A few lines later, the foolish virgin eventually arrives at the heart of her confession, 
announcing:  
 
Enfin, faisons cette confidence, quitte à la répéter vingt autres fois, - aussi morte, 
aussi insignifiante ! 
 Je suis esclave de l’Époux infernal, celui qui a perdu les vierges folles.  C’est bien 
ce démon-là. Ce n’est pas un spectre, ce n’est pas un fantôme. Mais moi qui ai perdu la 
sagesse, qui suis damnée et morte au monde, - on ne me tuera pas !  Comment vous le 
décrire ! Je ne sais même plus parler. Je suis en deuil, je pleure, j’ai peur. Un peu de 
fraîcheur, Seigneur, si vous voulez, si vous voulez bien ! (102-03) 
 
 (In short, I’ll give my confession, at the risk of repeating it twenty times over, - 
just as lifeless, just as insignificant! 
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 I am slave to the infernal Husband, he who led astray the foolish virgins. None 
other than that very demon. He is not a ghost, he is not a phantom. But I, having lost my 
senses, damned and dead to the world, - I will survive! How to describe him to you! 
Words fails me completely. I am mourning, I am crying, and I am fearful. I need some 
air, Lord, if you would be so kind!) 
 
She confesses that the source of her suffering is her dependence on the infernal husband, who is 
not a phantom, nor a ghost, but a living demon. Over the course of the ensuing paragraphs, a 
description of this infernal husband slowly takes shape, revealing many details that appear to 
correspond with what we know about Rimbaud as a historical figure. As the author of the text, 
however, Rimbaud performs a sort of narrative de-centering in this description of himself. Not 
only is his self-depiction displaced into the character of the infernal husband; it also undergoes a 
degree of narrative refraction as it is presented through the perspective and “I” of the foolish 
virgin. She describes diverse aspects of his personality, behaviors, and opinions, revealing that 
“Il feignait d’être éclairé sur tout, commerce, art, médecine” (“he claimed to be well-versed in 
everything, business, art, medicine”), for example, or recognizing that “il pouvait être un sérieux 
danger dans la société” (“he could pose a serious threat to society”), or wondering why “il 
voulait tant s’évader de la réalité” (“he so wanted to escape reality”) (103-104). Sometimes the 
account is affectionate or nostalgic, like when she confesses: “Je nous voyais comme deux bons 
enfants, libres de se promener dans le Paradis de tristesse” (“I pictured us as two blameless 
children, free to wander in the Paradise of sadness”) (104). But these details are usually qualified 
with an acknowledgment of his underlying diabolism: “Sa douceur aussi est mortelle” (“His 
sweetness, as well, is lethal”), the foolish virgin warns (105).  
So where is Rimbaud as speaking subject in all of this? Even as the author-narrator of the 
autobiographical text, he manages to minimize the manifestations of his own subjectivity and 
voice. His presence as author-narrator in the introductory sentence, “Écoutons les confessions 
 126 
d’un compagnon d’enfer” (“Let’s listen to the confessions of a comrade from hell”), is only 
evident in the imperative’s invisible but implied “nous” (“we”). And in addition to this 
avoidance of an identifiable “I,” he manages to avoid speaking altogether beyond this one 
sentence, which states his intention to listen, rather than to talk. Positioned as listener alongside 
the other subjects (perhaps us as readers) of the “écoutons” (“let’s listen”), he appears more as a 
passive witness to this description of himself than an active and deliberate producer of it.   
The infernal husband is not depicted in third person throughout the entire text, however.  
At times, the foolish virgin quotes him, allowing him to speak in first person through an instance 
of direct discourse. Sometimes she introduces this discourse with statements such as, “Il dit: « Je 
n’aime pas les femmes. L’amour est à réinventer, on le sait […] »” (“He says: ‘I dislike women. 
We all know that love needs reinventing […]’”) (103). Other times, she simply quotes him 
directly, relying on the quotation marks surrounding his “je” (“I”) to differentiate it from hers: 
“« Je suis de race lointaine […] »” (“‘I am from an ancient race’”), “« Jamais je ne travaillerai 
[…] »” (“‘I will never work”’), etc. (103). As these narrative structures and punctuation serve to 
remind us, however, this “I” is a borrowed “I.” The foolish virgin is still the speaking subject in 
this confession, during which she is occasionally lending the first-person pronoun to the infernal 
husband. When he speaks in first person in the text, he is forced to speak through the “je” (“I”) 
produced and already circumscribed by the discourse of the foolish virgin. Of course, we must 
also not forget that just as the foolish virgin is ventriloquizing Rimbaud as the infernal husband, 
Rimbaud as the author of the text is ventriloquizing the foolish virgin. Every time someone 
speaks in this text, they are speaking through the “je” (“I”) of another.   
For the infernal husband, “I” is another; for the foolish virgin, “I” is another; for 
Rimbaud also, then, is “I” another? If we are to consider the larger, encompassing discourses 
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from within which Rimbaud as author of the text is himself obliged to speak, the answer is, in a 
sense, yes: The foolish virgin concludes, rather anti-climatically, the description of her 
relationship with the infernal husband in her summary remark: “Drôle de ménage !” (“Strange 
household!”) (106). But the connotations of this final image – the “ménage” as household with 
husband and wife – point to the circumscribing heteronormative discourse from within which 
Rimbaud writes. He presents himself and Verlaine in terms of a married couple (reinforced by 
the imagery of the “époux” (“husband”) and “vierge” (“virgin”)), and more specifically, in terms 
of a heterosexual married couple. While the foolish virgin may be hysterical and married to a 
demon who poses a serious threat to society, it is nonetheless a conventionally appropriate 
pairing of man and woman. Verlaine’s character is feminine and speaks with a grammatically 
feminine “je,” perhaps so that it might more efficiently and convincingly depict the nature of 
Verlaine and Rimbaud’s intimate relationship to nineteenth century readers. Or perhaps 
Verlaine’s character is a woman and Rimbaud’s a man because that is the only way in which 
heteronormativity identifies and legitimizes a household or couple in nineteenth century 
France.36 
The question of discourse and its constraining nature on the speaking subject also 
provides the basis for Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity. In “Critically Queer,” she 
explains why the “I” that we use to express ourselves is never fully our own. Part of the reason is 
that “where there is an ‘I’ who utters or speaks and thereby produces an effect in discourse, there 
is first a discourse which precedes and enables that ‘I’ and forms in language the constraining 
 
36 Several other discourses also shape Rimbaud’s subjectivity and self-expression, from the 
literary discourses of Romanticism, post-Romanticism, and Symbolism, to the religious 
discourses of Catholicism and Christianity. I will confine my discussion to heteronormative 
discourse because it corresponds most closely with the love lyric tradition. 
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trajectory of its will” (18). This discursive determinacy is embodied in parallel fashion in the 
narrative layers of Delirium I, where the infernal husband must speak through an “I” that is 
already circumscribed and determined by the discourse of the foolish virgin’s confession. And 
just as the foolish virgin must speak through the “I” that is produced by Rimbaud as author, in a 
similar manner, Rimbaud must speak through an “I” that is circumscribed and determined by its 
own encompassing discourses.  
As Butler explains, “The ‘I’ is thus a citation of the place of the ‘I’ in speech, where that 
place has a certain priority and anonymity with respect to the life it animates” (18). But she also 
highlights that “This not owning of one’s words is there from the start […] since speaking is 
always in some ways the speaking of a stranger through and as oneself, the melancholic 
reiteration of a language that one never chose, that one does not find as an instrument to be used, 
but which one is, as it were, used by, expropriated in, as a continuing of the ‘one’ and the ‘we,’ 
the ambivalent condition of the power that binds” (29). Such a perspective closely parallels 
Rimbaud’s corollary to the notion that JE est un autre (“I is another”). In his letter to Georges 
Izambard on 13 May 1871, he explains that, “Il est faux de dire : Je pense. On devrait dire : On 
me pense” (“It is untrue to say: I think. One should say: I am thought”) (249). Just as one does 
not use the language one speaks, but rather is used by it, as its object, not subject, one is also not 
the subject or agent of one’s thoughts, but rather, is subject to them. It is perhaps for this reason 
that Rimbaud appears to maintain little control over his poetic thoughts, enabling him to 
experience the act of thinking more “objectively”: “j’assiste à l’éclosion de ma pensée : je la 
regarde, je l’écoute : je lance un coup d’archet : la symphonie fait son remuement dans les 
profondeurs, ou vient d’un bond sur la scène” (“I am witness to my thought’s unfolding: I watch 
it, I listen to it: I pull on the strings with the bow: the symphony stirs in the pit, or leaps up onto 
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the stage”) (250). After his metaphorical bow stroke, he stands back, ready to see what 
symphony comes of it. 
If one never fully owns or controls one’s thoughts or one’s words, including the prized 
“I” of self-expression, to what extent can one’s subjectivity be self-determined and freely 
expressed? Butler believes that, when a baby is born into the world, it is subjected to an 
immediate and continuous gendering, which begins with the initial requisite declaration, “It’s a 
girl!” This declaration constitutes a performative use of language, in Butler’s theory, because it 
does not simply label an already existing girl subject, but rather begins to form the subject as a 
“girl.” It is the start of an ongoing and unending process of “girling,” which will establish the 
newborn baby as an identifiable and legitimate subject in the world. “This is a ‘girl,’” Butler 
explains, “who is compelled to ‘cite’ the norm in order to qualify and remain a viable subject” 
(“Critically Queer” 23). In other words, she must continue to perform her gender through various 
compulsory citations of “femininity” in order to be recognized as a viable subject in society. In 
this sense, “Gender is performative insofar as it is the effect of a regulatory regime of gender 
differences in which genders are divided and hierarchized under constraint. Social constraints, 
taboos, prohibitions, threats of punishment operate in the ritualized repetition of norms, and this 
repetition constitutes the temporalized scene of gender construction and destabilization. There is 
no subject who precedes or enacts this repetition of norms” (21). If there is no subject who 
precedes or enacts this repetition of norms, and if this repetition is rendered compulsory through 
various social constraints, then self-determination and free expression of one’s “individual 
subjectivity” appear to be quite limited, if not impossible.  
This is not necessarily the case, however. It may still be possible, from within this 
compulsory repetition of norms, to create space for the formation of a queer subjectivity. Butler 
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remarks that the very constraints of this “compulsory repetition of prior and subjectivating 
norms” are in fact also “the resources from which resistance, subversion, displacement are to be 
forged” (22). “If repetition is bound to persist as the mechanism of the cultural reproduction of 
identities,” she states in Gender Trouble, “then the crucial question emerges: What kind of 
subversive repetition might call into question the regulatory practice of identity itself?” (32).  
Whatever this subversive repetition may be, it must take place within the constraints of gender 
performativity in order to be most effective, since the performative nature of gender leaves no 
room for a viable subject as agent outside of its compulsory repetition of norms. The subject 
must continue to repeat the gender norms but may do so in an unexpected or deviant way. 
Agency “is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition,” Butler states 
(Gender Trouble 145). And it is through this varied form of repetition that the norms are 
“resignified,” as they gain additional interpretations and perhaps even lose their initial 
significations. In this sense, performativity can also be read as “the unanticipated resignifiability 
of highly invested terms” (“Critically Queer” 28). Its restrictive nature, with its compulsory 
repetition of norms, is at the same time the source of its possible queering. This queering does 
not throw off the confines of such norms altogether, but works within them, to resignify them, in 
the hope that they might gain additional, queer, interpretations or significations.  
I propose an examination of the French “Love Lyric” through the lens of Butler’s gender 
performativity since the genre is closely entwined with heteronormative discourse and since it is 
a poetic tradition that involves its own compulsory repetition of norms. The love lyric has 
arguably one of the most conventionalized literary structures, and it forms part of a long-standing 
lyric tradition that can be traced back to the Middle Ages. In this sense, it holds within itself 
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significant potential for a resignification of norms, performed by poets who repeat its 
conventions in subversive or misleading ways.   
 
Paul Verlaine’s Feminine “I”  
 
The love lyric can be traced back to the twelfth century troubadours of southern France 
and the thirteenth century trouvères of northern France, whose songs exalted the values of 
fin’amor, more commonly known today as “courtly love” (Kay et al. 41). The contemporary 
success of these songs, as well as their lasting effect on modern literature and cultural 
conceptions of love, is significant. “Even though few of these poets’ names are familiar to 
modern readers […], and many indeed were anonymous,” Sarah Kay acknowledges, “the 
scenario of the love-struck troubadour serenading his lady, or tales of lover-heroes such as 
Lancelot and Tristan, remain well-known cultural reference points” (16). There were also 
trobairitz, female authors of courtly love songs, most numerous in the region of Occitania 
between the mid twelfth and mid thirteenth centuries, but societal structure and social 
expectations ultimately led to a predominantly male tradition. Kay explains that the masculine 
bias of Medieval literary culture resulted from the period’s largely gendered access to education, 
as well as the question of who had the right to speak or sing in public, a right almost exclusively 
reserved for men (26). Since these songs were usually performed in the court or in public by their 
authors, this left little room for women’s voices and authorship. 
 The largely masculinist perspective of the courtly love tradition has had lasting effects 
on western representations of femininity, masculinity, and love relations. And as Kay explains, 
the figure of the lady, as the absent focus of this literary genre, does not necessarily present a 
realistic image of women, their desires, or their behaviors. “Fin’ amor […] is an imaginary 
corrective to the marriages dictated by dynastic and territorial interest which were the norm for 
 132 
aristocratic society throughout the Middle Ages and beyond,” she explains (41). Nevertheless, 
the literary tradition’s growing popularity lead to the rapid diffusion of courtly love literature 
throughout Europe, where the masculinist perspective of literary courtliness became increasingly 
present in “moral and political reality” as well (41). As a result, the woman, as a mostly silent 
object of desire who is praised (or condemned) by the male poet lover, as subject of this desire, 
remains a recognizable trope in modern-day culture. “These innovative fictions are not only the 
forebears of much modern literature,” Kay concludes, “they have also enduringly shaped our 
experience of love, desire, and gender” (16).   
 In addition to this thematic influence, the courtly love song has also had an enduring 
structural influence on the modern period’s love lyric, particularly with respect to the concept of 
the lyric “I” and its relation to the lyric “you.” As editor Dominique Rabaté confirms in his 
critical anthology, Figures du sujet lyrique (Figures of the Lyric Subject), the notion of the lyric  
“I” originates from the centrality of the author as composer and performer in courtly love songs, 
a role that becomes increasingly central to lyric poetry over the centuries: “L’histoire de la 
poésie occidentale semble se confondre avec la croissance, l’extension que prend au fil des 
siècles ce type de discours poétique fondé originairement sur l’oralité et la présence de plus en 
plus insistante d’un sujet d’énonciation qui l’organise” (“The history of Western poetry seems to 
intersect with the growth and extension, over the course of centuries, of a poetic discourse 
originally founded on the notion of orality and on an increasingly present speaking subject as 
organizer of the text”) (5). In the love lyric structure in particular, this lyric “I” is established in 
rather strict relation to a lyric “you,” often in the form of an apostrophe. As Yves Vadé remarks 
in “L’émergence du sujet lyrique à l’époque romantique” (“The Emergence of the Lyric Subject 
in the Romantic Era”), “L’apostrophe est chose commune dans la poésie lyrique. Dans la poésie 
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amoureuse en particulier, rien de plus habituel que de nommer la femme aimée (par son nom ou 
par un pseudonyme) et de s’adresser directement à elle” (“The use of apostrophe is common in 
lyric poetry, and in love lyric poetry in particular. It has become customary to name the beloved 
woman (either by her own name or a pseudonym) and to speak to her directly”) (18). This 
dynamic forms the basis of a structural paradigm which, by opposing the pronouns “I” and 
“you,” likewise opposes their associated positions of subject and object, speaker and listener, 
lover and beloved, male and female, while simultaneously aligning the “I” with the categories of 
“male,” “lover,” “speaker,” and “subject” of the discourse, and the “you” with the categories of 
“female,” “beloved,” “addressee,” and “object” of the discourse:  
 
    I   you 
    male   female 
    subject   object 
    poet   addressee 
    speaker  listener 
    lover   beloved 
 
    
But what if one or more of these poetic roles does not align with the love lyric’s 
conventional paradigm? For example, what if the “I” were not male, but female, or what if it 
were positioned on the same side of the paradigm as the lyric “you,” rather than in opposition to 
it? These variations on the conventional love lyric structure are enacted by Verlaine in the fourth 
of his six poems comprising the “Ariettes oubliées” (“Forgotten Airs”) section of his collection 
Romances sans paroles (Ballads without Words). The text was likely written at some point 
between 1872 and 1873, around the same time that Rimbaud is thought to have written Une 
saison en enfer (A Season in Hell). Does it dialogue with this text? If Verlaine is addressing 
Rimbaud in the texts, then perhaps, but the addressee is unclear. While some critics believe that 
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Verlaine is addressing Rimbaud, others believe that he is addressing his wife, Mathilde.37 In any 
case, the very fact that such disagreement exists can be attributed in part to Verlaine’s 
manipulation of specific love lyric conventions. Had he abided by the conventional paradigm, we 
could assume, as readers, that the “je” is masculine and most likely refers to Verlaine himself, 
and that his addressee is a feminine object of desire, such as his young wife, Mathilde. As the 
text reveals, however, such a conventional reading is not possible:  
 
Il faut, voyez-vous, nous pardonner les choses. 
De cette façon nous serons bien heureuses, 
Et si notre vie a des instants moroses, 
Du moins nous serons, n’est-ce pas ? deux pleureuses. 
 
O que nous mêlions, âmes sœurs que nous sommes, 
A nos vœux confus la douceur puérile 
De cheminer loin des femmes et des hommes, 
Dans le frais oubli de ce qui nous exile. 
 
Soyons deux enfants, soyons deux jeunes filles 
Éprises de rien et de tout étonnées, 
Qui s’en vont pâlir sous les chastes charmilles 
Sans même savoir qu’elles sont pardonnées.38 
 
 
(We must, you see, forgive ourselves for this. 
Only then we’ll be truly cheerful, 
And if our life should ever lack in bliss, 
Together, at least, we’ll be tearful. 
 
As sister souls, O let us blend 
With our tangled vows the childlike style 
Of wandering far from both women and men, 
In the sweet oblivion of our virgin exile. 
 
37 For a concise overview of critics’ various stances on this question, see Daniel Bergez, 
“Incertitude et vacuité du moi dans les ‘Ariettes oubliés’ de Verlaine.” Revue d’histoire littéraire 
de la France, vol. 82, no. 3, pp. 412-23, particularly pp. 418-19. 
 
38 “Il faut, voyez-vous, nous pardonner les choses.” Œuvres poétiques complètes, edited by 
Yves-Gérard Le Dantec. Gallimard, 1954, p. 123. 
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Let us be two young children, let us be two young girls 
Enamored by nothing and by everything smitten, 
Who grow pale in the bower as its leafy shade unfurls 
Without even knowing that they are forgiven.) 
 
 
The absence, in the poem, of the subject pronouns “je” (“I”) and “tu” (“you”) is further 
marked by the quantity of other pronouns in use, such as the “il” (“it”), “vous” (“you” – 
plural/formal) and “nous” (“us”) of the first line alone. This opening line establishes an 
immediate ambiguity with respect to who is talking, to whom, and the relation between the two. 
It begins with an expression of necessity, “il faut” (“it is necessary”), whose characteristically 
vague impersonal “il” (“it”) refers to no one in particular. The necessity in question, however, 
pertains to both the “vous” (“you” – plural/formal) and the “nous” (“us”) that follow. And how 
are we to interpret these two pronouns? Are they simply the plural equivalents of the lyric “tu” 
and “je” respectively? Or does this “vous” (“you” – plural/formal) represent an additional 
subject, or subjects, separate from the subjects of the “nous” (“we”) who are to be forgiven? And 
regarding this “nous” (“we”), does it combine both the lyric “je” and “tu”? Or, does it contain the 
“je” and previously mentioned “vous” (“you” – plural/formal), or perhaps the “je” and another, 
unspecified subject? And of course, what exactly is it that needs to be pardoned?  
 None of these questions can be answered completely or immediately, but the poem as a 
whole does offer some clarifications. The rest of the first stanza is spoken entirely through the 
subject “nous” (“we”) and it seems likely that this “we” refers to the conventional lyric “I” and 
lyric “you,” given their hope of future happiness together, and the passing reference to “notre 
vie” (“our life”). And, if there must be “des instants moroses” (“somber moments”), at least the 
subjects in question will experience them together, as “deux pleureuses” (“two weeping 
women”). As this designation reveals in its grammatically feminine plural ending, which pairs it 
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with that of “heureuses” (“happy”), two lines before, both the “I” and the “you” in this text must 
be feminine. Writing with an implied feminine “I” then, and writing in its plural form, “we,” 
Verlaine subverts several levels of the love lyric paradigm: First, he subverts the supposed 
alignment that places “I” on the “masculine” side of the paradigm; second, he collapses the 
supposed gender division between speaker and listener, and third, he calls into question the 
grammatical opposition between subject and object. Both the lyric “I” and the lyric “you” are 
subjects in this text, functioning through the pronoun “we,” and, endowed with their feminine 
genders, they appear more in a relation of assimilation than of differentiation. 
 The first line of the second stanza, with its subjunctive expression of desire, “O que nous 
mêlions, âmes sœurs que nous sommes” (“O that we might combine, sister souls that we are”), 
descriptively reinforces this inclination towards coalescence with its verb “mêler” (“to 
combine”). And the image of “âmes sœurs” (“sister souls”) points to a degree of affinity and 
congruence that functions on a more profound, spiritual or intellectual level. As the stanza 
continues, however, it becomes clear that it is not the subjects who are merging with each other. 
Rather, as the following two lines reveal, the two subjects wish to combine their “vœux confus” 
(“confused vows”) with the “douceur puérile / De cheminer loin des femmes et des hommes” 
(“childlike sweetness / Of wandering far from women and men”). But what are these “vœux” 
(“vows”), and in what sense are they “confus” (“confused”)? The ambiguity of the terms 
provides several possible interpretations: “vœux” perhaps first recalls the notion of wedding 
vows, while it also refers, in a more general sense, to any kind of resolution or expression of 
commitment. And the term “confus” has at least three general definitions: The “vœux” can be 
“confus” in the sense that the speakers are embarrassed or ill at ease; they can be “confus” in the 
sense that they are muffled, faint, or indistinct; and they can be “confus” in the sense that they 
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are chaotic, disordered, or muddled, much like the levels of the love lyric paradigm that the text 
is simultaneously destabilizing.   
And what about the desire to combine these “confused vows” with the “childlike 
sweetness of wandering far from women and men”? Such an image conceptually depicts the 
subjects’ persuasion away from a state of categorical distinction, especially in terms of society’s 
gender and sexuality. The “childlike sweetness” of such an experience recalls the pleasure, 
innocence, or naturalness often associated with childhood, as well as the somewhat forbidden joy 
of distancing oneself from adults and their society. And it is perhaps not from people, in general, 
that the subjects are distancing themselves; the speaker wants to wander far from “women and 
men,” in particular, and to do so, as the final line of the stanza reveals, “in the sweet oblivion” of 
the two subjects’ exile. In other words, perhaps the speaker desires to combine with these 
“confused vows” the sweet joy of being far from women and men, of wandering freely, forgotten 
by the compulsory gender categorizations that exile these two subjects from the social structure.  
The line recalls a particular phrase from Rimbaud’s Délires I, in which the “foolish 
virgin” reflects upon the bitter-sweet aspect of her relationship with the “infernal husband,” 
stating, “Je nous voyais comme deux bons enfants, libres de se promener dans le Paradis de 
tristesse” (“I pictured us as two blameless children, free to wander in the Paradise of sadness”) 
(Œuvres complètes 104). This intertextual correlation is reinforced by the following stanza of the 
poem, which begins with the speaker’s imperative declaration to be two such children: “Soyons 
deux enfants, soyons deux jeunes filles” (“Let’s be two children, let’s be two young girls”), the 
speaker concludes in the third stanza (line 9). And the declaration completes a series of 
identifications manifested by the verb “to be” throughout the text. In the first stanza, the verb 
appears in the future indicative with the promise, “nous serons bien heureuses” (“we will be truly 
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happy”), and “nous serons […] deux pleureuses” (“we will be […] two weeping women”). In the 
second stanza, it appears in the present indicative, with the expression, “âmes sœurs que nous 
sommes” (“Sister souls that we are”). And in the third stanza, it manifests in the form of a plural 
imperative, “soyons deux enfants, soyons deux jeunes filles” (“let’s be two children, let’s be two 
young girls”). These different manifestations of the verb “to be” parallel the overarching 
argument of the text, which begins with the poem’s opening expression of necessity, “Il faut” 
(“It is necessary”): While the first verse expresses a future happiness, and the second expresses a 
desire in the subjunctive, the third expresses a call to action in the imperative. In order to be 
“truly content” in the future, as the sister souls that they are, the subjects decide to identify as 
two young girls, or rather, to be two young girls.   
The last stanza continues with a description of these girls, “éprises de rien et de tout 
étonnées / Qui s’en vont pâlir sous les chastes charmilles” (“Enamored by nothing and by 
everything amazed / Who go off to pale under the chaste bowers”). The chiasmic depiction of 
them as “enamored by nothing and by everything amazed,” provides a familiar image of young 
children moving incessantly from one object of interest to another. But the image of their 
running along “to pale under the chaste bowers” is a little less clear, particularly with its use of 
the verb “pâlir” (“to pale”). Why would otherwise happy little girls turn pale once in the shady 
seclusion of the chaste bower? Perhaps the green shadiness simply subdues their colors, or 
perhaps they experience some kind of strong emotion like fear, pain, or the “sweet suffering” of 
love. The text ends with an equally ambiguous line, which recalls the pardon mentioned at the 
beginning of the poem: The young girls run off, growing pale in the shade of the bower, “sans 
même savoir qu’elles sont pardonnées” (“without even knowing that they are forgiven”). And 
with these words concluding the text, the initial question remains unanswered: Forgiven for 
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what? And by whom? And more particularly in this last stanza, what does it mean if the girls are 
unaware of this forgiveness? Is that a good thing or a bad thing, a sign of a carefree attitude or a 
somewhat tragic situation? Perhaps, in tone with the poem’s continuous inclination toward a 
state of coalescence, it is neither one nor the other, but a little of both: In their “Paradis de 
tristesse” (“Paradise of sadness”), the two subjects are amazed in one moment and grow pale in 
the next; they will be “bien heureuses” (“truly happy”) but also “deux pleureuses” (“two weeping 
women”); they are “éprises de rien et de tout étonnées” (“enamored by nothing and by 
everything amazed”). 
This continuous push toward forms of coalescence and amalgamation manifests on other 
levels of the poem as well. With respect to the poem’s thematic content, the speaker references 
“nos voeux confus” (“our confused vows”) and expresses the desire to mix them, in turn, with 
the “douceur puérile de cheminer loin des femmes et des hommes” (“the childlike sweetness of 
wandering far from women and men”). As mentioned above, this desire could be read in a larger 
context, as a desire to distance oneself from the hierarchical distinctions that organize society 
into its binary and gendered structure, and that exile the poetic subjects from this conventional 
social order. On a textual level, Verlaine as poet is striving to accomplish a similar 
amalgamation. He is mixing with his own impressionistic “confused vows” the sweet joy of 
distancing himself from similarly conventional, but poetic, distinctions: The “je” and the “tu” do 
not exist as separate entities in this poem, as the love lyric paradigm would have it, but are 
combined into the subject, “nous” (“we”). They also share the same gender, muddying the 
masculine/feminine sides of the paradigm; and finally, the subject’s decision to be two young 
girls, and its reflection in the grammatical elements of the text, destabilizes the speaker’s 
alignment with the masculine-lover-poet-“I” side of the paradigm.   
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The declaration “soyons deux jeunes filles” (“let us be two young girls”) is an unusual 
imperative in its literal sense, because it calls for a seemingly impossible act – to simply “be” 
another identity. As Butler has shown with respect to the constraining nature of discourse, the 
possibility for self-determination and free expression in terms of gender identity is extremely 
limited. Of course, in the poetic context, the imperative can be read figuratively, and such self-
identification and self-determination can, temporarily, take place through language. In 
“L’adresse lyrique” (“Lyric Address”), Joëlle de Sermet remarks on the lyric subject’s 
construction, which takes place in and by the poem: 
 
[…] le sujet lyrique, emporté par le dynamisme de la fictionnalisation, n’est jamais 
achevé, et même qu’il n’est pas. Le sujet lyrique, loin de s’exprimer comme un sujet déjà 
constitué que le poème représenterait ou exprimerait, est en perpétuelle constitution dans 
une genèse constamment renouvelée par le poème, et hors duquel il n’existe pas. Le sujet 
lyrique se crée dans et par le poème, qui a valeur performative. (63) 
 
([…] the lyric subject, animated by the dynamics of fictionalization, is never a finished 
product; it never simply is. The lyric subject, far from speaking as an already-constituted 
subject that is represented or expressed through the poem, is constantly in the process of 
formation, a process continually renewed by the poetic act, and outside of which it does 
not exist. The lyric subject creates itself in and by the poem, which has a performative 
quality.) 
 
 
Described in this way, the poetic text functions as performatively as gender with respect to the 
poetic subject that it constructs. And it appears to be through this performative process that 
Verlaine’s poetic subjects are able to “be” two young girls. Their feminine identity is constructed 
through the text. It is represented by a feminine lexicon (weeping women, sister souls, two young 
girls, etc.) and by feminine grammatical markers. And it is further reinforced on a poetic level, 
with the text’s use of only “feminine” rhymes, subverting the conventional alternation with 
“masculine” line endings. The poem’s meter, as well, is “feminine” in the sense that it is an 11-
syllable meter, identical to that brought back into practice by Marceline Desbordes-Valmore, 
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after having been adopted by Sappho centuries before and subsequently named the “Sapphic” 
meter.   
This use of textual, linguistic, and poetic conventions to construct an image of femininity 
constitutes a performative use of language, but at the same time, it also constitutes a subversive 
repetition of poetic norms. Verlaine’s variations on the conventional rhyme scheme, meter, and 
lexicon of the poem work in conjunction with his variations on the structure and organization of 
the love lyric paradigm. And it is through these subversions of convention that Verlaine is able to 
create space for a different subjectivity to emerge. The text is still recognizable as a love lyric 
poem through its subject-matter, structure, lexicon, and prosody, but the repeated conventions 
that enable such recognition vary slightly from the norm: most significantly, the implied lyric “I” 
no longer signals an identification with masculinity, and it no longer assumes a position of 
difference in relation to the lyric “you.” These small variations significantly destabilize the love 
lyric paradigm and render it unable to signify in the conventional way.   
Given the figurative nature of the subject’s imperative declaration to be two young girls, 
and given the textual construction of these feminine subjects, the resignification of norms that 
Verlaine enacts is confined to the text itself and to the duration of the poem. The feminine 
subjects do not exist outside the text. Their construction is only possible through the text’s 
imperative declaration, its destabilization of the love lyric paradigm, and its subversive repetition 
of certain poetic and grammatical conventions. But the limited nature of this queering effect 
offers a possible reading regarding the central question of the text – the question of forgiveness.  
Just as the resignification of norms is limited to the duration of the poem, so, it appears, is the 
need for forgiveness. The first line of the poem establishes this forgiveness as necessary for the 
girls’ future happiness (“Il faut, voyez-vous, nous pardonner les choses” (“We must, you see, 
 142 
forgive ourselves for this”)), but the last line of the text establishes a situation where it is no 
longer necessary (the girls are now “pardonnées” (“forgiven”)). Perhaps the wrongs to be 
forgiven did not pertain to a past dispute, but to a certain subversion of convention, that is, to the 
pairing of two young girls in a heteronormative society of “women and men,” or to the 
combination of an “I” with a “you” in the love lyric paradigm.   
 
Renée Vivien’s Androgynous “I”  
 
While Verlaine’s “Ariette oubliée IV” (“Forgotten Air IV”) succeeds in collapsing 
certain layers of the love lyric paradigm, the following poem by Renée Vivien reveals how this 
queering effect might extend beyond the limits of the text. By means of its lyric “I,” which 
embodies two sexes at once, the poem not only subverts the structure of the love lyric paradigm; 
it also succeeds in queering the reader’s reception of the text, as well as queering the larger, lyric 
tradition and heteronormative paradigm within which the text exists. The poem is entitled “La 
double ambiguïté” (“Double Ambiguity”), and it was published as part of Vivien’s 1903 
collection, Échos et reflets (Echoes and Reflections). Like many of the texts in this collection, it 
celebrates the ambivalence of dusk, the ephemeral moment between day and night, where light is 
dimming and sensuality awakening:  
 
 La double ambiguïté 
 
J’écoute avidement tes paroles dans l’ombre… 
Je goûte les langueurs et les parfums du lit 
Et la complicité des ténèbres, où sombre 
La Pléiade d’or que Sélanna pâlit. 
 
Tu souris, déployant ta chevelure blonde, 
Et le sommeil répand des pétales d’azur. 
La musique s’éteint. La nuit glisse sur l’onde 
Harmonieusement, ainsi qu’un cygne obscur. 
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Ma bouche a possédé ta bouche féminine 
Et mon être a frémi sous tes baisers d’amant, 
Car je suis l’Être Double, et mon âme androgyne 
Adore en toi la vierge et le prince charmant. 
 
 
(Double Ambiguity 
 
I avidly listen to your words in the twilight… 
I savor the languor and the fragrant linens 
And the collusion of night, in whose darkened heavens 
The Pleiades twinkle faintly, imbued in moonlight. 
 
You smile as you let down your disheveled coiffure, 
And sleepiness unfolds its petals of azure. 
The music dies out. The day is almost gone,   
And night glides in like a silent black swan.  
 
My mouth possessed your feminine lips 
My body quivered in receipt of your courtship, 
And my androgynous soul – For I am the Double Being –  
Adores in you the damsel as much as the prince charming.) 
 
 
In contrast to the impersonal “il” (“it”) that begins Verlaine’s poem, Vivien’s text 
immediately establishes the speaker through the first-person pronoun of “J’écoute” (“I listen”). 
The addressee is also clearly established through the “Tu souris” (“You smile”) at the beginning 
of the second stanza. Despite this clear distinction between the lyric “I” and “you,” however, the 
poem still succeeds in cultivating a sense of ambiguity. Like dusk – the moment of transition and 
overlap between day and night, the first stanza similarly combines images of light and dark. The 
speaker savors the collusion of darkness, whose pale moonlight makes the stars seem faint. And 
as Vivien’s use of the term “complicité” (“complicity”) highlights, this darkness has an 
appealing quality to it: It is “dans l’ombre” (“in the shadows”) that the speaker listens avidly to 
the words of the addressee and savors the “langueurs” (“languor”) and the “parfums du lit” 
(“scents of the bed”). The lexicon of these two lines also creates a degree of synesthetic 
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ambiguity: “J’écoute avidement tes paroles dans l’ombre” (“I listen avidly to your words in the 
shadows”) depicts the speaker as listening with a sort of sensual thirst to the words of the 
addressee. This image is reinforced by the expression “Je goûte,” in the following line, 
signifying both a figurative “savoring” and a more literal “tasting” of the dreaminess and scents 
of the bed.   
In addition to this ambiguous combination of sensual experiences, the poetic subject also 
combines varying degrees of agency and passivity. The transitive verbs beginning the first two 
lines are conventionally conjugated in the first-person singular, with the speaker as their subject, 
but in referring to sensory experiences, they simultaneously highlight the speaker’s more 
receptive role, and invert the qualities conventionally associated with the lyric “I” and “you.” As 
the first line reveals, the speaker is not speaking in this moment, but listening, and the addressee 
is not listening, but speaking. This combination and inversion of agency and passivity continues 
in the second stanza, in which the “I” appears to step back and to “cède l’initiative” (“concede its 
agency”), in Mallarméan terms, to a variety of other subjects: “Tu souris” (“you smile”), “le 
sommeil répand” (“sleepiness spreads”), “La musique s’éteint” (“The music dies out”), and “la 
nuit glisse sur l’onde” (“night glides in”). The stanza concludes by comparing the night’s silent 
arrival to a swan gliding smoothly and effortlessly through still water.  
But why is this swan “obscur” (“dark”)? It could be another instance of Vivien’s 
ambivalence between light and dark, where the characteristic whiteness of the swan is replaced 
with a contrasting, but equally appealing, blackness. The fact that it is a black swan in particular, 
however, attributes additional meaning to the image. As Jaan Puhvel explains in his philological 
study, “The Origin of Etruscan tusna (“Swan”),” “Words for ‘swan’ are frequently akin to terms 
for whiteness; collocations like niveos cycnos, candidior cycnis (Vergil), and albus olor (Ovid) 
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were poetic commonplace, while conversely a niger cycnus to the Romans was the quintessential 
rara avis in terris (Juvenal 6.165)” (209). In later centuries, the “black swan” was adopted as an 
expression of impossibility, given the presumption that only white swans existed (209). And 
after Europeans eventual discovered the existence of black swans, the expression came to serve 
as a metaphor for the weaknesses of a system of thought based on inductive reasoning and 
empirical observation. John Stuart Mill appears to be the first to use the black swan as an 
example of this problem (Taleb 311). In his philosophical work, A System of Logic (1843), he 
states that, “To an inhabitant of Central Africa, fifty years ago, no fact probably appeared to rest 
on more uniform experience than this, that all human beings are black. To Europeans, not many 
years ago, the proposition, All swans are white, appeared an equally unequivocal instance of 
uniformity in the course of nature. Further experience has proved to both that they were 
mistaken” (226). As a result of this error in judgement, until the discovery of white men and 
black swans, “mankind believed in a uniformity of the course of nature where no such uniformity 
really existed” (226).   
Through her image of the dark swan, Vivien incorporates into the poem a metaphor that 
recalls the possibility of variance in nature. As Mill explains below, the metaphor of the black 
swan underlines nature’s combinations of unexpected and supposedly distinct phenomena: 
 
The course of nature, in truth, is not only uniform, it is also infinitely various. Some 
phenomena are always seen to recur in the very same combinations in which we met with 
them at first; others seem altogether capricious; while some, which we had been 
accustomed to regard as bound down exclusively to a particular set of combinations, we 
unexpectedly find detached from some of the elements with which we had hitherto found 
them conjoined, and united to others of quite a contrary description. (226) 
 
 
Such an unexpected combination appears in the last stanza of Vivien’s poem, in which the 
speaker switches to past tense to recount what has occurred since the night’s swan-like entrance: 
 146 
“Ma bouche a possédé ta bouche feminine” (“My mouth possessed your feminine mouth”), states 
the speaker to the addressee, “Et mon être a frémi sous tes baisers d’amant” (“And my being 
quivered under your suitor kisses”). Here, the subject pronouns “I” and “you” disappear as the 
subjects are deconstructed into their composite parts – each subject’s “bouche” (“mouth”), the 
speaker’s “être” (“being”), and the addressee’s “baisers d’amant” (“suitor kisses”). It is not the 
speaker who possessed the addressee; it is the speaker’s lips that possessed the addressee’s 
“bouche féminine” (“feminine mouth”). But if the addressee’s mouth is “feminine,” why does it 
give the speaker its “baisers d’amant” (“suitor kisses”)? And if the speaker’s mouth is the one 
who possessed the addressee’s, why was it the speaker’s being that trembled under the 
addressee’s kisses?  
Vivien answers these questions in the last two lines of the poem, whose “Car” 
(“Because”) introduces the text’s conclusion: “Car je suis l’Etre Double, et mon âme androgyne / 
Adore en toi la vierge et le prince charmant” (“For I am the Double Being, and my androgynous 
soul / Adores in you the virgin and the prince charming”). This Double Being combines within it 
both masculine and feminine subjectivities. And this ambiguity is doubled by the composition of 
the addressee, who likewise combines both the female virgin and the male prince charming. 
Whereas Verlaine’s combination of subjectivities involved the pairing of two similarly gendered 
subjects (“je” and “tu”) into the plural subject, “nous,” Vivien’s involves the combination of two 
supposedly distinct and contrary subjectivities (masculine and feminine) within the one “je” and 
the one “tu.” As a result, Vivien’s Double Being functions in the same way as the metaphorical 
black swan: The love lyric paradigm, which, to take Mills words, “we had been accustomed to 
regard as bound down exclusively to a particular set of combinations,” has been shown to exist 
otherwise, where the masculinity normally bound to the lyric “I” and the femininity normally 
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bound to the lyric “you” have been unexpectedly detached from their respective pronouns and 
positions, and reorganized to form different and unforeseen combinations 
In The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2010), Nassim Taleb defines 
an event as a Black Swan if it meets the following three criteria: First, it is an “outlier” in that “it 
lies outside the realm of regular expectations”; second, “it carries an extreme impact”; and third, 
“in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after 
the fact, making it explainable and predictable” (xvii-xviii). Vivien’s Double Being appears to 
function similarly within the text: Something unforeseen takes place in the obscurity of the blank 
space between the second and third stanzas, and Vivien’s description of this event thoroughly 
destabilizes the lyric paradigm, as well as the belief system reinforced by heteronormativity. 
Looking back, the Double Being’s existence can be explained in retrospect when we consider the 
text’s ambivalence between contrary phenomena, such as light and dark, the subjects’ 
combinations of agency and passivity, and the ambiguity regarding each subject’s gender.   
In addition, this “cygne obscur” (“dark swan”) functions as a “signe obscur” (“obscure 
sign”), where the androgyny of the subjects must be deciphered with respect to the ambiguity of 
the text as a whole. And it is the obscurity of the poem’s signs that leads to the ambiguity of the 
poem’s signification. Beyond her ambiguously gendered lexicon, Vivien does not use a single 
adjective or noun whose grammatical markers would reveal a masculine or feminine gender for 
either the speaker or addressee.  In this sense, the androgyny of the lyric “I” and lyric “you” 
manifests on a linguistic, as well as thematic, level.   
But what function could such androgyny or duplicity be serving? Perhaps it is a literary 
representation of the author’s queer sexuality in terms of Karl Ulrich’s concept of “sexual 
inversion,” a common theory for homosexuality at the turn of the century. Rather than 
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conceiving of the possibility of attraction between similar genders, this theory explains 
homosexuality as a kind of double being, or hermaphroditism of the soul, as Foucault has called 
it (59). Or, perhaps the duplicity of the lyric “I” is a reflection of the text’s supposed double 
authorship. The collection, Échos et reflets (Echoes and Reflections), which contains “La double 
ambiguïté” (“Double Ambiguity”), was actually signed by Paule Riversdale, the collective 
pseudonym for Renée Vivien and Hélène de Zuylen de Nyevelt. Hélène de Zuylen was Vivien’s 
lover at the time, and the two collaborated on several texts. As Jean-Paul Goujon states in his 
editorial note to “La double ambiguïté (“Double Ambiguity”), however, he finds little evidence 
of collaboration in this text or in others of the collection. “Disons, pour résumer” que la quasi-
totalité des poèmes d’Échos et reflets doit, sans grand risque d’erreur, être restituée à Vivien” 
(“In short, almost all of the poems in Echoes and Reflections can safely be attributed to Vivien”), 
he concludes (499). 
Or perhaps this double subjectivity is already at play in love lyric poems, and Vivien is 
simply expanding an inherent androgyny that resides at the heart of the love lyric tradition. In 
“L’adresse lyrique” (“Lyric Address”), Joëlle de Sermet concludes that the love lyric poem is a 
“pure projection métaphorique de l’espace subjectif qui se scinde en sujet et objet” (“purely 
metaphorical projection of the subjective position, which is split between subject and object”), 
and that it functions “comme une tentative désespérée pour s’arracher au piège du solipsisme 
tout en se délivrant dans un « tu » qui n’est pas un alter ego vers lequel on s’élance mais une 
hypostase du « je »” (“as a desperate attempt to avoid solipsism by rendering itself through a 
‘you’ that is not an alter ego but rather a substitution for the ‘I’”) (93). This trace of the lyric “I” 
within the lyric “you” stems from the fact that the love object is ultimately the creation of the 
poetic subject itself. And much like the discursively produced poetic subject, this poetic object is 
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also created through the subject’s conventional reiteration of the pronoun “you” over the course 
of the love lyric tradition. In Queer/Early/Modern (2006) Carla Freccero considers the queerness 
of such a dynamic between the lyric “I” and lyric “you” in the context of Petrarchan love lyric 
poetry. She remarks that, on account of the poetic object’s similarly discursive production, 
“Laura comes to resemble, not so much an ‘other’ object of desire, but a kind of Petrarch in 
drag” (22). Laura is the literary creation of Petrarch, and as a result, the feminine subjectivity of 
the lyric “you” is ultimately shaped through the masculine subjectivity of the lyric “I.” For this 
reason, Freccero concludes, the Petrarchan tradition’s “explicit construction of a presumptively 
heterosexual desiring subject […] turns out to be strangely queer” (6-7).   
 Vivien incorporates into the linguistic and thematic layers of “La double ambiguïté” 
(“Double Ambiguity”) this hidden queerness that lies at the heart of the lyric tradition’s “I-you” 
relation. And as such, the resulting androgyny of the lyric “I” and lyric “you” can be exploited as 
an effective means of queering the reader’s reception of the text. The ambiguous gender of both 
the pronouns “I” and “you” in Vivien’s poem leaves the reader without any indication as to the 
gender of the speaking subject or its relation to the love object. Just as gender identification and 
desire are dependent and mutually exclusive, according to the heteronormative paradigm, so the 
love lyric structure depends on the subject’s identification in order to determine the object’s 
identification. Challenging the assumption of even one of these categories throws into question 
its relation to the others. This ambiguity in turn destabilizes the reader’s reception of the text, 
since the reader is forced to choose between several interpretive approaches: A reading based 
solely on conventions of the love lyric tradition, for example, would assume a masculine “I” in a 
relation of desire with a feminine “you.” A biographical reading, however, working under the 
tradition’s heterosexual assumption, would switch the interpretation to a female “I” and therefore 
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a male “you.” While knowledge of the author’s sexuality might further alter such a biographical 
reading to a female “I” and female “you,” etc. With such a variety of possible readings, none of 
which can be confirmed or excluded through either the thematic or linguistic aspects of the 
poem, the reader is faced with a choice. The necessary choice concerning which discursive 
context to use renders the reader conscious of the process involved in constructing a gendered 
subject through the discursive context of the poem. If the reader wishes to avoid such a heavily 
signified choice, the only form of reading that remains is a queer reading of indeterminacy and 
multiplicity.   
Given the variety of possible readings for this poem, it might also be interesting to 
consider the question of reader identification as a factor influencing approaches to the text. In 
other words, could such an indeterminate lyric “I” prompt different interpretations for different 
readers? Would a modern reader, with a twenty-first century understanding of queer sexuality 
read this text differently from a reader at the turn of the twentieth century? Might a male reader 
approach it differently from a female reader? A queer reader from a heteronormative reader? A 
trans* or non-binary reader from a cisgender reader, etc.? These questions extend beyond the 
scope of this text, but they point to areas of possible investigation regarding the relation between 
reader and lyric “I,” the notion of reader identification, as well as historical and cultural impacts 
on reader reception.   
In any case, however, by collapsing the paradigmatic relations between the lyric “I” and 
the lyric “you,” between subject and object, male and female, self and other, Paul Verlaine and 
Renée Vivien destabilize the foundational structure of the love lyric poem. Literary historian 
François Rigolot comments on the prevalence of this structural convention in today’s culture. He 
remarks that when reading a love lyric poem, “les publics masculin et féminin (lecteurs, 
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auditeurs et futurs poètes) s’attendent à ce que le poème mette en scène un Amant, que cet 
Amant parle à la première personne de sa situation amoureuse, et que ce soit une Dame qui 
incarne l’objet de son désir” (“masculine and feminine audiences […] expect that the poem will 
depict a Lover, that this lover will speak in first-person about his romantic situation, and that it 
will be a Lady who embodies the object of his desire”) (304). And he further remarks that, “Il ne 
sera pas déraisonnable de poser qu’en règle générale le discours amoureux s’organise autour de 
modèles thématiques et formels établis depuis longtemps, en théorie et en pratique, par la 
tradition essentiellement masculine de la fin’amor” (“It would not be unreasonable to conclude, 
as a general rule, that love discourse is shaped by longstanding thematic and formal models that 
were constructed, in theory and in practice, by the essentially masculine tradition of fin’amor”) 
(303-04). The love lyric structure has shaped Western love discourse for centuries. And by 
destabilizing the lyric “I” and the love lyric paradigm in this way, these poets have enabled the 
queering not only of the love lyric tradition, but also of a major participant in the discursive 
production of heterosexual love and heteronormative life.   
 
Conclusion 
 
From Marceline Desbordes-Valmore to Renée Vivien, the lyric “I” undergoes a variety of 
manipulations over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is refracted, split, 
doubled, and obscured. But with its resulting destabilization comes its potential for the creation 
of queer subjectivities. By working the weaknesses in its norms, the above poets have succeeded 
in forging a new trajectory in discourse, one that deviates slightly from the compulsory repetition 
of norms and creates space within such discourse for a deviant, queer subjectivity to form. This 
process of destabilization is neither straightforward nor linear, and it requires a particularly 
performative use of the first-person pronoun. As Butler specifies, a performative use of language 
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only “works” to the extent that “it draws on and covers over the constitutive conventions by 
which it is mobilized” (“Critically Queer” 19). The examples discussed in this chapter do just 
this. By writing with a heterosexual lyric “I,” Proust draws on the constitutive conventions of the 
lyric to queer modern-day conceptions of gay subjectivity and Romantic conceptions of poetic 
subjectivity. Marceline Desbordes-Valmore, Pierre Louÿs, and Renée Vivien likewise use the 
conventions of translation’s transparent lyric “I” to their advantage, while subverting them in the 
process. And the same can be said of Renée Vivien’s and Paul Verlaine’s participation in the 
love lyric tradition. Their subversive use of the love lyric “I” destabilizes the love lyric structure 
from within, collapsing aspects of the love lyric paradigm and queering the reductive 
heteronormative relations of identification and desire that the love lyric tradition has helped to 
construct.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE POETIC LINE 
 
A line of poetry is more than a syntactical arrangement of words; with these words come 
their denotative meanings and connotative associations, their syllable count, rhythmic qualities, 
timbre, and rhyming possibilities, as well as their material quality and disposition on the page. 
All of these elements contribute to our interpretation of the poetic line, and over the course of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, poets exploit and manipulate their signifying potential 
in a variety of ways. This chapter will approach the poetic line from a semantic, metric, and 
visual perspective. It will examine the ways in which the poetic line can express, both verbally 
and non-verbally, a poem’s queer subject matter or a poet’s queer identity. It will explore how 
the period’s “crisis of verse” facilitates the emergence of purely literary forms of queerness. And 
it will consider how visualizations of the heteronormative paradigm might correspond to poets’ 
experimental presentations of the poetic line upon the page. In this way, the chapter aims to 
analyze how certain poets’ exploitations and manipulations of the poetic line’s signifying 
elements relate to expressions, manifestations, and conceptualizations of queerness.   
 
Section 1: Signifying the Poetic Line    
 
 Given its many signifying elements, the poetic line produces meaning in a variety of 
ways, thereby rendering it particularly well suited to expressing different forms of queerness. 
The often highly figurative and connotative language of lyric poetry, for example, enables the 
poetic line to produce two levels of meaning – explicit and implicit. And by exploiting the nature 
of its implicit meaning production, the poet can blur the line between speech and silence, or 
between what is said and what is not said. How might this process facilitate closeted expressions 
of queerness? And can queerness be expressed through non-verbal elements as well, such as 
meter, rhyme scheme, or form? If so, what kind of interpretive issues are raised by such a 
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process? And finally, certain signifying elements can be manipulated in such a way that meaning 
production is entirely thwarted.  How might such a cultivation of meaninglessness relate to 
notions of queer negativity? 
 
Queer Connotations in Marcel Proust 
 
The beginning of Chapter 2 briefly touched upon Marcel Proust’s adolescent poem 
entitled “Pédérastie,” which appears to reveal, rather openly, a first-person declaration of queer 
desire: 
 
“Pédérastie” 
 
Si j’avais un gros sac d’argent d’or ou de cuivre 
Avec un peu de nerf aux reins lèvres ou mains 
Laissant ma vanité – cheval, sénat ou livre, 
Je m’enfuirais là-bas, ce soir ou demain 
 
Au gazon framboisé – émeraude ou carmin ! –  
Sans rustiques ennuis, guêpes, rosée ou givre 
Je voudrais à jamais coucher, aimer ou vivre 
Avec un tiède enfant, Jacques, Pierre ou Firmin. 
 
Arrière le mépris timide des Prud’hommes ! 
Pigeons, neigez ! Chantez, ormeaux ! blondissez, pommes ! 
Je veux jusqu’à mourir aspirer son parfum ! 
 
Sous l’or des soleils roux, sous la nacre des lunes 
Je veux … m’évanouir et me croire défunt 
Loin du funèbre glas des Vertus importunes ! 
 
 
(Pederasty 
 
If I had money from a boundless mint 
and sinew enough in hands, lips, loins, 
I’d shun the vanity of politics and print, 
and leave – tomorrow? No, tonight! – for lawns 
 
luminous with artificial green 
(without the rustic flaws of frost and vermin), 
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where I’d forever be sleeping with one 
warm child or other: François, Firmin? … 
 
For what is manly mockery to me? 
Let Sodom’s apples burn, acre by acre, 
I’d savor still the sweat of those sweet limbs! 
 
Beneath a solar gold, a lunar nacre, 
I’d … languish (an ars moriendi of my own), 
deaf to the knell of dreary Decency!)39 
 
 
This expression of queer desire appears to be most explicit in the poem’s second stanza, where 
the male poet announces, “Je voudrais à jamais coucher, aimer ou vivre / Avec un tiède enfant, 
Jacques, Pierre ou Firmin” (“I would like to forever love or live / With a warm-bodied boy, a 
Jacques, Pierre or Firmin”). Upon closer examination, however, the explicitness of the statement 
is tempered by its use of the conditional tense. The poet’s desire is contingent upon the 
hypothetical situation described in the first stanza: If he had a large sum of money, etc., he would 
escape to a rustic retreat and live forever with a young boy. Since the use of the imperfect tense 
implies that these conditions are not currently a reality for the poet, neither is his contingent 
desire to lead such a life.  
It is not until the poem’s third stanza that the conditional “je voudrais” (“I would like”) 
becomes the more direct “je veux” (“I want”). Here, the poet is expressing what he desires at the 
moment, regardless of the situation. However, as the verb tense switches to the more affirmative 
present indicative, the surrounding language becomes much more figurative. Whereas in the first 
and second stanzas the poet plainly expresses a hypothetical desire, in the third stanza he 
commands pigeons to snow, elm trees to sing, and apples to brown. How exactly are we to read 
 
39 Translation by Richard Howard. 
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this line? In what sense can pigeons snow and elm trees sing? Is there some implied reference in 
such images? 
 Richard Howard, a translator of Marcel Proust and Charles Baudelaire, sees in these lines 
a reference to Sodom. In his English translation of the tercet, he writes:  
 
For what is manly mockery to me? 
Let Sodom’s apples burn, acre by acre, 
I’d savor still the sweat of those sweet limbs! 
 
 
Where Proust refers to the “mépris timide des Prud’hommes” (“timid disdain of Gentlemen”), 
Howard sees a form of “manly mockery”; where Proust calls on pigeons to snow, elms trees to 
sing, and apples to brown, Howard reads a resigned call for Sodom to burn; and where the poet 
wants, until the point of death, to inhale “son parfum” (“his scent”), Howard interprets a 
passionate resolve to savor “the sweat of those sweet limbs.” If Proust’s evocation of snowing 
pigeons, singing elm trees, and browning apples does in fact refer to the force of his homosexual 
desire overcoming the wrathful and fiery destruction of Sodom, as the translated version implies, 
then such an articulation of queer passion is admittedly not immediately evident.   
As the apparent discrepancies between Proust’s and Howard’s versions reveal, a 
passionate declaration of same-sex desire can be simultaneously read and not read through the 
stanza’s figurative language. Howard does not read in Proust’s mention of pigeons, elm trees, 
and apples a description of a calm, country setting. Or if he does, he does not only read such a 
description. Howard’s translation highlights not so much the denotative nature of Proust’s words 
as it does their connotative nature, perhaps associating browning apples with heat and fire, 
snowing pigeons with falling ash, and elm trees with the acreage of Sodom’s orchards. In any 
case, Howard sees in these poetic lines a hidden, queer sense. This hidden sense only manifests 
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on the figurative level of the poetic line, remaining latent on the level of its more literal 
meanings. In this sense, the poetic lines of the third stanza facilitate an articulation of queerness 
that might not be able to manifest explicitly to the same degree.   
By facilitating the implicit articulation of queerness, the stanza’s highly figurative 
language blurs the line between speech and silence, between what is “said” and what is “not 
said.” The elusiveness of this line is central to the nature and functioning of what Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick considers a defining feature of the gay experience – the closet. “In the vicinity of the 
closet,” she remarks, “even what counts as a speech act is problematized on a perfectly routine 
basis” (3). She recalls Michel Foucault’s assertion that “Il n’y a pas à faire de partage binaire 
entre ce qu’on dit et ce qu’on ne dit pas” (“It is not a question of establishing a binary relation 
between what one says and what one does not say”), and that “Il faudrait essayer de determiner 
les différentes manières de ne pas les dire” (“We should be trying to determine the different ways 
of not saying things”) since “Il n’y a pas un, mais des silences” (“there is not silence, but rather, 
silences”) (38-39). These ways of not saying something are as integral to discourse as the ways 
of saying something. Sedgwick proposes that “closetedness” relies in particular on such an 
interplay between said and not said, since it is “a performance initiated as such by the speech act 
of a silence – not a particular silence, but a silence that accrues particularity by fits and starts, in 
relation to the discourse that surrounds and differentially constitutes it” (3). In the vicinity of the 
closet, queerness manifests as a silence whose nature is determined more by what is not 
explicitly said in discourse, than by what is said. The highly connotative language of the poetic 
line, which also pulls its significance as much, if not more, from what is not explicitly said, 
seems particularly well suited to the articulation of such closeted queerness.   
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Closetedness is a silence that gains its shape differentially from the discourse that 
surrounds it. But it is by no means a void. It is a space of latency, whose concealed and 
amorphous queerness exists in a sort of negative or concave space, shaped from without by the 
many ways of not saying something. Where exactly is this space to be found with respect to the 
poetic line? Its locus depends on our conception of, and approach to, “queer texts”: In the 
climactic third stanza of Proust’s poem, a latent queerness emerges from the figurative language, 
manifesting not through a labelling and denotative use of discourse, but rather, in the space 
opened up by what is not explicitly said. But how does one localize this latent queerness, given 
the difficulty of localizing that which is not said? Does it reside in the poetic line itself? in 
Howard’s reading of the line? in our reading of Howard’s poetic line? Or somewhere else? In 
other words, does the reader of the poem unveil a latent queerness or constitute it? Does 
queerness lie in the eye of the beholder, so to speak? Perhaps it is more a question of “residing” 
versus “manifesting,” where if a latent queerness resides in a poetic text, it manifests in the 
reader’s interpretation of the text. In either case, what exactly is required of the reader to access 
this latent queer signification? And how might this process of unveiling or constituting a poem’s 
queerness differ from reader to reader? These questions extend beyond the scope of the current 
chapter, but they point to areas of further discussion regarding where, in the poetic act, queerness 
resides and manifests, and whether the author or the reader is more “responsible” for a text’s 
queerness. 
 
Queer Impressions in Renée Vivien and Paul Verlaine 
 
What about non-verbal aspects of the poetic line, such as its rhyme scheme, meter, or 
form? How might these elements signify queerness? In The Gendered Lyric (1999), Gretchen 
Schultz examines the ways in which gender is inscribed into the poetic tropes and forms 
 159 
characteristic of nineteenth century French lyric poetry. With respect to Charles Baudelaire, in 
particular, she considers the feminine-masculine binary to govern a variety of relations seen 
throughout his poetry, “including those shared by dispersal and concentration, irregularity and 
regularity, body and mind, pleasure and work, dependence and autonomy, merger and identity” 
(188). To illustrate gender’s centrality to the dualist structures of Les Fleurs du Mal (The 
Flowers of Evil), she points to Baudelaire’s opening statement in Mon cœur mis à nu (My Heart 
Laid Bare): “De la vaporisation et de la centralisation du Moi. Tout est là” (“Of the vaporization 
and centralization of the Ego. Everything is there”) (qtd. in Schultz 188). And she turns to his 
sonnet, “La musique” (“Music”), whose lines alternate between a 12-syllable meter and a 5-
syllable meter, to analyze the unfolding of this aphorism through the metrical structure of the 
text.   
 
La musique souvent me prend comme une mer ! 
 Vers ma pâle étoile, 
Sous un plafond de brume ou dans un vaste éther 
 Je mets à la voile ; 
 
La poitrine en avant et les poumons gonflés 
 Comme de la toile, 
J’escalade le dos des flots amoncelés 
 Que la nuit me voile ; 
 
Je sens vibrer en moi toutes les passions 
 D’un vaisseau qui souffre ; 
Le bon vent, la tempête et ses convulsions 
 
 Sur l’immense gouffre 
Me bercent. D’autres fois, calme plat, grand miroir 
 De mon désespoir ! 
 
 
(Music will often take me like the sea! 
 When clouds are low 
Or in clear ether, I, towards my pale star, 
 Set sail and go; 
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With chest thrust forward and with lungs puffed out 
 My sails are tight; 
I climb the backs of all the heaped-up waves 
 As day turns night; 
 
Throbbing within me are the passions of 
 A suffering ship; 
The mild breeze, or the tempest and its throes 
 
 On the abyss 
Rock me. At other times, dead calm, the glass 
 Of hopelessness.)40 
 
 
“This sonnet,” Schultz proposes, “confronts the opposition of vaporization and 
centralization on the levels of rhythm, subjectivity, and thematic structure” (195). Regarding the 
rhythmic element, this opposition unfolds in the poem’s alternation between the “notoriously 
‘regular’” 12-syllable meter (the alexandrine) and the “oddly irregular” 5-syllable meter (the 
pentasyllable) (196). “Insofar as the abstraction of meter can carry meaning,” Schultz remarks, 
“the alexandrine signifies tradition and order in French poetry,” whereas the contrasting 
pentasyllable “has no specific tradition in the history of French verse” (196-97). The 
pentasyllable also creates the effect of deforming the alexandrine’s regularity by its being one 
syllable short of a hemistich, subverting the reader’s conditioned expectation of 6-syllable 
groupings (197). For this reason, Schultz reads in Baudelaire’s use of the alexandrine a 
representation of regularity and constraint, and in his use of the pentasyllable, one of irregular 
spontaneity and diffusion, characteristics aligning with Baudelaire’s centralization and 
vaporization of the subject, and with its overarching masculine-feminine duality. Such a reading 
leads Schultz to conclude that this alternation between two meters functions as a gender-coded 
 
40 Translation by James McGowan. 
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use of prosody, associating the alexandrine with masculine attributes and the pentasyllable with 
feminine ones.   
 If prosodic elements can signify gender in this way, could they signify queerness in a 
similar manner? If so, what might this look like? Renée Vivien’s “Sonnet féminin” (“Feminine 
Sonnet”), published in 1902, offers a possible example. The poem is written in the strictest of 
fixed forms – the sonnet, and in the most traditional of meters – the alexandrine. But with respect 
to the rhyme scheme, it flaunts a cardinal rule of French versification – the alternation of 
feminine and masculine rhymes: 
 
Ta voix a la langueur des lyres lesbiennes, 
L’anxiété des chants et des odes saphiques, 
Et tu sais le secret d’accablantes musiques 
Où pleure le soupir d’unions anciennes. 
 
Les Aèdes fervents et les Musiciennes 
T’enseignèrent l’ampleur des strophes érotiques 
Qui versent dans la nuit leurs ardentes suppliques, 
Ton âme a recueilli les nudités païennes. 
 
Tu sembles écouter l’écho des harmonies ; 
Bleus de ce bleu divin des clartés infinies, 
Tes yeux ont le reflet du ciel de Mytilène. 
 
Les fleurs ont parfumé tes étranges mains creuses ; 
De ton corps monte, ainsi qu’une légère haleine, 
La blanche volupté des vierges amoureuses. 
 
 
(Your voice is as languid as the lesbian lyres, 
As the excited air of sapphic melodies and odes, 
And you know well the secret of their entrancing modes 
Through which the sighs of ancient unions expire. 
 
The devoted Poets, with their consorted Musicians 
Instilled in you the expanse of sensual verse 
Which serenades, at night, its burning requests, 
In your soul dwells the candor of all these pagan women. 
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You seem to listen now to the echo of their chants, 
And as blue as the divine blue of infinite light, 
Your eyes reflect the azure of Mytilene’s heavens above. 
 
Flowers have perfumed your alluring, bare hands: 
From your body arises, like a warm, gentle breath, 
The lily-white pleasure of virgins in love.) 
 
 
The traditional gendering of the sonnet’s rhymes depends on whether the last syllable of 
the poetic line contains an “e muet” (silent “e”). If it does, the rhyme is labelled “feminine,” and 
if it does not, it is labelled “masculine.” All of the rhymes in “Sonnet féminin” are therefore 
feminine, meaning Vivien has systematically disobeyed a centuries-old rule. In his Petit traité de 
versification française (Short Treatise on French Prosody), first published in 1908, Maurice 
Grammont remarks that “Cette règle d’alternance, qui est à vrai dire la plus importante des règles 
classiques concernant la rime, a été observée jusqu’à nos jours” (“This rule of alternation, which 
is, quite frankly, the most important of classical rules concerning a poem’s rhyme, has been 
observed to this day”) (36). The principle of alternating between so-called masculine and 
feminine rhymes began as early as the fourteenth century, and it was prescribed and adopted as 
standard practice in the seventeenth century. Lyric convention continued this practice until the 
middle of the nineteenth century, when it was undermined by poets such as Théodore de Banville 
in his 1866 Les Exilés (The Exiles) or Charles Baudelaire in “A une mendiante rousse” (“To a 
Red-Haired Beggar Girl”), and by Symbolism’s vers libristes (The Riches of Rhyme 44-45).  
Grammont proposes, however, that an alternative distinction be established between 
masculine and feminine rhymes since in modern French, the silent “e” is no longer pronounced 
at the end of the line like it is in the line’s interior, leaving no strict phonetic difference between 
a masculine rhyme and a feminine one: 
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[…] cette alternance était très réelle et très nette à l’époque où l’on prononçait tous les e à 
la fin des mots ; mais aujourd’hui on n’en prononce plus aucun à la pause ; […]  En sorte 
qu’il n’y a plus la moindre différence sensible pour la finale entre fanfare et hasard ; 
entre un dé et une idée. Si donc on veut conserver l’alternance, et il y a tout avantage à 
n’y renoncer qu’exceptionnellement et en vue d’effets particuliers, il ne faut pas prendre 
garde à l’orthographe, puisqu’elle ne répond plus à la prononciation.  (105-06) 
 
([…] this alternation was very real and very clear when the “e” was pronounced at the 
end of words; but today it is no longer pronounced at the line’s pause; […] As a result, 
there is no longer the slightest noticeable difference in the ending of fanfare and hasard; 
between un dé and une idée. If, then, one wishes to preserve this alternation, and there is 
every reason to forego this feature only in exceptional circumstances and when seeking a 
particular effect, one must not pay attention to spelling, since it no longer corresponds 
with pronunciation.) 
 
 
Many poets and critics, however, continue to allege an impression of difference between the two, 
often associating feminine rhymes with a degree of softness and masculine rhymes with a degree 
of abruptness. In his 1861 Sapphic poem, “Érinna,” for example, Théodore de Banville writes: 
 
 Et j’ai rimé cette ode en rimes féminines 
 Pour que l’impression en restât plus poignante, 
 Et, par le souvenir des chastes héroïnes, 
 Laissât dans plus d’un cœur sa blessure saignante (lines 89-92) 
 
 (And I wrote this ode in feminine rhymes 
 So that its impression is all the more stark, 
 And, by the recollection of chaste heroines, 
 Leave its bleeding wound in many a heart) 
 
 
Similarly, in The Riches of Rhyme: Studies in French Verse (1988), Clive Scott asserts that the 
silent “e” at the end of a poetic line “lengthens the preceding accentuated vowel, or the voice’s 
dwelling on it” (47). And when this “e” is preceded by a consonant, Scott describes its effect as 
giving “resonance” to that consonant and creating the impression of “a dying echo or 
prolongation of sound” (47).  
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Is this effect perceptible through the accumulation of feminine rhymes in Vivien’s 
“Sonnet féminin”? In the opening lines of the poem, Vivien describes her addressee’s voice as 
having the languid quality of “lyres lesbiennes” (“lesbian lyres”), a descriptor which, through the 
prolonged [i] in “lyres” and prolonged [n] in “lesbiennes,” carries its own languid quality. And 
like the “soupir d’unions anciennes” (“sigh of ancient unions”) of the line’s rhyming pair, the last 
line of the stanza similarly enacts the phonetic prolongation of a sigh. With these languorous 
impressions manifesting phonetically throughout the text’s exclusively feminine line endings, the 
poem as a whole assumes the quality of a “dying echo.” And this quality is developed 
thematically, as well, over the course of the sonnet: the apostrophized love object knows not the 
fullness of the ambient melodies, but their secret – their whispered repetition (line 3); the love 
object appears to listen not to the harmonies of the Ancient stanzas, but to the echo of such 
harmonies (line 9); the addressee’s eyes hold not the blueness of the sky, but its reflection (line 
11); and the love object’s bare, alluring hands hold only the residual fragrance of the flowers that 
they once contained (line 12). Through its combination of phonetic and thematic “echoes,” the 
poem as a whole resonates with the sounds, sights, and scents of its Ancient setting.   
These vestiges and resonations are central to the queerness of Vivien’s poetic production, 
which draws from the historical intersection of lesbianism and lyricism. In the sonnet’s first 
stanza, the use of exclusively feminine rhymes reinforces this association. Rather than alternating 
between the sonorities of masculine and feminine rhymes, the line endings all resonate together, 
highlighting the mutual affiliation of their rhyming words – “lesbiennes,” “anciennes,” 
“saphiques,” and “musiques.” Their collective grouping ties lesbianism with Sapphism and 
lyricism, both of which are tied to the historical, cultural, and literary contexts of Antiquity. And 
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“Sonnet féminin” continues the tradition as both a literal and literary echo, a resonation of this 
Ancient Sapphic lyric production.    
But could the poem’s exclusively feminine rhymes signify queerness in another way? In 
“De quelques discours sur l’e muet” (“A Selection of Writings on the Silent e”), Christine Planté 
comments on the conceptualization of “isosexual” and “homosexual” rhymes: 
 
En poésie, quand on assiste, dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, à la crise du 
système édifié au XVIe siècle, les atteintes à la règle d’alternance des rimes révèlent une 
conscience aigüe chez certain(e)s poètes de ses implications symboliques, et tout un jeu 
avec les rôles et la morale sexuels. C’est alors qu’on pourrait parler de rimes 
homosexuelles, plutôt qu’isosexuelles, dont l’emploi apparaît d’abord dans des évocations 
poétiques de Sappho. (56) 
 
(In poetry, when we witness, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the faltering of 
a system constructed in the sixteenth century, certain poets’ deliberate disregard for the 
rule of alternation reveals a keen awareness of its symbolic implications and its interplay 
with sexual roles and morals. It is in this context that we can speak of homosexual, rather 
than isosexual, rhymes, which initially appear in Sappho’s poetic evocations.) 
 
 
By conceiving of rhymes as “homosexual,” Planté is not only attributing a gendered signification 
to their lack or inclusion of an “silent “e”; she is also attributing a sexualized signification to 
their organization into a rhyme scheme. In this sense, a subversion of the traditional alternation 
between masculine and feminine rhymes signifies a queer rhyme scheme. With the elimination 
of masculine rhymes from the text, this rhyme scheme removes the distinction of gender from its 
rhyme groupings, an organization that can be read as a symbolic representation of female same-
sex relations.   
But such readings, which metaphorically inscribe a poem’s queerness into its formal 
elements, pose certain interpretive problems. Verlaine’s inverted sonnet, “Sappho,” provides an 
example. This sonnet is the last of a series of six poems composing Verlaine’s “Les Amies” 
(“The Female Companions”) section of Parallèlement (In Parallel) (1889). All six texts address 
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the trope of female homoeroticism and are written in exclusively feminine rhymes. In this sixth 
sonnet, however, Verlaine also manipulates the order of its stanzas by putting its tercets before 
its quatrains: 
 
Furieuse, les yeux caves et les seins roides, 
Sappho, que la langueur de son désir irrite, 
Comme une louve court le long des grèves froides, 
 
Elle songe à Phaon, oublieuse du Rite, 
Et, voyant à ce point ses larmes dédaignées, 
Arrache ses cheveux immenses par poignées ; 
 
Puis elle évoque, en des remords sans accalmies, 
Ces temps où rayonnait, pure, la jeune gloire 
De ses amours chantés en vers que la mémoire 
De l’âme va redire aux vierges endormies : 
 
Et voilà qu’elle abat ses paupières blêmies 
Et saute dans la mer où l’appelle la Moire, -  
Tandis qu’au ciel éclate, incendiant l’eau noire, 
La pâle Séléné qui venge les Amies. 
 
 
(Intense, eyes sunken and breasts taut, 
Sappho, driven by languorous desire, 
Like a she-wolf haunts the frozen shore. 
 
She dreams of Phaon, forgetful of the lyre, 
And, finding that her tears are still disdained 
Tears her long hair in handfuls once again; 
 
Then she evokes, with endless remorse, 
The days when youth’s fire shed its purity 
Over verse singing love, soul’s memory 
Repeats to slumbering virgins evermore: 
 
And see how her pallid eyelids shudder, 
Leaping to the waves, called by the Fates –  
While that dark sea Selene illuminates, 
The pale Selene who avenges Lovers.)41 
 
41 Verlaine, Paul. Selected Poems in Translation, translated by A. S. Kline. London: Poetry in 
Translation, 2010, p. 129. 
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One could argue that this “inverted” structure of the sonnet reflects the “inverted” 
sexuality of Sappho, much in the same way as its exclusively feminine rhymes recall the 
exclusively feminine sensual unions of les amies. But since the sonnet’s form is not 
conceptualized in the same, gendered way as its rhymes, additional associations must be made 
for such a reading to take place. Specifically, we must think of Sappho’s possible lesbianism in 
terms of “sexual inversion” in order for the sonnet’s structural inversion to gain a metaphorically 
queer significance.42 Did Verlaine have such a theory in mind when writing this sonnet? Or is it 
an association attributed to the text after the fact, either by Verlaine’s contemporary readers, or 
by modern-day scholars? In other words, whose associations are we to consider as productive of 
such queerness? Verlaine’s or the readers’? And given the now outdated conception of 
homosexuality as a form of inversion, does the poem’s structure still signify queerness? Or was 
its queerness more salient in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when such a theory 
was more prevalent? These questions point to a general uncertainty regarding how the poem’s 
queerness changes with respect to the historical context in which it is written and read. 
A further problem with such a reading lies in the apparent facility of interpretive 
justifications and in the contradictory or inconsistent nature of its applications. In “Femmes 
damnées”: Saphisme et poésie (1846-1889) (2012) Myriam Robic comments on Verlaine’s use 
of inverted sonnets, remarking that “Cette inversion que l’on retrouve dans d’autres recueils ou 
manuscrits verlainiens […] donne lieu à diverses interprétations en lien avec l’homosexualité” 
(“This inversion, which we find in other collections or manuscripts by Verlaine […] leads to 
diverse interpretations related to homosexuality”) (135). She quotes Steve Murphy, who has also 
concluded that “Tous les premiers sonnets renversés patents de Verlaine évoquent, indirectement 
 
42 See Karl Ulrich’s The Riddle of Man-Manly Love for an explanation of this theory.  
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ou frontalement, l’homosexualité” (“All of Verlaine’s early inverted sonnets evoke 
homosexuality, whether indirectly or head-on”) (qtd. in Robic 135). In 2006, however, Nicole 
Albert, in her article “Du Sonnet féminin au sonnet saphique: Poétisation de la lesbienne chez 
quelques auteurs fin-de-siècle,” pointed out that this sixth sonnet addresses Sappho’s 
heterosexual love for Phaon: “Bien qu’elle se confonde avec Les Amies […], la dixième muse est 
présentée comme « oublieuse du Rite »” (“Even though she is grouped with Les Amies […], the 
tenth muse is presented as ‘forgetful of the Rite’”) (300). Albert considers the sonnet’s inversion 
to reflect this particular trope: “l’ordre traditionnel des strophes a été interverti (3/3/4/4) afin de 
traduire le retournement sexuel de l’héroïne. Au renversement des quatrains et tercets s’ajoute le 
renversement sinon des thèmes, du moins de l’atmosphère qui régnait dans les cinq pièces 
précédentes” (“the traditional order of the stanzas has been inverted (3/3/4/4) in order to convey 
the heroine’s reversed queer sexuality. The reversal of the quatrains and tercets is accompanied 
by a reversal, if not in thematic content, at least in the atmosphere depicted by the five preceding 
texts”) (301). In this sense, the sonnet’s inverted form reflects not Sappho’s homosexuality, but 
her heterosexuality. It is to be read not as a subversion of heterosexual norms, but as a 
subversion of the homosexual norms established in the previous five poems of Les Amies. 
Myriam Robic disagrees with this interpretation, stating that “La technique du sonnet inversé se 
rapporte plus volontiers, dans ce cadre, à la trahison du Rite lesbien considéré comme une 
véritable religion : intervertir quatrains et tercets transforme ainsi métaphoriquement Sapho en 
Judas” (“In this context, the technique of the inverted sonnet has more to do with the betrayal of 
the lesbian Rite, which is considered a veritable religion: the inversion of quatrains and tercets 
therefore metaphorically transforms Sappho into Judas”) (137-38). In this sense, the sonnet’s 
inverted form is a reflection of religious subversion rather sexual subversion. How can the 
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sonnet’s inversion signify both homosexuality and heterosexuality, as well as something other 
than sexuality all together? 
It is not just this particular text that poses interpretive problems. The same issue plays out 
on a larger scale, extending to Verlaine’s own queer sexuality and to the poem’s intertextual 
relation to similarly subversive forms. “En outre, pourrait-on voir dans ce sonnet inversé 
l’inversion sexuelle du poète ?” (“Furthermore, could one see in this inverted sonnet the sexual 
inversion of its poet?”), asks Robic (138). She refers again to Steve Murphy’s comments 
regarding the text and its author. He sees in Verlaine’s use of formal inversion and exclusively 
feminine rhymes an intertextual connection with Charles Baudelaire’s manipulation of such 
prosodic elements. In his own use of the inverted sonnet, “Bien loin d’ici” (“Very Far from 
France”), which was first published in 1864 and then in the third edition of Les Fleurs du Mal, 
Baudelaire enacts a similar subversion of stanza order and rhyme schemes: Murphy reads in 
Verlaine’s use of these same techniques in “Sappho” an effort to disguise his own queer 
sexuality by presenting his text as an intertextual reference to Baudelaire’s purely formal 
subversions: 
 
Le marquage intertextuel est si voyant qu’il nous semble servir presque d’alibi, 
dédouanant Verlaine de tout fantasme personnel en faisant apparaître ce sonnet – et les 
autres Amies – comme un exercice de style, subversif aux yeux de la loi, profondément 
respectueux cependant d’un autre ordre, poétique. Il se peut ainsi que l’indiscrétion que 
l’on pouvait reprocher à de tels emprunts – mais en s’affichant, l’indiscrétion s’annule – 
serve avant tout à contrer l’idée d’un investissement psychique personnel d’un poète 
homosexuel dans une poésie de l’homosexualité féminine. (Qtd. in Robic 138)  
 
(The intertextual branding is so conspicuous that it almost seems to serve as an alibi, 
clearing Verlaine of any personal fantasies by making this sonnet – and the others of Les 
Amies – seem like an exercise in style, subversive in the eyes of the law, but sincerely 
respectful of a different, poetic, order. In this way, the indiscretion represented by such 
borrowed techniques […] serves primarily to counter the possibility of a homosexual 
poet’s psychological investment in a poetic work about feminine homosexuality.) 
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In other words, Verlaine’s use of the inverted sonnet issues from his personal investment in 
homosexuality, which he wishes to conceal through the sonnet’s intertextual connection to 
Baudelaire’s use of formal subversion, which appears to arise without reference to 
homosexuality.   
This rather convoluted reading of Verlaine’s use of formal subversion leads to questions 
of essentialization. Even when Verlaine is apparently trying to avoid letting his homosexuality 
show through the text, it appears that his homosexuality is “showing” through the text. Why does 
the formal inversion of “Bien loin d’ici” not relate to Baudelaire’s sexuality, while the formal 
inversion of “Sappho” appears to stem directly from Verlaine’s? Robic also questions Murphy’s 
argument, but not its essentializing component. She proposes that Verlaine establishes an 
intertextual connection with “Bien loin d’ici” because Baudelaire’s text does relate to queerness: 
“Mais revient-il à Verlaine le mérite du recours stratégique au sonnet renversé pour aborder, 
explicitement ou implicitement, la question de l’homosexualité masculine et féminine ? Le 
sonnet « Bien loin d’ici » a-t-il un quelconque rapport avec le sujet saphique dans l’esprit de 
Baudelaire à tel point que la forme inaugure le sujet ?” (“But can Verlaine be credited with a 
strategic use of the inverted sonnet in order to approach, explicitly or implicitly, the question of 
masculine and feminine homosexuality? Does the sonnet “Bien loin d’ici” convey for Baudelaire 
the notion of Sapphism to the extent that its form inaugurates its subject?”) (140). She challenges 
Murphy’s claim that “Bien loin d’ici” is an example of purely formal subversion without 
underlying impressions of queer sexuality. And in order to do this, she links the poem’s trope of 
prostitution to Sappho, and Sappho to sexual inversion.   
This also rather convoluted interpretation of the text does lessen, to a degree, Murphy’s 
essentializing reading of Verlaine. By proposing an equally queer reading of Baudelaire’s text, 
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Robic moves beyond interpretations founded on the poet’s perceived sexual orientation. But in 
the same way that Murphy’s argument treats the formal subversions of “Sappho” as a reflection 
of Verlaine’s queer identity, Robic’s argument treats the formal subversions of “Bien loin d’ici” 
as a reflection of Baudelaire’s queer subject-matter. In each of these approaches to reading 
queerness in the formal aspects of a text, there must first exist a queer identity or subject-matter 
that such aspects “inaugurate,” as Robic terms it. In this sense, queerness manifests in the form 
of an impression. This impression is to be understood less in the sense of an “inclination” or 
“inkling,” and more in the sense of an “imprint” – a noticeable mark on the poetic line, 
materializing in its non-verbal components such as its meter, rhyme scheme, or form.   
While it can be enlightening to consider how the poetic line might signify beyond the 
word and its meanings to include the meter and its meanings, the rhyme and its meanings, and 
the form and its meanings, such readings are ultimately metaphorical. As such, they pose certain 
interpretive problems. First, we must consider the context that enables these elements to signify 
in such a way and recognize that their queerness changes according to the historical period, 
culture, or language in which the poem is written and read. But more important, we must take 
into consideration the source of such queer impressions. The more they are attributed to 
intentional manipulations on the part of the author to reflect a certain queer identity or subject-
matter, the more biographical or self-justifying the reading becomes. And the more these 
“impressions” are viewed as unintentional marks of the author’s queerness, the more 
essentializing the reading becomes. For this reason, I believe we should move beyond, if not 
away from, conceptions of queer poetry that stem solely from the queerness of its author or the 
queerness of its subject-matter. While it is interesting to see how queerness can be inscribed in a 
text, this type of queer reading only ever views the poem as a reflection of queerness, or as a 
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material on which an external queerness is imprinted. The rest of the chapter, however, aims to 
analyze poetic texts as sources of queerness in and of themselves, beginning with this section’s 
final poem, Stéphane Mallarmé’s “Sonnet en -x” (“Sonnet in -x”).  
 
Queer Negations in Stéphane Mallarmé 
 
 Whereas the queerness of Proust’s sonnet manifested in its implicit meaning, and the 
queerness of Vivien’s and Verlaine’s sonnets manifested in their non-verbal meanings, the 
queerness of Mallarmé’s “Sonnet en -x” (“Sonnet in -x”) manifests in its lack of meaning. In a 
letter to Henri Cazalis on July 18, 1868, Mallarmé discusses the initial version of this sonnet, 
which he describes as a “sonnet nul et se réfléchissant de toutes les façons” (“a nullified sonnet 
reflecting upon itself in every way”) (Œuvres Complètes 1:732). This section analyzes the poem 
with respect to these two defining characteristics – nothingness and reflection – in order to 
understand the ways in which it cultivates meaninglessness, and in order to explore how this 
process relates to queerness.   
 
Ses purs ongles très haut dédiant leur onyx,  
L’Angoisse, ce minuit, soutient, lampadophore, 
Maint rêve vespéral brûlé par le Phénix 
Que ne recueille pas de cinéraire amphore 
 
Sur les crédences, au salon vide : nul ptyx 
Aboli bibelot d’inanité sonore, 
(Car le Maître est allé puiser des pleurs au Styx 
Avec ce seul objet dont le Néant s’honore.) 
 
Mais proche la croisée au nord vacante, un or 
Agonise selon peut-être le décor 
Des licornes ruant du feu contre une nixe, 
 
Elle, défunte nue en le miroir, encor 
Que, dans l’oubli fermé par le cadre, se fixe 
De scintillations sitôt le septuor.  
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(Her pure nails on high displaying their onyx, 
The lampbearer, Anguish, at midnight sustains 
Those vesperal dreams that are burnt by the Phoenix 
And which no funeral amphora contains 
 
On the credenzas in the empty room: no ptyx, 
Abolished shell whose resonance remains 
(For the Master has gone to draw tears from the Styx 
With this sole object that Nothingness attains). 
 
But in the vacant north, adjacent to the window panes, 
A dying shaft of gold illuminates as it wanes 
A nix sheathed in sparks that a unicorn kicks. 
 
Though she in the oblivion that the mirror frames 
Lies nude and defunct, there rains 
The scintillations of the one-and-six.)43 
 
  
 The text’s “nothingness” manifests initially through various absences. In the first line, 
“Ses purs ongles très haut dédiant leur onyx” (“Her pure nails raised high displaying their 
onyx”), it is the referent of the possessive adjective “ses” (“her”) that is missing. To whose nails 
is the poet referring? The use of the third-person possessive adjective normally requires a pre-
established referent, but it is not until afterward, in the next line, that this referent becomes clear: 
the pure onyx nails belong to “l’Angoisse” (“Anguish”). This Anguish, like a statuesque lamp 
holder, holds up the evening’s many dreams, which are burned by the Phoenix. But the urn, 
which would normally collect the ashes of these dreams, is also missing. And as the following 
stanza reveals, it is one of many absent objects not populating the “salon vide” (“empty room”) 
of the poem’s setting. The most conspicuous of these absences is to be found (or not found) on 
the mantle, upon which there is, Mallarmé states, “nul ptyx” (“no ptyx”). The “Maître” 
(“Master”), who is also absent, has taken this object with him to draw tears from the river Styx.   
 
43 Translation by Henry Weinfield. 
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The ptyx, “objet dont le Néant s’honore” (“honorary object of the Void”), is the most 
central of the sonnet’s absences, with its nullity manifesting not only thematically (its absence 
from the room) and syntactically (the line’s reference to “nul ptyx” (“no ptyx”)), but also 
semantically (the word’s lack of definition). Many scholars have tried their hand at proposing a 
possible signification for this word, but as Ellen Burt reminds us in “Mallarmé’s ‘Sonnet en -yx’: 
The Ambiguities of Speculation” (1977), “the ptyx is first of all a group of letters that means 
nothing,” since the word does not exist in French (72).44 As she notes, the subsequent line, 
“Aboli bibelot d’inanité sonore” (abolished novelty of sonorous inanity), which is to be read in 
apposition to ptyx, comments further on its futility as a signifying word (72). Mallarmé himself 
confirms this purely material and meaningless quality when he writes in a letter to Lefébure on 
May 3, 1868: “[…] comme il se pourrait […] que […] je fisse un sonnet, et que je n’ai que trois 
rimes en ix, concertez-vous pour m’envoyer le sens réel du mot ptyx, ou m’assurer qu’il n’existe 
dans aucune langue, ce que je préfé[re]rais de beaucoup afin de me donner le charme de le créer 
par la magie de la rime” (“As it seems […] that […] I am writing a sonnet, and that I have only 
three rhymes in -x, devote your efforts to sending me the true meaning of the word ptyx, or to 
assuring me that it does not exist in any language, which I would prefer by far, so that I can give 
myself the pleasure of having created it by the magic of rhyme”) (Œuvres Complètes 1:728-29). 
He would prefer that the word not, in fact, have any meaning in any language.   
But what would be the purpose and the significance of such a word? Perhaps its value 
lies, like Mallarmé implies above, in its having been created from nothing, through the magic of 
rhyme. Perhaps, as critics’ readings have demonstrated, its value lies in its limitless potential for 
 
44 For a concise overview of the most prominent critical interpretations, see Ellen Burt, 
“Mallarmé’s ‘Sonnet en -yx’: The Ambiguities of Speculation,” Yale French Studies, vol. 54, no. 
1, 1977, p. 71. 
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meaning. Or perhaps, through its lack of assigned meaning, the word epitomizes the nullity of 
the poem as a whole. In any case, a word without a corresponding meaning thoroughly 
destabilizes our conception of the linguistic sign. In Saussurian terms, “ptyx” is a signifiant 
(signifier) without a signifié (signified) – a broken, or incomplete, linguistic sign. Its process of 
signification has been subverted by this lack of meaning, leaving the word “ptyx” to signify 
nothing other than “ptyx.” As Bertrand Marchal remarks in his editorial notes, “ptyx” is “un mot 
qui est son propre référent” (“a word that serves as its own referent”) (Œuvres complètes 
1:1190). With no external meaning to which it can refer, the word must, in a sense, fall back in 
on itself, becoming its own referent in a form of semantic self-reflection.   
This process of reflection ripples throughout the text, manifesting most noticeably in the 
sonnet’s tercets, where it occurs on various levels of the poetic line. It is seen in the phonetic and 
visual elements of line 9, for example. As Deirdre Reynolds remarks in “Mallarmé et la 
transformation esthétique du langage” (“Mallarmé and the Aesthetic Transformation of 
Language”) (1990), “les « or » du deuxième hémistiche reflètent lettre à lettre les « ro » du 
premier: ‘Mais proche la croisée au nord vacante, un or’” (“the or’s of the second hemistich 
reflect, letter for letter, the ro’s of the first: ‘Mais proche la croisée au nord vacante, un or’”) 
(214). This “or” (“gold”) undergoes another form of reflection in the following line, as it 
“agonizes” in accordance with the décor. The etymology of this verb, deriving from the Greek 
masculine noun agon, designates an assemblage, often of two inverted or opposing parts (Miller 
195). This meeting of opposites takes place in the third line of the tercet, “Des licornes ruant du 
feu contre une nixe” (“bucking unicorns kicking fire at a nymph”), where the combat between 
the unicorns and the nymph involves the symbolic opposition of fire and water.   
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In the final stanza of the sonnet, the concept of reflection is reinforced by the poem’s 
thematic content, through the presence of a mirror in the empty room: 
 
Elle, défunte nue en le miroir, encor 
Que, dans l’oubli fermé par le cadre, se fixe 
De scintillations sitôt le septuor. 
 
(She, naked and lifeless in the mirror,  
Even though in its framed oblivion are fixed, 
By their sparkling twinkle, the Seven Sisters.) 
 
 
Perhaps this “Elle” (“She”), reflected naked and lifeless in the mirror, refers not to the nymph of 
the preceding tercet, as scholars have tended to read it, but instead, to “l’Angoisse,” the 
personified Anguish of the first quatrain. Taking the form of a statuesque lampstand, her still, 
nude figure is framed in the mirror, along with the faint shimmer of a grouping of seven stars. In 
this way, it is both the “lampadophore” (“lampstand”) and the “septuor” (“septet”) that shine 
together in the mirror. The poem, as a whole, folds back on itself, with its final image appearing 
alongside its initial image. The poem’s line of symmetry is established between the sonnet’s 
quatrains and its tercets, hinging upon the conjunction “Mais” (“But”), in line 7, a conjunction 
that marks a reversal of direction, the beginning of a counter statement.  
So, while the first two stanzas establish various forms of absence, the final two stanzas 
reflect back upon this absence to form a “sonnet nul et se réfléchissant de toutes les façons” (“a 
nullified sonnet reflecting upon itself in every way”). This combination of absence and reflection 
is encapsulated in the very letter that renders the sonnet’s rhyme scheme so remarkable – the “x.”  
Perfectly symmetrical in all directions, the letter reflects upon itself vertically, horizontally, and 
diagonally. And as the primary symbolic designation for an unknown quantity or variable, it also 
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marks the absence of a relevant piece of information. In the case of “ptyx,” for example, it might 
indicate the word’s unknown or undetermined meaning (“ptyx” = x).   
 How does this lack of meaning relate to queerness? Queer theorist Lee Edelman valorizes 
meaninglessness as a central component of his notion of queer negativity. In No Future: Queer 
Theory and the Death Drive (2004), he revisits the stigmatic association of queerness with non-
reproductivity and its supposed resistance to society’s organizing principle of communal 
relations and reproductive futurism. He argues that “rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, 
this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might […] do better to consider accepting and even 
embracing it” (4). In this sense, “Far from partaking of this narrative movement toward a viable 
political future, far from perpetuating the fantasy of meaning’s eventual realization, the queer 
comes to figure the bar to every realization of futurity, the resistance, internal to the social, to 
every social structure or form” (4). Its resistance to “meaning’s eventual realization” is to be 
understood in Lacanian terms, where the political social order can be compared to the Lacanian 
Symbolic. As Edelman states: 
 
[…] politics may function as the framework within which we experience social reality, 
but only insofar as it compels us to experience that reality in the form of a fantasy: the 
fantasy, precisely, of form as such, of an order, an organization, that assures the stability 
of our identities as subjects and the coherence of the Imaginary totalizations through 
which those identities appear to us in recognizable form. (7) 
 
 
It is through language that we construct and conceptualize this social reality. And for this reason, 
Edelman explains, “Only the mediation of the signifier allows us to articulate those Imaginary 
relations, though always at the price of introducing the distance that precludes their realization: 
the distance inherent in the chain of ceaseless deferrals and substitutions to which language as a 
system of differences necessarily gives birth” (8).   
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By embracing its association with negativity, queerness does not participate in the 
reproduction of the social order and its reliance upon the signifying function of language. In this 
sense, Edelman explains, the queer can be aligned with the death drive, which is “opposed to 
every form of social viability” (9). He notes that while the drives, in general, are intractable and 
“unassimilable to the logic of interpretation or the demands of meaning production,” the death 
drive, in particular, “holds the place of what meaning misses in much the same way that the 
signifier preserves at the heart of the signifying order the empty and arbitrary letter” (9). Through 
its alignment with the death drive, queerness functions in a similar manner. Rather than striving 
to close the inevitable gap in meaning created by the differential nature of language, queerness 
inhabits this space of meaninglessness. In doing so, “queerness exposes the obliquity of our 
relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally 
necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the 
linguistic structures, that shape them” (7). For this reason, in order to subvert the reproduction of 
such a reality, queerness must embrace its negativity by relinquishing the drive toward 
reproductive futurism and by “de-idealizing the metaphorics of meaning on which 
heteroreproduction takes its stand” (27).   
Mallarmé’s “Sonnet in -x,” through its cultivation of meaninglessness, enacts such a 
process. As Mallarme himself proclaims, it is a “sonnet nul” (“nullified sonnet”), whose many 
levels of self-reflection subvert its narrative movement toward some external meaning by 
causing it to continuously fold back upon itself. This process of semantic self-reflection is 
epitomized in the central image of the text – “nul ptyx” (“no ptyx”) – an absent entity with an 
absent meaning. A signifier without a corresponding signified, the word “ptyx” subverts the 
conventional direction of linguistic signification: unable to connect with an external referent, it 
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can only fall back upon itself, and in doing so, become its own referent. Edelman asserts that in 
order to subvert the idealization of reproductive futurism, “queer theory must always insist on its 
connection to the vicissitudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier’s collapse into the 
letter’s cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of reference wherein it generates 
meaning itself” (7). The word “ptyx” plays on this very tension, with its lack of meaning 
highlighting the often-overlooked instability and insufficiency of language as a signifying 
system. Like the death drive and queer negativity itself, the word remains “unassimilable to the 
logic of interpretation” (9). And like the sonnet as a whole, it cultivates meaninglessness in a 
way that embraces the impossibility of every truly and fully representing reality through 
language. 
Mallarmé appears acutely aware of this impossibility: “On n’écrit pas, lumineusement, 
sur champ obscur” (“One does not write, luminously, against a dark background”), he remarks in 
“L’action restreinte” (“Action Restrained”), “l’alphabet des astres, seul, ainsi s’indique, ébauché 
ou interrompu” (“the alphabet of the stars, alone, presents as such, outlined or suspended”) 
(Œuvres Complètes 2: 215). Unable to produce such a cosmic language, “L’homme poursuit noir 
sur blanc” (“Man proceeds in black on white”), limited by the materiality of language and its 
inevitable shortcomings (2: 215). Through a literary enactment of queer negativity, however, 
“Sonnet in -x” cultivates the inevitable gap in meaning that results from the material quality of 
the signifier and the differential nature of language as a whole. And although the poem, as a text, 
is written “black on white,” its final reflection provides a glimpse of this more stellar form of 
writing. Behind the lampstand’s reflected image in the mirror appears the shimmering reflection 
of a constellation. Recalling the brightest part of Ursa Major – the Big Dipper, or the Pleiades 
constellation and its poetic associations, this grouping of seven stars also recalls, as Alain 
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Chestier has notably pointed out, the sonnet’s seven rhymes (48). With the seven stars 
corresponding to the seven rhymes of the “Sonnet in -x,” the poem’s concluding reflection is a 
cosmic representation of the text itself. Framed in the mirror’s reflection as a constellation 
shining against the midnight sky, this cosmic image of the sonnet is, however, that of a text 
written “luminously, against a dark background,” in its own sort of “alphabet of the stars.”   
As such, perhaps “Sonnet in -x” can be read as a form of writing that transgresses the 
limits of language, approaching what Mallarmé has called l’œuvre pure (the pure literary work). 
In Crise de vers (Crisis of Verse), he explains that “L’œuvre pure implique la disparition 
élocutoire du poëte, qui cède l’initiative aux mots, par le heurt de leur inégalité mobilisés ; ils 
s’allument de reflets réciproques comme une virtuelle traînée de feux sur des pierreries, 
remplaçant la respiration perceptible en l’ancien souffle lyrique ou la direction personnelle 
enthousiaste de la phrase” (“The pure literary work entails the elocutory disappearance of the 
poet, who concedes his initiative to the words themselves, mobilized by the friction of their 
irregularity; these words light up from their reciprocal reflections like a virtual streak of fire 
against precious stones, replacing the perceptible breath of the poet with the ancient murmur of 
the lyric or the individual, enthusiastic flow of the phrase”) (Œuvres Complètes 2: 211). In this 
pure literary work, the poet steps back, leaving the poetic lines and their composing words to 
correspond and signify among themselves. They light up on account of their reciprocal 
reflections, much like the reflected lines and words of “Sonnet in -x.” And their resulting 
shimmer, “like a streak of fire against precious stones,” recalls the concluding image of the 
sonnet: accompanying the reflection of the constellation is that of the statuesque lampstand 
holding up the evening’s burning dreams, whose flames shine against her onyx fingers. With the 
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Master conspicuously absent from the empty room, these two images of the text are left to reflect 
endlessly upon themselves, much like the structure, lines, and words of the poem itself.   
If “Sonnet in x” does in fact approach Mallarmé’s conception of “the pure literary work,” 
it is perhaps, in part, through its queerness. Rather than striving to fill the gap in meaning created 
by the inevitable inadequacy of language, Mallarmé steps back, allowing the poem to animate 
and perpetuate itself from within. Its endless solipsism and self-reflection create a “nullified 
sonnet reflecting upon itself in every way,” which embraces a form of nothingness and 
meaninglessness in what can be considered a literary enactment of queer negativity.   
 
Section 2: Versifying the Poetic Line 
 
The previous section looked at different ways of reading queerness in a poem. It 
considered the poetic line’s various signifying elements and their role in transmitting the poem’s 
queer subject-matter or in imprinting the author’s queer sexuality onto the materiality of the text.  
But it also considered a form of queerness that existed irrespective of the poem’s content or the 
poet’s identity. This final consideration moved beyond viewing the poetic line solely as an 
instrument of transmission for a queer subject-matter or identity. Rather, it viewed the poetic line 
as potentially productive of queerness, in and of itself. This section continues such a 
conceptualization of the poetic line’s queerness, but on a larger scale. It considers the poetic 
line’s evolution over the course of the century and examines the potential queerness of its 
various metric manifestations, ranging from Victor Hugo’s “dislocated alexandrine,” to Marie 
Krysinska’s free verse, to Charles Baudelaire’s prose poems.   
By separating the poetic line from the sexuality of the poem’s author or the sexual nature 
of the poem’s subject-matter, this section aims to create a purely literary context in which to 
analyze the nature and underlying mechanisms of queerness. What exactly makes something 
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queer? And what exactly constitutes an act of queering? Given its etymological origins in the 
notion of difference, for example, is “queer” simply that which deviates from the norm? If so, 
how far must it deviate? Or if non-conformity is not enough to establish queerness, what other 
factors ought to be considered? And how does queerness relate to instances of poetic innovation 
or the notion of poetic modernité? By examining large-scale metric manipulations of the poetic 
line over the course of the century, this section attempts to answer such questions about the 
nature of queerness in general. And in doing so, it aims to provide an initial framework of issues 
to consider when exploring the notion of literary queerness in particular. 
 
Victor Hugo and the Dislocated Alexandrine 
 
 In 1856, Victor Hugo published the poem “Quelques mots à un autre” (“In Response to 
Another”) in Les Contemplations (The Contemplations). Written in 1834, the poem is framed as 
a response to those critics who are unsettled by the “looser” nature of his poetic line. As the 
opening line of the poem reveals, Hugo does not reject such a characterization; rather, he 
embraces it as a natural consequence of his time:  
 
On y revient ; il faut y revenir moi-même. 
Ce qu’on attaque en moi, c’est mon temps, et je l’aime. (lines 1-2) 
 
(It has come up again; so I return to it myself. 
What they criticize me for is just a product of my time.) 
 
 
His critics compare the formal looseness of his poetic lines to inappropriately or insufficiently 
clothed women: 
 
Vous me criez : « Comment, Monsieur ! qu’est-ce que c’est ? 
La stance va nu-pieds ! le drame est sans corset ! 
La muse jette au vent sa robe d’innocence ! 
Et l’art crève la règle et dit : « C’est la croissance ! » » (lines 15-18) 
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(You howl at me: “Really, sir! What on Earth is this? 
The stanza is barefoot! The drama’s without corset! 
The muse throws to the wind her robe of innocence! 
And art devours its rules and claims: ‘This is progress!’”) 
 
   
And the last of these lines reveals the crux of his critics’ objections: in the name of progress, art 
is destroying its rules. In response to this artistic innovation, Hugo’s objectors declare: 
 
 « Que veulent ces affreux novateurs ? ça des vers ? 
Devant leurs livres noirs, la nuit, dans l’ombre ouverts, 
Les lectrices ont peur au fond de leurs alcôves. 
Le Pinde entend rugir leurs rimes bêtes fauves, 
Et frémit. Par leur faute aujourd’hui tout est mort ; 
L’alexandrin saisit la césure, et la mord ; 
Comme le sanglier dans l’herbe et dans la sauge, 
Au beau milieu du vers l’enjambement patauge ; (lines 39-46) 
 
(“Do these awful innovators call this verse? 
At night, in the dim light, before their opened black books, 
Young women are scared, as they read in their nooks. 
The Pindus hears their wild, beastly rhymes roar, 
And it shudders. By their hand, poetry is no more; 
The alexandrine seizes and devours its cesura 
Like the wild boar among the grass and the sage, 
In the middle of the line the enjambment wades;) 
 
 
Hugo and his fellow innovative poets have led poetry, as we know it, to its death. Like a savage 
animal, the alexandrine has attacked its cesura, and like wild boars, the poem’s enjambments 
plod heavily in the middle of the line. In the eyes of Hugo’s critics, these transgressions are 
enough to constitute a revolutionary act: 
  
Et m’écrasant avec tous les noms qu’on vénère, 
Vous lâchez le grand mot : Révolutionnaire. (lines 33-34) 
 
(And throwing out name after name – each legendary, 
As an insult, you label me: Revolutionary.) 
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Mimicking the tone of his critics, Hugo agrees: “Je suis le ténébreux par qui tout dégénère” (“I 
am the mystic figure by whom all is debased”) (line 9). He presents himself as responsible for 
the decadence of the poetic line, particularly in terms of its versification. And he concludes in a 
similarly exaggerated fashion, “Tout est perdu! le vers vague sans muselière !” (“All is lost! The 
line wanders, unconstrained!”) (line 77). 
But is Hugo’s poetic line really roaming around freely without constraints? Does he agree 
with his critics’ accusations of poetic degeneracy? Or is he mocking what he considers to be their 
exaggerated outrage? Michèle Aquien notes in “Victor Hugo et l’architecture du vers” (“Victor 
Hugo and the Architecture of the Line”) (2002) that Hugo is, in fact, “très respectueux des règles 
de décompte et de marquage syllabique à la césure” (“very respectful of the line’s syllable count 
and syllabic placement of the cesura”) (33). While the poet may claim in line 44 that 
“l’alexandrin saisit la césure et la mord” (“the alexandrine seizes its cesura and bites it”), the 
cesura remains practically untouched. It is not displaced, nor is it ever positioned in the middle of 
a word (Cornulier 81). What Hugo does change with respect to the alexandrine is the relation 
between the line’s metrical and syntactical organizations. As Aquien explains “c’est que 
l’articulation syntaxique de ses vers est décalée” (“it’s that the syntactical rhythm of his lines is 
out of sync”) (33). While this effect is particularly noticeable, according to Aquien, in the poems 
of La Légende des Siècles (The Legend of the Ages), it can also be seen in the poems of Les 
Contemplations (The Contemplations). In this particular poem, for example, Hugo writes in line 
11: “Vous aussi, vous m’avez vu tout jeune, et voici” (“You too knew me when I was young, and 
yet”), in which an auxiliary verb (“avez”) and its past participle (“vu”) straddle the cesura. 
Similarly, line 122 has its syntactical pause after “d’hier” but its cesura before it: “Vous êtes un 
ancien d’hier. Libre et sans voiles” (“You are yesterday’s news. Free and sans robe”).  
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While lines such as these might not appear particularly subversive to the modern reader, 
Hugo’s contemporaries are taken aback. His alexandrine has destabilized their conception of the 
poetic line: “Qu’est-ce que c’est ?” (“What is this?”), they exclaim in line 15, and “ça des vers?” 
(“they call this verse?”), in line 39. In La Fabrique du vers (The Making of the Line) (2009), 
Guillaume Peureux addresses such a discrepancy between modern and contemporary reader 
responses. He points out that “Un lecteur contemporain d’Hugo, rompu à la forme 6-6 du vers de 
douze syllabes, est dans un rapport de très forte attente à l’égard des vers qu’il lit” (“A reader of 
Hugo’s time, well-versed in the 6-6 structure of the 12-syllable line, has strong expectations 
regarding the lines that he reads”) (24-25). “Un lecteur d’aujourd’hui” (“A modern-day reader”), 
however, “qui a développé d’autres compétences et est différemment sollicité, perçoit moins 
aisément les équivalences et anomalies métriques que ne le faisaient des lecteurs lettrés d’il y a 
cent cinquante ans” (“who has developed other abilities and is called upon in different ways, is 
not as able to notice metrical relations and anomalies as were readers a hundred and fifty years 
ago”) (19). For this reason, the perceived effect of Hugo’s manipulations is lessened for the 
modern reader but heightened for the contemporary one.   
This discrepancy in reader response highlights the evolving nature of reader reception, 
and the need to take such evolution into consideration when analyzing the potential queerness of 
the poetic line. It is not enough to ask, “Is Hugo’s dislocated alexandrine queer?” One must also 
ask, “Queer with respect to what?” – That is, with respect to the alexandrine as Hugo’s 
contemporaries know it? Or with respect to the alexandrine as modern readers know it? Because 
each group “knows” a different definition of this poetic line. With respect to the alexandrine as 
we know it today, Hugo’s dislocated alexandrine is not particularly queer. This is because we are 
accustomed to reading a much more unstable version of the poetic line in terms of its internal 
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structure. As Jacques Roubaud explains in La Vieillesse d’Alexandre (The Old Age of Alexander) 
(1998), “Après [Hugo], et de son vivant déjà, les limites entre lesquelles il maintient son 
bouleversement du modèle classique sont franchies dans plusieurs directions non nécessairement 
compatibles de « desserrement »” (“After Hugo, and even during his lifetime, the limits that 
confined his disruption of the classical model are transgressed in various ways, and not 
necessarily in accordance with a form of ‘loosening’”) (107). After Hugo’s initial “loosening,” 
the alexandrine continues to change; its twelve syllables are arranged in various ways and its 
cesura is liberated from its central position between six-syllable hemistiches. Hugo’s structural 
modifications, however, are more limited in scope. Aquien remarks that above all, Hugo’s 
dislocated alexandrine does not alter the centrality of the cesura, the “clé de voûte” 
(“cornerstone”) of the poetic line (33). As such, this metrical architecture allows Hugo 
“d’instiller des variations rythmiques qui […] font entendre d’autres rythmes, liés à une 
fragmentation du vers, à l’intérieur de ce qu’est alors l’alexandrin, c’est-à-dire toujours et 
profondément un 6/6” (“to instill rhythmical variations that […] bring out different rhythms, 
which can be linked to a fragmentation of the poetic line, but which take place within the overall 
structure of the alexandrine – a line that retains, and profoundly so, its 6-6 structure”) (33).   
In this sense, Hugo does not challenge the alexandrine in terms of its use as a standard 
meter for the poetic line. In fact, his abundant poetic and theatrical production may even serve to 
reinforce it. But through his stylized repetition of its norms over the course of his literary 
production, Hugo creates a “looser” form of rhythmic expression, one that is not bound by the 
presumed alignment of meter and syntax. Much like Butler’s subversive repetition of gender 
norms, Hugo’s metrical modifications do not destroy, eliminate, or altogether transgress the 12-
syllable line; rather, they work with it, as a norm, repeating it in a stylistically subversive way. 
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For Hugo’s contemporaries, this dislocated alexandrine has a queering effect. It highlights and 
undoes the poetically constructed correlation between two aspects of the poetic line – its meter 
and syntax, in much the same way as Butler’s subversive repetition of gender norms highlights 
and subverts the socially constructed correlation between sex and gender.   
 
Marie Krysinska and Free Verse 
 
In 1882, Marie Krysinska published her third poem, “Symphonie en gris” (“Symphony in 
Gray”) in Le Chat noir, dedicating it to the founder of the Chat Noir cabaret, Rodolphe Salis.  
The text is unconventional in its prosody, with longer lines of differing syllable counts, no 
strophic divisions, and line groupings that do not rhyme. Krysinska republished the poem in her 
collection, Rythmes pittoresques (Picturesque Rhythms), in 1890 with a slightly different but 
equally unconventional form. In this later text, the lines are grouped more clearly into verses, but 
their inconsistent syllable count and their lack of rhyme scheme remain characteristic features. In 
a manner reminiscent of Charles Baudelaire’s “Harmonie du soir” (“Evening Harmony”), the 
poem describes the sensory and emotional experiences that arise with the approach of dusk: 
 
Symphonie en gris 
 A Rodolphe Salis. 
 
Plus d’ardentes lueurs sur le ciel alourdi, 
Qui semble tristement rêver. 
Les arbres, sans mouvement, 
Mettent dans le loin une dentelle grise. –  
Sur le ciel qui semble tristement rêver, 
Plus d’ardentes lueurs. –  
 
Dans l’air gris flottent les apaisements, 
Les résignations et les inquiétudes. 
Du sol consterné monte une rumeur étrange, surhumaine. 
Cabalistique langage entendu seulement 
Des âmes attentives. –  
Les apaisements, les résignations, et les inquiétudes 
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Flottent dans l’air gris. – 
 
Les silhouettes vagues ont le geste de la folie. 
Les maisons sont assises disgracieusement 
Comme de vieilles femmes – 
Les silhouettes vagues ont le geste de la folie. – 
 
C’est l’heure cruelle et stupéfiante, 
Où la chauve-souris déploie ses ailes grises, 
Et s’en va rôdant comme un malfaiteur. – 
Les silhouettes vagues ont le geste de la folie. 
 
Près de l’étang endormi 
Le grillon fredonne d’exquises romances. 
Et doucement ressuscitent dans l’air gris 
Les choses enfuies. 
 
Près de l’étang endormi 
Le grillon fredonne d’exquises romances. 
Sous le ciel qui semble tristement rêver. 
 
 
(Symphony in Gray 
 For Rodolphe Salis 
 
No more glowing lights on the heavy sky, 
Which seems lost in sad dreams. 
The motionless trees 
Trace on the distance their gray lace. –  
On the sky that seems lost in sad dreams, 
No more glowing lights. –  
 
In the gray air float calm, 
And resignation, and disquiet. 
From the dismayed earth rises a strange, superhuman murmuring. 
A cabalistic language heard only 
By attentive souls. –  
Calm, resignation, and disquiet 
Float in the gray air. –  
 
The vague silhouettes gesture like madmen. 
The houses squat as awkwardly 
As old women. –  
The vague silhouettes gesture like madmen. –  
 
It is the cruel and astounding hour, 
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When the bat unfolds its gray wings, 
And takes off, prowling like a criminal. –  
The vague silhouettes gesture like madmen. –  
 
By the sleeping lake 
The cricket sings exquisite romances. 
And gently brings back to life in the gray air 
Things fled away. 
 
By the sleeping lake 
The cricket sings exquisite romances. 
Under the sky that seems lost in sad dreams.)45 
 
 
The text’s title, “Symphonie en gris” (“Symphony in Gray”) recalls Théophile Gautier’s 
“Symphonie en blanc majeur” (“Symphony in White Major”), first published in 1849. Unlike 
Gautier’s Parnassian poetics, however, which value exactitude and rigidity in style and imagery, 
Krysinska’s poetic style is one of indeterminacy and fluidity. In this poem, the gray half-light of 
dusk contributes to the subdued and ill-defined nature of its images: there are no more “ardentes 
lueurs” (“fiery rays”) emanating from the sky, and objects are seen only in the form of 
“silhouettes vagues” (“faint silhouettes”); an imprecise sound rises up from the earth as a 
“rumeur étrange” (“strange murmur”); and an ambiguous emotional state results from “les 
apaisements, les résignations et les inquiétudes” (“the sense of calm, resignation, and worry”) 
floating around in the air. The poem creates an incantatory effect through its repetition of certain 
lines and line fragments. And the intermingling images, sounds, and sensations that result from 
this repetition undermine the linear progression of the poem, creating a sense of stasis or 
circularity. This circularity lessens the definitiveness of the poem’s conclusion, as well, where its 
final line recalls one of its initial images – “le ciel qui semble tristement rêver” (“the sky that 
seems to sadly dream”) of the first verse. This stylistic imprecision also results from the uneven 
 
45 Translation by Rosemary Lloyd. 
 190 
and inconsistent syllable count of the poem’s vers libre. Varying in length from five to fifteen 
syllables, each line (with the exception of the first) transgresses perhaps the last defining 
characteristic of the alexandrine – its syllable count. This transgression produces a poetic line 
that is no longer recognizable or definable as an alexandrine. 
In an article published in 1901, entitled “Évolution poétique : devant l’Académie” 
(“Poetic Evolution: Before the Academy”), Krysinska explains the reasoning behind her 
transgression of the alexandrine and her adoption of the vers libre. She proposes that “une œuvre 
poétique […], c’est avant tout une œuvre littéraire, avec des devoirs aussi rigoureux que le sont 
ceux du prosateur en ce qui concerne la beauté et la clarté du langage, la perfection du style, la 
précision, la justesse, l’imprévu des images, et aussi la concision, qui doit porter encore plus loin, 
s’il se peut, que dans la prose, le caractère, frappé et définitif, de la parole écrite” (“a work of 
poetry […] is first and foremost a literary work, its obligations as rigorous as those of prose 
when it comes to the beauty and clarity of its language, the perfection of its style, the precision, 
accuracy, and novelty of its images, as well as its conciseness, which must convey, even more so 
than in prose, if possible, the concrete nature of the written word”) (102). “Or” (“However”), she 
remarks, “les règles strictes de la prosodie exigent à chaque instant le sacrifice de ces qualités” 
(“prosody’s strict rules require poets to constantly sacrifice these qualities”) (102). In order to 
form an acceptable poetic line, poets are often forced to settle for a word or wording that fits 
metrically but not artistically. “Combien de fois […] les versificateurs doivent s’y résoudre pour 
obtenir le métrage nécessaire ?” (“How many times have versifiers had to settle in order to 
produce the necessary meter?”), she remarks (102). It is to avoid making such poetic sacrifices 
that Krysinska adopts the vers libre, which allows her to move beyond the forced symmetry of 
the alexandrine or other even-syllabled meters: “[…] ainsi sincèrement et bravement renoncée, 
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pour un motif d’honnêteté littéraire, la symétrie rompue donnerait une harmonie autre, mais belle 
et pittoresque” (“with its metric symmetry having been earnestly and valiantly renounced, for the 
sake of literary honesty, the poetic line’s asymmetry would create a different, but pleasant and 
picturesque, kind of rhythmic balance”) (102). This new rhythmic harmony in no way implies a 
depreciation of those poets who have produced great works in regularly metered verse: “Notre 
admiration pour eux est infinie” (“our admiration for them in immeasurable”), notes Krysinska; 
“Nous voyons dans leur œuvre des forêts de beautés si luxuriantes, si riches, qu’on n’aperçoit 
point quelques arbres abattus par place : les sacrifices littéraires” (“We see in their works such 
luxuriously beautiful and rich forests that we do not notice a few fallen trees: their literary 
sacrifices”) (102). Nevertheless, these poets’ adherence to a regular meter entails literary 
sacrifices that Krysinska is no longer willing to make. Her vers libre enables a fully sincere 
poetic expression that does not require the felling of any literary trees.   
Others do not see this new poetic line in such a positive light. According to Krysinska, 
the poet Sully Prudhomme, in his 1897 article, “Vues générales sur le mouvement poétique en 
France” (“General Perspectives on the Progression of Poetry in France”), “traite de dangereuse 
hérésie la tentative nouvelle, l’acheminement vers plus de liberté dans les cadres” (“considers 
this new practice, this progression toward a less restrictive framework, to be a dangerous form of 
heresy”) (102). And the poet Édmond Haraucourt writes, in Jules Huret’s Enquête sur l’évolution 
littéraire (1891), writes that the vers libre “supprime des difficultés pour les faibles, et des 
ressources pour les forts […] Il enlève toute cadence et n’offre rien en place” (“eliminates 
difficulty for the unversed, and resources for the well-versed […] It takes away every cadence 
and offers nothing in its place”) (qtd. in Huret 339). In Vers Libre: The Emergence of Free Verse 
in France 1886-1914 (1990), Clive Scott compares such remarks to Robert Frost’s opinion that 
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free verse is like playing tennis without a net (3). Scott notes that such negative reactions to the 
vers libre continue into the twentieth century and asks, “What is it in free verse that provokes 
such vituperations?” (4). He concludes: 
 
Clearly regular verse feels threatened by it, feels that free verse is a conspiracy to 
displace it; for, however much the verslibristes themselves may have claimed that free 
verse merely complemented and extended the resources of regular verse, they were also 
bound to justify free verse by its capacity to express, organically, the uneven life of the 
poet’s physiology and psyche, in a way that regular verse could not, and to reflect the up-
to-the-minute of the self and its environment (including current, colloquial language and 
pronunciation), which made regular verse look anachronistic. (4-5) 
 
 
Scott also attributes the perceived threat posed by the vers libre to the new poetic line’s 
subversively innovative characteristics: “In some senses free verse itself is to blame,” he 
remarks, “for, in its rejection of the time-honoured conventions of syllabicity, rhyme, and 
metricality, in its ousting of the aesthetic in favor of the expressive, of the formally anterior in 
favour of the instantaneous, of the enunciated in favour of the enunciation, of the lapidary and 
pre-ordained in favour of the contingent, the aleatory, the unpredictable, it could not but present 
itself as an anti-poetry” (2). While the vers libre is viewed as transgressive and expressive by its 
proponents, it is viewed as either unprincipled or subversive by its critics.   
But can it be viewed as queer? In The Straight Mind and Other Essays (1992), Monique 
Wittig talks about the nature of sexual categories and the need to think beyond them. She 
explains in “The Category of Sex” that the ideology of sexual difference “functions as censorship 
in our culture by masking, on the ground of nature, the social opposition between men and 
women. Masculine/feminine, male/female are the categories which serve to conceal the fact that 
social differences always belong to an economic, political, ideological order” (2). In this sense, 
“it is oppression that creates sex and not the contrary” (2). That is to say, sex does not exist, 
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except as a political category. Yet despite its politically contingent nature, “it grips our minds in 
such a way that we cannot think outside of it,” remarks Wittig (8). “This is why we must destroy 
it,” she argues, “and start thinking beyond it if we want to start thinking at all, as we must 
destroy the sexes as a sociological reality if we want to start to exist” (8). In order to think 
beyond the category of sex altogether, one cannot continue to work from within it to change its 
norms. It must be completely surpassed as an ideological framework. Therefore, in a literary 
context, thinking beyond the norm might function in the same way as Krysinska’s adoption of 
the vers libre. Rather than continuing to work with the twelve syllables of the alexandrine in 
ways that loosen or redefine its norms, Krysinska creates a new framework for the poetic line, a 
framework that altogether transcends the notion of a consistently-syllabled line.   
 In La Vieillesse d’Alexandre (The Great Age of Alexander) (1998), however, Jacques 
Roubaud questions whether such a liberated poetic line truly frees itself from the vestigial power 
of the alexandrine. He proposes that “le coup de force contre la métrique hugolienne n’a pas mis 
fin aussi simplement à la dominance de la prosodie traditionnelle ; que celle-ci, loin de continuer 
seulement chez ses héritiers officiels et affichés, se perpétue également ailleurs, et plus encore 
peut-être, sous d’autres déguisements, sous lesquels on ne s’attendrait pas à la trouver” (“the act 
of overthrowing the alexandrine – the Hugolian meter par excellence – did not simply end the 
reign of traditional prosody; this prosody persisted, not only in its official and self-declared heirs, 
but also, and perhaps even more so, in different clothing, clothing in which one would not 
necessarily expect to find it”) (10). One of these disguises, he argues, is the vers libre. In Chapter 
6 of La Vieillesse d’Alexandre, Roubaud discusses what he considers to be “le paradoxe du vers 
libre : à savoir qu’il ne l’est pas et que, loin de réussir à délivrer la poésie française des 
contraintes qui historiquement pèsent sur elle, son adoption a réussi en définitive à leur assurer 
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un sursis en les maintenant sous une forme dissimulée” (“the paradox of free verse, which is that 
it is not, in fact, free, and that the adoption of free verse, far from successfully liberating French 
poetry from its historically weighty constraints, ultimately grants these constraints amnesty by 
allowing them to continue in disguise”) (15). For this reason, the vers libre “se révèle être un 
instrument privilégié de la survie de l’ancien” (“turns out to be a valuable agent in the survival of 
the old regime”) (15). “Cet échec du vers libre éclate inséparablement de son triomphe” (“this 
failure will forever accompany free verse’s success”), Roubaud concludes (15). Despite the vers 
libre’s liberation from the metricality of the alexandrine, the hegemony of the traditional poetic 
line haunts the freer structure of the new poetic line. 
It is in the very act of establishing itself as “antinomique du vers traditionnel” 
(“antonymic to the traditional poetic line”) that the vers libre ensures its continued relation to the 
traditional poetic line (Roubaud 126). This is a relation of negation, but a relation, nonetheless. 
Roubaud points out that, by transcending the last defining characteristic of the alexandrine – its 
12-syllable meter – the new poetic line paradoxically recalls this meter through its conspicuous 
and systematic avoidance of it: “Ce creux dans les longueurs permises des vers est un moyen, 
évident, d’affirmer le vers libre contre le vers traditionnel, et il est sûr que cette affirmation a, au 
moins, au début, une vertu libératrice” (“This gap in permitted line-lengths is an obvious means 
to establish the vers libre as antonymic to the traditional poetic line, and this assertion 
undoubtedly has, at least initially, a liberating effect”), acknowledges Roubaud (125). “Mais, très 
vite” (“But very quickly”), he continues, “cette absence du douze deviendra aussi aveuglante que 
sa présence” (“this absence of twelve will become as glaring as its presence”) (125-26). Indeed, 
Krysinska’s “Symphony in Gray” appears to make a spectacle of avoiding the 12-syllable line: 
After a most conventional and symmetrical 6-6 alexandrine, employed conspicuously in the 
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opening line of the text, each of the subsequent lines contrasts with this symmetry and 
conventionality through its systematic avoidance of twelve syllables. Furthermore, since the 
majority of the text’s subsequent lines count eleven syllables, they create the expectation of the 
conventional 12-syllable line only to subvert this expectation by ending one syllable “too soon.” 
In this context, such lines are perhaps recognized less as “11-syllable lines” and more as “not-
quite-12-syllable lines.” The ghost of the alexandrine haunts the remainder of the poem, despite 
the text’s systematic avoidance of the 12-syllable line.   
Roubaud’s disbelief in the possibility of fully transcending the alexandrine recalls Judith 
Butler’s distrust in the possibility of fully escaping heteronormativity’s categories of sex and 
gender. In Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), Butler calls into 
question the feasibility and effectiveness of Wittig’s proposition to “think beyond” the category 
of sex. By transposing Wittig’s theory into the context of gender categories, she argues that, 
since there is no subject who precedes or enacts the compulsory repetition of gender norms, there 
is no possible subject position to be located outside of these norms and their constitutive power. 
For this reason, as Butler explains in “Critically Queer” (1993), any attempt to undermine the 
hegemony of heteronormativity must focus on “the subversive and parodic redeployment of 
power rather than on the impossible fantasy of its full-scale transcendence” (124).   
Given the impossibility of fully escaping heteronormativity’s power, Butler attempts 
instead to diminish this power by working the weaknesses in its norms in order to resignify them.  
On the other hand, Wittig’s attempt to completely transcend the normative category of sex leaves 
its power intact, despite her calls to destroy it. This failure to neutralize the power of 
heteronormativity is what limits the queering potential of Wittig’s proposition, according to 
Butler. As Butler explains with respect to her views on the queering potential of drag, “The 
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critical promise of drag does not have to do with the proliferation of genders, as if a sheer 
increase in numbers would do the job, but rather with the exposure of the failure of heterosexual 
regimes ever fully to legislate or contain their own ideals. Hence, it is not that drag opposes 
heterosexuality, or that the proliferation of drag will bring down heterosexuality” (“Critically 
Queer” 26). By thinking beyond the category of sex, Wittig simply creates a new ideological 
framework. And the creation of a new ideological framework does not necessarily diminish the 
power of the old one; it simply contributes to a proliferation of norms.   
Likewise, that the vers libre presents itself as opposed to the fixed-syllable poetic line 
simply implies that it creates a new ideological framework, a new norm, through which to define 
the poetic line. And according to Butler’s conception of queering, such a proliferation of 
definitions is not necessarily enough to queer the hegemonic norm – that is, the traditional, 
regularly-metered poetic line epitomized by the alexandrine. So, while Wittig’s desire to escape 
heteronormativity by transcending the category of sex finds its literary corollary in poets’ 
adoption of the vers libre, the feasibility and queerness of such a transgressive act remain 
questionable. Like Roubaud, Butler does not believe that full transcendence of the norm is 
possible. And even if it were, it would not be enough to constitute an act of queering. For Butler, 
an act of queering requires diminishing the power of the norm. Transcending or deviating from 
this norm, however, as opposed to resignifying it, may very well leave the norm’s hegemony 
intact. In this sense, the vers libre can be considered transgressive, with respect to the 
alexandrine, but it is not necessarily queer.   
 Transcendence and resignification need not be mutually exclusive, however, especially in 
the context of literary queerness. A literary feature can transcend a norm on one level and 
resignify it on another. In this case, while the vers libre can be viewed as an attempt to transcend 
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the alexandrine, it can also be viewed as a resignification of the poetic line more generally. 
Despite Krysinska’s denial of any revolutionary intent in her adoption of the vers libre, this new 
framework for the poetic line gained adherents. In 1887, Gustave Kahn published Les Palais 
nomades, a collection of poems written, in large part, in vers libre. Jules LaForgue, Jean Moréas, 
Jean Ajalbert, Édouard Dujardin, and Henri de Régnier, among several others, also published 
collections of free verse in the late 1880s and early 1890s (Scott, Vers Libre 67-68). As Daniel 
Grojnowski remarks in “Poétique du vers libre” (“Poetics of Free Verse”) (1984), “de 
l’expérience individuelle on est passé à l’expression d’une parole collective” (“a form of 
personal experimentation became a means of expression for an entire community”) (396). The 
vers libre was not just another norm in a proliferation of norms; its wide-scale adoption by poets 
in subsequent years made it a particularly competitive norm with regards to the possible prosodic 
composition of the poetic line. And as a competitive norm, this new prosodic framework has 
changed the defining characteristics of the poetic line in such a way that a consistent syllable 
count and rhyme scheme have evolved from essential to optional components. In other words, 
the vers libre may not have resignified our conception of the alexandrine, but it has, to a certain 
extent, resignified our conception of the poetic line in general.  
 A final qualification of queerness, however, involves the nature of such resignification.  
Is every act of resignification an act of queering? Not necessarily. Just as Butler’s resignification 
subverts a central dynamic of the heteronormative paradigm – the alignment between sex and 
gender – a resignification of the poetic line must subvert a central dynamic of the normative 
poetic paradigm. As Hermine Riffaterre has remarked, for example, the versed poem 
traditionally aligns its content with its form, “subordinating the development of meaning to the 
repetition of a form or variations upon this form” (115). This typically plays out through the 
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alignment of the line’s syntax with its meter, which is precisely the alignment subverted by 
Hugo’s alexandrin disloqué. It could be argued, however, that the vers libre’s resignification of 
the poetic line simply reverses the order of determinacy between form and content: rather than a 
line’s meter determining its syntax, as is the case with the traditional alexandrine, the vers libre 
uses its syntax to determine its meter. Placing syntax in a position of primacy and meter in a 
position of dependency does not undo the alignment between them; it simply switches the 
hierarchy. For this reason, the vers libre’s resignification of the poetic line does not necessarily 
queer the poetic line, just as its transcendence of the alexandrine does not necessarily queer the 
alexandrine. The vers libre is transgressive but not queer, and its mainstream adoption indicates 
an instance of poetic innovation but does not constitute an act of literary queering.     
 
Charles Baudelaire and the Prose Poem 
 
Fabienne Moore remarks that the prose poem began to emerge at the turn of the 
eighteenth century when French society and culture were in the process of moving away from 
the ideal of purity and toward a reality of hybridity: 
 
As absolute monarchy by divine right was assailed, a hybrid political system, 
parliamentary monarchy, was advocated. As the supremacy of blue blood became 
contested, the mixing of classes and origins appeared. As a single revealed religion 
abused its authority, philosophers fought for tolerance and coexistence of a plurality of 
religions. As explorers and travelers charted new territories, Eurocentric homogeneity 
had to confront global diversity and deal with the consequences of interpenetration. (12-
13) 
 
 
This move from purity to hybridity manifested in the period’s literary production, as well, where 
certain authors began to challenge notions of canonization and generic categorization (13). In 
1740, Voltaire published his Recueil de pièces fugitives en prose et en vers (Collection of Brief 
Works in Prose and in Verse). In 1768, Peyraud Beaussol gave us Écho à Narcisse, poème en 
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trois chants dans un genre nouveau qui tient de l’héroïde, de l’élégie et de l’idylle (Echo to 
Narcissus, a Poem in Three Parts in a New Genre Combining Héroïde, Elegy, and Idyll). And in 
1783, Abel Beffroy de Reigny published Marlborough, poëme comique en prose rimée 
(Marlborough, a Comical Poem in Rhymed Prose). And this growing interest in juxtaposing 
prose and poetry found its most obvious outlet in the period’s prose translations of texts that 
were originally in verse (125). Moore points to Jean-Baptiste de Mirabaud, in particular, whose 
1724 prose translations of Tasso’s Jerusalem Delivered proved to be highly successful works of 
literature. “The success of Tasso’s poem and its prose translation spurred the vogue for more 
modern, hybrid poetry – lyrical as well as epic – later in the eighteenth century,” Moore argues 
(127).  
With the increasing popularity of such modern, hybrid poetry, various pseudo-
translations soon appeared. A year after Mirabaud’s translation of Tasso, for example, 
Montesquieu deceptively published Le Temple de Gnide (The Temple of Gnidus) as a set of 
seven prose translations of Greek verse. James MacPherson followed suit, publishing his 1760s 
English “translations” of Ossian’s epic poems. And as Suzanne Bernard conjectures, 
Montesquieu and MacPherson are likely to have inspired the prose poems of Évariste de Parny 
who published his Chansons madécasses in 1787, presenting them as French translations of 
Madagascan songs (28). The trend continued through the nineteenth century with the pseudo-
translations of Chateaubriand and Eugène Hugo also taking the form of prose poems. Bernard 
believes that this consistent use of pseudo-translation not only allowed authors to claim more 
exotic origins for their literary compositions, but also served to justify their experimentation with 
prosaic characteristics in a classical lyric context: “les brusqueries du style, le manque de 
transitions, les expressions pittoresques ou réalistes, on souffre tout cela quand on le met sur le 
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compte d’une poésie primitive, ou tout au moins étrangère” (“the stylistic abruptness, the lack of 
transitions, the picturesque or realist expressions – all of these things could be tolerated when 
attributed to a ‘primitive,’ or at least foreign, poetry”), she explains (35). Through their use of 
pseudo-translation, poets were able to justify their own experimentations in the new genre.  
As a result of this strategic use of pseudo-translation, a new truth came to light: “que la 
rime et la mesure ne sont pas tout dans un poème” (“that there is more to a poem than rhyme and 
meter”) (Bernard 24). The prose poems produced by the likes of MacPherson, Parny, and 
Chateaubriand may lack versification, but this does not mean that they lack “poeticity.” Poetry is 
more than versification, and a poem is not defined by its form. Aloysius Bertrand, who, in the 
nineteenth century, elected to write prose poems outside the pretext of translation, embraced this 
novel conceptualization of the poem. Although Bertrand diminishes his authorship of Gaspard 
de la Nuit – Fantaisies à la manière de Rembrandt et de Callot (Gaspard of the Night – 
Fantasies in the Manner of Rembrandt and Callot), he does not justify its poems’ prose form 
through the pretext of translation. In his introduction to the text, he presents them as original 
poetic compositions, written initially and intentionally in prose by a certain Monsieur Gaspard de 
la Nuit, who gave him the manuscript.  
In the dedication opening his collection of prose poems, Charles Baudelaire explains that 
it was in leafing through Gaspard de la Nuit that he had the idea to attempt something similar 
himself, “et d’appliquer à la description de la vie moderne, ou plutôt d’une vie moderne et plus 
abstraite, le procédé que [Bertrand] avait appliqué à la peinture de la vie ancienne, si 
étrangement pittoresque” (“and to apply to a description of modern life, or rather, to a 
description of a modern and more abstract life, the process that [Bertrand] had applied to the 
depiction, so strangely picturesque, of historicized life”) (Œuvres vi). The process that Bertrand 
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had applied to his depictions of a picturesque medieval life in Gaspard de la Nuit seemed 
particularly apt, in Baudelaire’s opinion, to accommodate the fluctuating and contrasting 
“mouvements lyriques de l’âme” (“lyrical movements of the soul”), “ondulations de la rêverie” 
(“wanderings of reveries”), and “soubresauts de la conscience” (“sudden shifts of conscience”) 
that characterize this vie moderne (Œuvres vi).  
In “Le Confiteor de l’artiste” (“The Artist’s Confiteor”), the third of his Petits poëmes en 
prose (Little Poems in Prose), Baudelaire explicitly addresses the conflicted mental states that 
typify his experience as an artist of modernité. The text, which was published in 1862, depicts 
the initial attractiveness, and subsequent repulsiveness, of the infinite sky and sea on an autumn 
evening, and it reflects upon the poet’s impression of powerlessness in the face of such beauty: 
 
Le Confiteor de l’artiste 
 
 Que les fins de journées d’automne sont pénétrantes ! Ah ! pénétrantes jusqu’à la 
douleur ! car il est de certaines sensations délicieuses dont le vague n’exclut pas 
l’intensité ; et il n’est pas de pointe plus acérée que celle de l’Infini. 
 Grand délice que celui de noyer son regard dans l’immensité du ciel et de la mer ! 
Solitude, silence, incomparable chasteté de l’azur ! une petite voile frissonnante à 
l’horizon, et qui, par sa petitesse et son isolement, imite mon irrémédiable existence, 
mélodie monotone de la houle, toutes ces choses pensent par moi, ou je pense par elles 
(car dans la grandeur de la rêverie, le moi se perd vite !) ; elles pensent, dis-je, mais 
musicalement et pittoresquement, sans arguties, sans syllogismes, sans déductions. 
 Toutefois, ces pensées, qu’elles sortent de moi ou s’élancent des choses, 
deviennent bientôt trop intenses. L’énergie dans la volupté crée un malaise et une 
souffrance positive. Mes nerfs trop tendus ne donnent plus que des vibrations criardes et 
douloureuses. 
 Et maintenant la profondeur du ciel me consterne ; sa limpidité m’exaspère.  
L’insensibilité de la mer, l’immuabilité du spectacle, me révoltent … Ah ! faut-il 
éternellement souffrir, ou fuir éternellement le beau ? Nature, enchanteresse sans pitié, 
rivale toujours victorieuse, laisse-moi ! Cesse de tenter mes désirs et mon orgueil ! 
L’étude du beau est un duel où l’artiste crie de frayeur avant d’être vaincu.   
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(The Artist’s Confiteor 
 
How the close of an autumn day pierces! Pierces to the point of pain, for 
delightful sensations, though vague, may be intense, and there is no sharper pang than 
that of Infinity. 
 What greater delight than for the eye to drown in the immensity of sky and sea! 
Solitude, silence, incomparably chaste blue, on the horizon a tiny sail quivering which, 
by its smallness and isolation, resembles my irremediable existence, monotonous melody 
of the sea swell – all these things think through me, or I think through them (for, in the 
grandeur of reverie, the I is soon lost); they think, I say, but musically and picturesquely, 
without quibble, without syllogism, without deduction. 
 These thoughts, whether from inside me or from external things, soon become too 
intense. Voluptuous energy creates uneasiness and positive suffering. My overtense 
nerves then give out only peevish and painful vibrations. 
 And now the depth of sky is appalling; its clarity exasperates me. I find the 
indifference of the sea, the immutability of the spectacle, revolting … Ah! must I suffer 
eternally, or else eternally flee the beautiful? Nature, pitiless enchantress, always 
victorious rival, let me go! Tempt no more my desires and my pride! Study of the 
beautiful is a duel in which the artist cries out in fear, before being bested.)46 
 
 
Baudelaire’s poem conforms quite well to the definition of a prose poem offered by The 
Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics: 
 
A composition able to have any or all features of the lyric, except that it is put on the 
page – though not conceived of – as prose. It differs from poetic prose in that it is short 
and compact, from free verse in that it has no line breaks, from a short prose passage in 
that it has, usually, more pronounced rhythm, sonorous effects, imagery, and density of 
expression. It may contain even inner rhyme and metrical runs. Its length, generally, is 
from half a page (one or two paragraphs) to three or four pages, i.e., that of the average 
lyrical poem. If it is any longer, the tensions and impact are forfeited, and it becomes – 
more or less poetic – prose. (664) 
 
 
While it may recall prose through its organization into paragraphs and its lack of line breaks, “Le 
Confiteor de l’artiste” retains many lyrical features, such as the elevated syntax and diction of its 
first paragraph, the more pronounced imagery of its second and third paragraphs, and the more 
marked rhythms and inner rhyme of its fourth paragraph. And the tensions in the poem are many, 
 
46 Translation by Keith Waldrop. 
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from those created by its competing generic elements to those implied through its central images 
and extended metaphors.   
 One of these images is that of a duel between artist and Beauty. In the final line of the 
text, the poet concludes that “L’étude du beau est un duel où l’artiste crie de frayeur avant d’être 
vaincu” (“The study of beauty is a duel in which the artist calls out in fear before being 
defeated”). It is a metaphor that extends throughout the text and depicts, through related tropes 
and images, the powerlessness of the artist to master his subject, Beauty. As the poet exclaims in 
the first paragraph, “les fins de journées d’automne sont pénétrantes ! […] et il n’est pas de 
pointe plus acérée que celle de l’Infini” (“The ends of autumn days are piercing! […] and there is 
no sharper tip than that of the Infinite”). The dueling poet is wounded by the sharpest of blades, 
pierced “jusqu’à la douleur” (“to the point of pain”) by the infiniteness of the autumn evening. It 
is an image of powerlessness that is further developed in the second paragraph, where Baudelaire 
describes, against the immensity of the sky and sea, “une petite voile frissonnante à l’horizon” 
(“a little sail trembling on the horizon”). In its “petitesse” (“smallness”) and its “isolement” 
(“isolation”), the tiny sail reminds the poet of his own “irrémédiable existence” (“merciless 
existence”).   
 The solitude, the silence, the incomparable chastity of the azure, the puny trembling sail, 
and “la mélodie monotone de la houle” (“monotonous melody of the waves”) – all these images 
communicate with the poet: “toutes ces choses pensent par moi, ou je pense par elles” (“all of 
these things think through me, or I think through them”), he declares in the paragraph’s 
subsequent lines. The ambiguity of this experience heightens the tension between the poet as 
agent and the poet as mere vehicle of the images, “car dans la grandeur de la rêverie, le moi se 
perd vite !” (“for in the immensity of revery, the me is quickly lost!”). But in losing his sense of 
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self, the poet comes to a realization: “elles pensent” (“they think”), he concludes. He describes 
the thoughts as a musical and picturesque process, “sans arguties, sans syllogismes, sans 
déductions” (“without equivocation, without syllogisms, without deductions”). When the poet is 
not the agent in this aesthetic process, there is no excessive reasoning; there are no syllogisms or 
deductions at work; there is only image and music. The beauty of the scene prevails over the 
intellectual and linguistic artifice of the poet.   
 The third paragraph develops another form of tension, this time between the poet’s 
sensations of pleasure and suffering in the face of such an aesthetic experience. All of these 
thoughts quickly become too intense for him. “L’énergie dans la volupté crée un malaise et une 
souffrance positive” (“the energy of this exquisiteness becomes a source of malaise and tangible 
suffering”), he writes, “Mes nerfs trop tendus ne donnent plus que des vibrations criardes et 
douloureuses” (“My strained nerves can do no more than quiver shrilly and painfully”). The 
poet’s description of this climactic experience adds a sexual connotation to the poem and its 
tension between agency and passivity. And while the third paragraph depicts the climax of his 
experience, the fourth depicts his ensuing exhaustion and resignation. “Et maintenant la 
profondeur du ciel me consterne ; sa limpidité m’exaspère. L’insensibilité de la mer, 
l’immuabilité du spectacle, me révoltent …” (“and now the profundity of the sky dismays me; its 
clarity exasperates me. The indifference of the sea, the constancy of the scene, irk me …”), 
concedes the poet. The parallelism of the sentences reinforces his passivity in this dynamic, as 
the repetition of the syntactical construction “subject – object pronoun – verb” highlights his 
function as recipient, not agent, of the actions. He has been pierced by the aesthetic intensity of 
the autumn evening, but he, as artist, has been unable to penetrate its “profondeur” 
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(“profundity”) and its “limpidité” (“clarity”); he remains powerless before its apparent 
“insensibilité” (“indifference”) and “immuabilité” (“constancy”).  
 The poet’s sense of powerlessness is encapsulated in his forlorn question, “Ah! faut-il 
éternellement souffrir, ou fuir éternellement le beau ?” (“Ah! Must I suffer forever, or forever 
flee from Beauty?”). The question’s chiasmic structure reinforces its rhetorical quality and its 
apparent lack of solution. Faced with an impossible choice, the poet can either flee Beauty or 
face it in an artistic duel – a duel that he can only ever lose. In either case, Beauty is a source of 
suffering for the artist. And so he turns to Nature and addresses her directly as the embodiment 
of his dueling adversary: “Nature, enchanteresse sans pitié, rivale toujours victorieuse, laisse-
moi !” (“Nature, merciless enchantress, ever-victorious rival, let me be!”), he pleads. As an artist, 
he finds himself compelled to pursue and master the beauty of nature, but now, he is the one who 
feels pursued, and what was initially an attraction has become an aversion. 
 That the poet’s emotional state switches from attraction to aversion over the course of a 
single aesthetic experience recalls the “soubresauts de la conscience” (“sudden shifts of 
conscience”) that Baudelaire dreams of being able to depict through the supple and jolted 
language of a poetic prose (Oeuvres vi). And it is partly by means of its construction as a prose 
poem that “Le Confiteor de l’artiste” (“The Artist’s Confiteor”) enables the expression of such 
dueling emotional experiences and states of mind. In “Poetry without Verse,” Tzvetan Todorov 
in fact wonders if “Baudelaire had only been attracted to the genre insofar as it enabled him to 
find an appropriate form […] for a thematics of duality, contrast, and opposition” (64). In any 
case, he remarks that prose poems are “texts which are in their very conception based on the 
meeting of opposites” (64).   
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The most predominant of these opposites is that of prose and verse. In the nineteenth 
century, prose and verse were perceived, and had been for a while, as distinct and opposite 
modes of literary production, whose binary relation was, within the domain of literature, all-
encompassing. The prose poem, then, constituted a form of hybrid that subverted the perceived 
distinction between the two modes – prose and verse. And as these literary modes became genres 
in their own right, later in the century, the prose poem has come to subvert the generic distinction 
between prose and poetry, as well. But the prose poem is more than a hybrid. It is, in a sense, an 
oxymoron, as well. As Jonathan Monroe notes in A Poverty of Objects: The Prose Poem and the 
Politics of Genre (1987), “The prose poem marks a crucial moment in literature where the 
coexistence of various modes of literary production (read genres) becomes, in [Fredric] 
Jameson’s words, ‘visibly antagonistic’” (20). With respect to prose and verse in particular, their 
antithetical relation can be seen as far back as the seventeenth century. A well-known example 
appears in Molière’s The Bourgeois gentilhomme (The Bourgeois Gentleman), whose Maître de 
Philosophe (Master of Philosophy) confidently explains that “tout ce qui n’est point prose est 
vers ; et tout ce qui n’est point vers est prose” (“All that is not verse is prose; and all that is not 
prose is verse”) (64). The prose poem’s hybridity combines two modes (and later, two genres) 
that are considered not only distinct, but wholly antithetical. And it is this oxymoronic quality 
that contributes to the queerness of the poème en prose.   
Any attempt to resolve the apparent inherent contradiction of the prose poem entails a re-
examination of the seemingly incongruous terms, “prose” and “verse,” as well as a re-evaluation 
of the relation between them. This is not a simple task, however. While the Master of 
Philosophy’s respective definitions of prose and verse turn out to be amusingly unhelpful, they 
also turn out to be surprisingly insightful regarding the difficulty involved in defining prose and 
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verse in positive, rather than negative, terms. The prose poem compounds this difficulty. 
Whereas the vers libre transcends the metered poetic line, the poème en prose transcends the 
poetic line all together. In doing so, it removes an important feature from the literary form – that 
of versification. Until this point in literary history, the organization of syntactical fragments into 
lines and verses has been a defining characteristic of poetry. And so, its transgression calls into 
question our conception of poetry’s “poeticity.” As Todorov concisely puts it, “if poetry is not 
verse, what is it?” (60). Without versification, how is poetry to be defined? Are there additional 
factors peculiar to the poetic genre that can be identified as contributing to the poeticity of the 
poème en prose?   
Literary critics of the prose poem have attempted to answer this question. Suzanne 
Bernard proposes three factors: unity (“le poème doit former un tout, un univers fermé, sous 
peine de perdre sa qualité de poème” (“the poem should form a whole, an enclosed world, lest it 
lose its poetic quality”)), gratuity (“un poème ne se propose aucune fin en dehors de lui-même” 
(“a poem proposes no purpose beyond its own existence”)), and brevity (“plus que le poème en 
vers, le poème en prose doit éviter les digressions morales ou autres, les développements 
explicatifs” (“more so than the versified poem, the prose poem must avoid any digressions, 
moral or otherwise, and any explanatory constructions”)). Todorov disagrees, demonstrating that 
the poeticity of Rimbaud’s Illuminations lies principally in their rejection of representation. 
Moreover, he is tempted to conclude that “the identification of poetry with the ‘presentative’ use 
of language is a historically circumscribed and culturally determined fact,” since “varying 
conceptions of poetry have existed and will continue to exist from one period or country to 
another” (77). He leaves the question unanswered, asking instead if there is even such a thing as 
“a transcultural, transhistorical ‘poeticity’” (60). Hermine Riffaterre, on the one hand, believes 
 208 
that there is, and she proposes that it lies in the reader’s perception of “constants,” which can be 
instances of intertextuality, rhetorical figures, parallelisms, or picture sequences (101). Michel 
Beaujour, on the other hand, suspects that “there is little substance behind the smoke; little at 
least to be apprehended and described by formalist, rhetorical, or stylistic strategies” (40).   
Ultimately, the question pertains to genre theory. In asking if there is such a thing as 
“poeticity,” we are asking about the essential nature of the poetic genre. Is poetry inherently 
different from other prose genres? Or are its defining qualities historically and socially 
constructed? Ralph Cohen believes that there are no essential generic traits and that genres are 
contextually and historically dependent. In “History and Genre” (1986), he explains that generic 
classifications are empirical, not logical: “They are historical assumptions constructed by 
authors, audiences, and critics in order to serve communicative and aesthetic purposes” (210). 
For this reason, “Such groupings are always in terms of distinctions and interrelations, and they 
form a system or community of genres” (210). In addition, “Groupings arise at particular 
historical moments, and as they include more and more members, they are subject to repeated 
redefinitions or abandonment” (210). If poetry’s definition is dependent on its relation to other 
genres, and if concepts of genre are historically and socially contingent, then Todorov may be 
correct to doubt the existence of a “transcultural, transhistorical ‘poeticity’.”   
As socially constructed, historically dependent, and contextually defined categories, 
genres function within literature in much the same way as genders function within society.  
Ralph Cohen in fact notes their shared etymological root, as well as their predisposition to 
hierarchical classification (203). In the context of gender, this hierarchical classification is 
enforced, according to Monique Wittig, through a process of particularization and 
universalization. Wittig develops this idea in The Straight Mind and Other Essays (1992) where 
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she equates the feminine with the particular and the masculine with the universal. In “The Mark 
of Gender,” she discusses the idea in relation to the notion of grammatical gender, the role it 
plays in language, and more importantly, the role it plays in society. “The mark of gender, 
according to grammarians, concerns substantives,” she writes, but in her opinion, its effects 
reach beyond the realm of language (76). As a materialist, Wittig believes that such gendered 
language “casts sheaves of reality upon the social body, stamping it and violently shaping it” 
(78). This process does not affect male and female bodies in the same way, however, because 
there is, in fact, only one gender – the feminine one. “For the masculine is not the masculine but 
the general,” Wittig explains in “The Point of View: Universal of Particular?” (60). “The abstract 
form, the general, the universal, this is what the so-called masculine gender means, for the class 
of men have appropriated the universal for themselves” (80). As a result, language produces only 
“the general and the feminine, or rather the general and the mark of the feminine,” she concludes 
(60).   
In the context of literature, prose can be considered an unmarked genre, and poetry a 
marked one. This classification of poetry and prose can be traced to classical conceptions of 
language and the way it is used in either genre. As Roland Barthes explains in Degré zéro de 
l’écriture (Writing Degree Zero) (1972), prose and poetry are traditionally conceived of in terms 
of the following equations, 
Poetry = Prose + a + b + c 
 
Prose = Poetry – a – b – c, 
 
where a, b, and c are particular attributes of language, “inutiles mais décoratifs, tels que le mètre, 
la rime ou le rituel des images” (“useless but decorative, such as meter, rhyme, or the convention 
of imagery”) (35). In this sense, “Toute poésie n’est alors que l’équation décorative, allusive ou 
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chargée, d’une prose virtuelle qui gît en essence et en puissance dans n’importe quelle façon de 
s’exprimer” (“All poetry is none other than the decorative, allusive, or laden equivalent of an 
implied prose which underlies any form of expression, whether essentially or potentially”) (35). 
Prose is the default, universal, and unmarked form of language. And what differentiates it from 
poetry is the absence of “additional” attributes, such as rhyme, meter, or imagery. Poetry is 
marked by these formal and stylistic attributes, whereas prose is not seen to have any identifying 
marks of its own, besides the lack of poetic ones.   
In the nineteenth century, conceptions of poetry as a purely decorative form of prose 
began to evolve: “Les poètes instituent désormais leur parole comme une Nature fermée, qui 
embrasserait à la fois la fonction et la structure du langage” (“From this moment on, poets 
established their poetic language as a closed system, which simultaneously encompassed the 
function and the structure of language”), Barthes explains (36). Poetry became a “substance” and 
gained “une qualité irréductible” (“an irreducible quality”) (36). But even today, poetry is still 
particularized with respect to the more general and universal qualities that characterize prose. In 
Défigurations du langage poétique (Defigurations of Poetic Language) (1979), Barbara 
Johnson’s argument for the subversiveness of the prose poem relies on this same concept of 
marked and unmarked genres. She argues that differentiating between poetry and prose is not a 
matter of differentiating between their respective attributes; rather, it is a question of 
differentiating between the presence and absence of defining attributes: “la prose, dans son 
acception courante” (“prose, as it is currently understood”), she remarks, “n’est pas un énoncé 
marqué « prose », mais au contraire précisément un énoncé qui n’est pas marqué, qui ne porte en 
lui aucune signalisation métalinguistique” (“is not an utterance marked ‘prose’; on the exact 
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contrary, it is an utterance that is not marked, that does not bare any metalinguistic markings”) 
(37).   
The prose poem, then, with its hybrid nature, raises the question: is it marked or 
unmarked? Something cannot be both marked and unmarked, or neither marked nor unmarked, 
so it must be one or the other. If we view the prose poem as marked (since it is, ultimately, still a 
poem), we are left to define the nature of these marks, which, as critics have shown, has proven 
quite difficult when versification is no longer present. And if we argue that it is unmarked (since 
it is, after all, written in prose), then it forfeits its poeticity, because its poeticity is ultimately 
what marks it as distinct from prose. Once again, the oxymoronic quality of the prose poem 
emerges. And this oxymoronic quality leads us to reassess not only what we classify as “marked” 
or “unmarked,” but our very definitions of “marked” and “unmarked.” As Johnson concludes, 
“S’il est impossible de savoir si un énoncé marqué « non Marqué » est ou n’est pas marqué, ce 
qui est certain, c’est que la définition de « marqué » n’est plus certaine” (“While it is impossible 
to know whether an utterance marked ‘Unmarked’ is or is not marked, one thing is clear: that the 
definition of ‘marked’ is no longer clear”) (54).   
It is this reassessment of classification and definition that constitutes an act of literary 
queering. If we try to resolve the prose poem’s inherent contradiction by reassessing our 
classification of poetry as marked and prose as unmarked, we are led to one of two conclusions: 
either poetry is also unmarked, in which case it loses its particularity, or prose is also in fact 
marked, in which case it loses its universality. In this way, the hierarchical nature of the relation 
between prose and poetry is dissolved. And if we try to resolve the contradiction by reassessing 
our definition of “marked,” we could perhaps attribute to it alternative qualifications or a range 
of degree. If it is a question of degree, we might say that prose is also marked, just to a lesser 
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degree than poetry. In this sense, literary writing is only ever more or less poetic, and the prose-
poetry binary is in fact a prose-poetry spectrum. Stéphane Mallarmé appears to adhere to this 
notion of literature when he states in Sur l’évolution littéraire (On Literary Evolution) that “en 
vérité, il n’y a pas de prose : il y a l’alphabet et puis des vers plus ou moins serrés : plus ou 
moins diffus.  Toutes les fois qu’il y a effort au style, il y a versification” (“in truth, there is no 
prose: there is the alphabet and then there are poetic lines, more or less compact, more or less 
dispersed. Every time there is an attempt at style, there is versification”) (Œuvres Complètes 2: 
698). Or, if it is a question of alternative qualifications, we could redefine the concept of “mark” 
to include, for example, certain narrative structures. In this case, we might say that prose is also 
marked, just in a different way than poetry. And by viewing prose as marked in a different way, 
rather than simply to a different degree, we bypass the hierarchical relation altogether and 
subvert the literary paradigm that places prose in opposition to poetry.   
One way to queer the gender binary would be to remove the mark of gender from the 
feminine, thereby eliminating its particularization and its differentiation from the general and 
masculine. But perhaps a more thorough way to queer the gender binary would be to call into 
question what a “mark of gender” even is. The prose poem queers literary genres in this way. 
Rather than simply removing the mark of genre from poetry, it calls into question what we 
consider to be a mark of genre in the first place. In this sense, it destabilizes not only our 
conception of poeticity, but also our conception and use of genres in general.   
It is perhaps for this reason that the poème en prose continues to be considered 
subversive and troubling. As Michel Delville remarks, “Despite the advent of free verse and the 
subsequent obsolescence of meter and stylistic criteria for distinguishing poetry from prose, the 
prose poem has paradoxically continued to be regarded by many as a rather disturbing, if not 
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downright illegitimate mode of literary expression” (4). In “The Rhythmicity of the French Prose 
Poem” (1999), Clive Scott attributes such qualities to the prose poem’s being more than just an 
ambiguous genre and a source of duality. He agrees with Mary Ann Caws’s opinion that “Part of 
the contemporary fascination with the prose poem has to do […] with its supposed potential for 
multiple perspectives, changeable limits, floating borders, and shifting contours” (“The Self-
Defining” 180). Scott argues that “‘Ambiguity’ suggests only the difficulty of making choices, 
an awareness of the multiplicity of the possible,” whereas “‘floating borders’ suggests, with 
more relevance, changing one’s mind, the frustrations and fruitlessness of the pursuit of 
consistency, constant processes of reassessment in a sequential experience” (35). In other words, 
the prose poem makes for a particularly queer reading experience. More than an ambiguous one, 
this experience is an unstable one. We are no longer confident that what we are reading counts as 
a poetic line, and moreover, we are no longer confident of what constitutes a poetic line in the 
first place.   
 
Section 3: Visualizing the Poetic Line 
 
 If we were to visualize the heteronormative paradigm, we might imagine a grouping of 
dots and lines. The dots could mark normative subject positions regarding sexes and genders, and 
the lines could mark the normative relations between them. So, from the dot marking “male sex,” 
there is a line of correspondence linking it to the dot marking “male gender.” Similarly, there is a 
line linking “female sex” to “female gender.” These are lines of identification. In other words, if 
one has been identified as having a male sex, one should identify as having a male gender as 
well. There are also lines of attraction, which link the male side of the paradigm with the female 
side. In terms of sexual attraction, for example, a line of attraction links male sex-gender with 
female sex-gender. And finally, there is a line of separation between the male side and the female 
 214 
side of the paradigm so that the male side is perceived as distinct from, and opposite to, the 
female side. Identification should take place on the same side of this gender line, and attraction 
should take place across it to incorporate both sides. The paradigm could look like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Initial attempts to queer this paradigm have visualized it in different arrangements. One 
method of visualizing it differently is to manipulate or redraw its lines so that they form 
alternative relations between subject positions.47 In other words, instead of linking male sex with 
female sex in a relation of attraction, an alternative paradigm might bend the line of attraction so 
that it circles back to the male side of the paradigm, joining male sex with male sex in a relation 
of sameness (Figure 1, below). And in terms of identification, instead of aligning female sex with 
female gender, an alternative paradigm could cross the gender line to align female sex with male 
gender in a gender non-conforming relation (Figure 2, below): 
 
 
 
 
47 An equivalent visualization could rearrange or replace the various subject positions, that is, the 
dots, instead of the lines. For example, “Male Sex” could be replaced with another “Female Sex” 
so that the line of attraction joins female sex with female sex. I have chosen to highlight 
manipulations of the lines because these alternative visualizations are more easily 
distinguishable. 
Male Gender Female Gender 
Male Sex Female Sex 
= attraction 
= identification 
= gender line 
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More recent representations of queerness have visualized the paradigm differently by 
removing its gender line altogether. In doing so, they have eliminated the binary distinction that 
heteronormativity maintains between male and female, and they have placed the male and female 
subject positions at opposite ends of a spectrum. This enables the visualization of non-binary 
gender identities and intersex variations. And this increased diversity of subject positions leads to 
an increased possibility in relations of attraction, as witnessed by the emergence of pansexuality.  
The removal of the gender line significantly destabilizes the paradigm and creates too many 
alternative visualizations to diagram. Generally, however, it enables the lines of identification to 
join any point between the two original genders with any point between the two original sexes, 
and it enables the lines of attraction to join any two points between the male and female ends of 
the sex/gender spectrum.   
At the end of the nineteenth century, and at the beginning of the twentieth century, poets 
begin to visualize the poetic line in a somewhat similar fashion, giving substance and plasticity 
to an otherwise transparent structural framework so that it might also be manipulated or 
repositioned upon the page. This section will look at two texts – Guillaume Apollinaire’s 
calligram, “La cravate et la montre” (“The Tie and the Pocket-Watch”) and Stéphane Mallarmé’s 
Male Gender Female Gender 
Male Sex Female Sex 
Male Gender Female Gender 
Male Sex Female Sex 
Figure 1 Figure 2 
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“Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hasard” (“A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish 
Chance”). It will examine how each text visualizes the poetic line upon the page, and it will 
explore how such visualizations relate to the queered paradigm described above.   
   
Black on White: “La Cravate et la montre” 
 
Published in 1918 in Guillaume Apollinaire’s Calligrammes: Poèmes de la paix et de la 
guerre, “La cravate et la montre” is composed of two distinct images – a tie and a pocket-watch. 
And each image entails a slightly different visualization of the poetic line upon the page. The tie, 
as Pénélope Sacks-Galey remarks, is a more solid figure whose interior is composed entirely of 
words and word fragments (43). The watch, on the other hand, is an emptier figure in which the 
poem’s words and word fragments serve primarily to outline, rather than fill, its shape: 
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It is in part for this reason that the tie is a little easier to “read” than the watch. 
Proceeding from left to right and from top to bottom, like in a conventionally written French 
poem, the reader can progress, uninterrupted, from the neck of the tie to its split ends. Even 
though the poem’s lines are significantly fragmented, with certain lines containing no more than 
a single word or syllable, each line still reads horizontally from left to right, and the overall 
grouping of lines still reads vertically from top to bottom. As a result, it is possible to isolate the 
poem’s text and rewrite it in a more conventional free verse structure, such as: 
 
LA CRAVATE DOULOUREUSE 
QUE TU PORTES 
ET QUI T’ORNE 
Ô CIVILISÉ 
ÔTE-LA SI TU VEUX 
BIEN RESPIRER 
 
 (THE PAINFUL TIE 
THAT YOU WEAR 
AND THAT ADORNS YOU 
O CIVILIZED ONE 
REMOVE IT IF YOU WANT 
TO BREATHE WELL) 
 
 
This division into lines represents only one possibility out of many, since, by prioritizing the 
visual width of a tie over syllable-count or rhythm, the poem leaves it to the reader to determine 
the rhythmic grouping of its words. But while the grouping of the words may vary, the order of 
the words remains stable, since the left-to-right and top-to-bottom arrangement of the text’s lines 
does not impede its overall linearity in any significant way. 
 A linear reading of the watch, however, proves more difficult. The reader will likely start 
with the phrase “Comme l’on s’amuse bien” (“How one enjoys oneself”), which forms the ring 
at the top of the image, but it immediately becomes unclear whether the line continues to “les 
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heures” (“the hours”) directly below, or to the phrase, “la beauté de la vie passe la douleur de 
mourir” (“the beauty of life passes the pain of dying”), which outlines the circular edge of the 
watch. In either case, the poetic line does not progress horizontally from left to right, and the 
reader must decide how to proceed based on certain grammatical and paratextual clues. The 
groupings of words forming the inner circle, for example, are positioned like numbers on a 
clock-face, so we might be tempted to read them in a clockwise direction. The capitalized letter 
of “Mon cœur” (“My heart”) signals a possible starting point, like the capitalized letter at the 
beginning of a sentence. And after completing this clockwise progression, the reader might 
continue to the remaining part of the image – the two clock hands, which are positioned at five 
minutes to twelve, and which can be read vertically, like the tie, above. Again, this approach 
presents only one of several possible readings. As Katherine Shingler has demonstrated, the 
order in which the various elements of the watch are read can differ from reader to reader.48 
Whereas word and line order remain stable in the image of the tie, they become variable in the 
image of the pocket-watch. This variability in reading order frustrates any attempt to separate 
text from image in order to rewrite the poem in linear form. But such non-linearity encourages us 
to adopt a more global perspective of the text. Focusing on all of the poem’s lines 
simultaneously, rather than successively, we are able to view the larger image that these lines 
create.   
From this perspective, the poetic line no longer functions solely as a supporting structure 
to metrically or rhythmically organize groups of words; it also functions as a material component 
 
48 See “Perceiving Text and Image in Apollinaire’s Calligrammes,” in which Shingler attempts to 
determine if readers can attend to the textual and visual components of the calligram 
simultaneously. In order to better understand how readers perceive and comprehend a calligram, 
she analyses their eye movements as they view/read “La cravate et la montre.” Her analysis 
documents a significant variety of reading patterns.   
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of the poem, with its groupings of black letters contrasting against the white page in such a way 
as to outline the shape of a pocket-watch. And in order to trace the curved outline of a pocket-
watch, the calligram’s lines must do something that the poetic line has never done before: they 
must bend and curve, tracing arced and circular trajectories as well as straight ones. Poets over 
the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have taken on various aspects of the 
poetic line (challenging its syntactical-metrical alignment, its fixed syllable-count, its rhyming 
endings, and its length), but until Apollinaire’s calligrams, one concept remains untouched and 
unquestioned – the poetic line’s orientation upon the page.   
It is this characteristic, more so than its combination of text and image, that renders 
Apollinaire’s calligram truly novel, since the concept of worded images has been around for 
centuries. In “Beyond the Word: Italian Visual Poetry and its French Antecedents,” Giovanna 
Wedel de Stasio explains that worded images represent a continuation of “an old manneristic 
tradition typified by the Greek technopegnia or poems shaped as objects (3rd century B.C.)” 
(138-39). These technopegnia were followed by “the carmina figurata composed by Latin 
Medieval poets, in the shape of crosses, angels, chalices, and other Christian emblems” (139). In 
the sixteenth century, “poems shaped as objects (e.g., wings, eggs, leaves, bottles) were still 
quite popular,” and in the seventeenth century, “it is possible to find many poems in the shape of 
animals (particularly peacocks)” (139). But the technopegnia and the carmina figurata, as well 
as their early-modern descendants, recall the solid nature of the calligram’s tie more than the 
outlined nature of its pocket-watch. As such, they maintain the left-to-right and top-to-bottom 
reading direction with lines oriented horizontally and grouped vertically. The lines of the pocket-
watch, however, which are not limited to the cardinal directions, are more daring and more novel 
in terms of their orientation upon the page. 
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 But is there any queerness to the bent and freely oriented lines of the calligram’s pocket-
watch? Does this text’s visualization of the poetic line upon the page form a literary equivalent to 
any of the queered heteronormative paradigms visualized above? While it is true that these 
visualizations also bend and re-orient the lines of the paradigm, just as the calligram bends and 
re-orients the poetic line upon the page, this manipulation of lines is not necessarily enough to 
constitute an act of queering. The paradigm’s lines are lines of relation, meaning they exist to 
demonstrate the relation between sexes and genders in terms of identification or attraction. In 
other words, it is not just the lines that are manipulated in the queered visualizations; this 
manipulation serves ultimately to alter the relation between the subject positions that the lines 
connect. When the vertical lines of identification are re-oriented, for example, male sex can be 
paired with female gender, or female sex with male gender, in a gender-nonconforming relation. 
And when the horizontal lines of attraction are bent in a circular fashion, male can be paired with 
male, or female with female, in a homosexual relation. It is possible to bend and re-orient the 
paradigm’s lines without altering the subject positions that they connect, however. Male sex can 
be joined to female sex by a bent, wandering line of attraction, for example, but this line still 
ultimately links the two in a normative relation. In this sense, a bent line may indicate deviance 
(from the normative, straight line), but it is not necessarily queer. Similarly, the poetic lines of 
Apollinaire’s calligrams may be deviant, but they are not for that reason queer. 
The bent and freely oriented lines of the calligram’s pocket-watch can only be considered 
queer if they alter a certain normative relation. Are any such relations at play in the pocket-
watch? It depends on what aspect of the poem we are looking at. With respect to the poem as a 
semantic text, there are relations of signification: As an expressive text, the poem as a whole 
relies upon a fundamental relation in its production of meaning – that between signifier and 
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signified. And with respect to the poem as a visual text, there are relations of form: As a 
calligram, the poem relies upon a fundamental relation regarding its delineation of an image – 
that between the black text of its lines and the white space of its page.   
With respect to relations of signification, calligrams in general alter the conventional 
relation between signifier and signified by adding image-based signifiers to their text-based 
signifiers. In “The Tie and the Pocket-Watch,” however, the relation between signifier and 
signified is altered in a more substantial, and possibly queer, way. This occurs in the poetic lines 
representing the hours of the clock-face. In the position corresponding to “1 o’clock,” 
Apollinaire places the phrase “Mon cœur” (“My heart”); for “2 o’clock,” he writes “les yeux” 
(“the eyes”), and for “3 o’clock,” he puts “l’enfant” (“the child”), continuing in this manner 
through 12 o’clock. As Peter Gahl points out, such phrases “evade the technopaignion principle, 
for they do not form an image or a part of it” (121). “Mon coeur” does not visually resemble the 
number “1” in any way. Instead, it alludes to this number discursively, forming a new relation of 
signification between “Mon coeur” (“My heart”) and “1 o’clock.”   
With the conventional signifier for one o’clock (“1,” “I”, “one,” etc.) having been 
replaced by the phrase “Mon cœur” (“My heart”), an alternative relation of signification is 
formed. And this relation of signification is a little less evident to readers than the conventional 
one. As Per Nykrog remarks, the phrases indicating the numbers on the clock-face are not the 
kinds of puzzles we are used to solving in conventional processes of interpretation. This is 
because “le lecteur n’a pas besoin de trouver le mot d’une énigme pour arriver au chiffre qui 
appartient à chaque place, il le sait bien en avance” (“the reader does not need to solve an enigma 
in order to find the number that belongs in each position; he knows it well in advance”) (117). 
“The problem is rather of understanding why one phrase or another represents a certain number,” 
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explains Gahl (121). We do not have to determine what “Mon cœur” signifies. We already know 
that it signifies “1 o’clock.” What we must determine is the relation of signification that joins 
them. In other words, we have the dots, but we must draw the line between them. 
Scholars and critics have tried their hand at establishing this relation. While most tend to 
agree that “Mon cœur” replaces the number “1” to signify “1 o’clock” because we have only one 
heart, and that “les yeux” (“the eyes”) signifies “2 o’clock” because we have two eyes or because 
“les yeux” rhymes with “deux” (“two”), other numbers inspire a myriad of explanations. This is 
especially true of the number 6, which is replaced by the word “Tircis.” On the one hand, Anne 
Hyde Greet and S.I. Lockerbie, in their edition of Apollinaire’s Calligrammes, read “Tircis” as a 
pun on the phrase “tire six” (“take six”) (388). On the other hand, Gahl points to the 
correspondence between the number of letters in “Tircis” and the hour that it replaces. Or, as an 
alternative explanation, he notes that “tircis” is the common French name “for the speckled wood 
(pararge aegeria) butterfly,” of which the male sex of certain varieties bears “six conspicuous 
specks on the upper side of the wings” (126). Similarly, for the number 10, which Apollinaire 
replaces with the phrase, “le bel inconnu” (the beautiful stranger), Greet and Lockerbie point to 
the fact that “an unknown person is designated by X,” and that “X” is also the roman numeral for 
“10” (387). Heep, however, proposes a religious interpretation, in which “le bel inconnu” (“the 
beautiful stranger”) corresponds to Jesus (93). He also sees a correspondence between the beauty 
of this unknown person and “les yeux” (“the eyes”) of the 2 o’clock position (which mirrors the 
10 o’clock position) since “beauty is perceived through sight” (93). Nykrog and Sacks-Galey 
both point to a literary interpretation, explaining that Guiglain ou le Bel Inconnu (Sir Gingalain 
or The Fair Unknown) is the title of a medieval romance, but it is unclear how this relates to the 
number 10 (Nykrog 118, Sacks-Galey 113).   
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I am less concerned with establishing explanations for Apollinaire’s alternative signifiers 
and more interested in the fact that it has proven rather difficult to do so. Several of the 
explanations proposed by critics seem stretched, to say the least. We have not even found (if 
there is one to find) a consistent category of relations (some measure quantity in terms of the 
body, like “Mon cœur” (“My heart”) and “les yeux” (“the eyes”); others measure quantity in 
terms of the signifiers’ letter-count, like “Tircis” and “semaine” (“week”); and others rely upon 
cultural knowledge, like “les 9 muses” (“the 9 muses”) and “le vers dantesque” (“the Dantean 
meter”)). The reason that these relations are not immediately evident to the reader, or easily 
categorizable, is that Apollinaire not only avoids denotative signifiers (“1,” “I,” “one,” “—,” 
etc.), but also connotative signifiers (their less direct, but still culturally recognized equivalents). 
The poet could have replaced the conventional denotative signifiers with certain connotations, 
such as the pronoun “Je” (“I”) or the word “Unique,” which evoke the number “1” a little more 
easily than the phrase “My heart,” for example. But Apollinaire does not employ culturally 
recognized equivalents, opting, it seems, for more personal associations. Denotations and 
connotations are types of relations that function on a cultural level, whereas associations need 
only function on an individual level. For this reason, Apollinaire’s various phrases do not 
constitute culturally recognized signifiers. And as such, they are not located on the normative 
paradigm of signification. In other words, Apollinaire’s phrases constitute alternative dots that 
exist apart from the conventional line of relation. These outlying signifiers alter the normative 
relation of signification, skewing the line of relation, which must now connect a normative 
signified (the hours) with a non-normative signifier (Apollinaire’s personal associations with the 
numbers 1 through 12).    
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How does this queered relation between signifier and signified relate to the materiality 
and plasticity of the calligram’s poetic lines? In a conventional clock-face, “1 o’clock” can be 
marked in various ways: with the number, “1,” the roman numeral, “I,” the word, “one,” or 
simply with a line. As this last instance reveals, it is not the line itself that signifies “1 o’clock,” 
since all hours are typically marked with identical lines; rather, it is the position of the line on the 
clock-face that carries significance and indicates the corresponding hour. And in the poem, it is 
the position of “Mon coeur” on the page that signifies “1 o’clock.” It is only a material, plastic, 
and freely oriented poetic line that can be positioned in such a significant way.   
As a visual text, as well as a semantic text, the calligram relies upon another type of 
relation – that between positively and negatively delineated space, between the black markings 
of the text and the white blankness of the page. The image created by the calligram is filled-in or 
outlined in black, so, in order to view or read the calligram, we focus on the black marks of its 
letters, words, and lines. In this sense, a normative relation between text and page presents the 
black text as significant and the white page as insignificant. That is to say, the negatively defined 
white space of the page does not signify. It merely serves as a contrasting background against 
which the positively defined black marks can be viewed and interpreted.  
But just as the hours of the clock-face alter the relation between signifier and signified, 
they alter the relation between text and page, as well. It is the position of “Mon coeur” that 
indicates “1 o’clock,” more so than the meaning or appearance of the words, and this is the case 
for all of the phrases indicating the hours of the clock-face. Where they are positioned on the 
page determines their meaning. In this case, then, meaning is also derived from the blank, white 
space underlying the words, and not just from the words themselves (whether semantically or 
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visually). White space is made to signify as much as black marks, and the normative relation 
between signifying text and non-signifying page is altered.   
The signifying quality of the white page is not common to calligrams in general however; 
it can only be glimpsed in this particular part of this particular calligram. As Gahl remarks, “In 
no other of Apollinaire’s Calligrammes is the mechanism of visual poetry similarly contaminated 
with ‘non-figurative’ elements (the purely verbal signifiers representing the clock’s figures) – a 
feature which makes La Cravate et la montre quite unique” (121). It is the non-figurative nature 
of these elements in particular that enables Apollinaire to replace normative signifiers, which 
rely on denotations or connotations, with non-normative signifiers, which rely on unconventional 
or personal associations. And it is the signifying capacity of positions on a clock-face that 
enables Apollinaire to focus the reader’s attention on the poetic line in space, where the white 
space in which the line is positioned signifies as much as the meaning of the line or the shapes 
that it forms. Without such particular characteristics (the use of a clock-face and non-figurative 
elements), calligrams, in general, do not alter relations of signification or form in any significant 
way, and they do not function as literary equivalents to the queered heteronormative paradigms 
above. Their novel orientation of the poetic line upon the page may be deviant, but it is not 
queer. And their reliance upon the visual as well as semantic qualities of the poetic line may in 
fact reinforce the poem’s positive delineation of space, where the reader focuses on the black 
marks of its words and lines as both semantically and visually significant, overlooking the 
signifying potential of the white page.   
 
White on Black: “Un Coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hasard” 
 
Stéphane Mallarmé composed his last complete poetic text, “Un Coup de dés jamais 
n’abolira le hasard” (“A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance”), in 1897 for 
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publication in the magazine Cosmopolis. The poem is a monumental work of twenty pages, with 
a complex syntax of interweaving and nesting subordinate clauses and a widely varied 
typography, which ranges in weight from bold to italic and which ranges in size from three-point 
to twenty-two-point fonts (Bloch 22). Its fragmented poetic lines, which vary in length, are 
dispersed and scattered across its pages, and they are often surrounded by large areas of white 
space. “Les ‘blancs,’ en effet, assument l’importance, frappent d’abord” (“The ‘white spaces,’ in 
fact, take on significance, become the most striking aspect”), remarks Mallarmé in the preface to 
the original publication (Œuvres Complètes 1: 391). Normally, we pay much more attention to 
the poetic line than we do to the blank space of the page that surrounds it. But in “A Throw of 
the Dice,” this blank space becomes more noticeable and more important. In fact, it becomes as 
significant to our interpretation of the poem as the poetic line itself. As this section aims to 
demonstrate, if we are to fully appreciate the poem on an oral, a visual, and a semantic level, we 
can no longer read the poetic line in isolation, separated from the page around it. And if we are to 
more fully apprehend the iridescent Idée (Idea) that the poem aspires to represent, we must learn 
to read the white space of the page like we do the black marks of the text. How does such a 
visualization of the poetic line on the page relate to the queered heteronormative paradigms, 
above? And how might this relation enhance our conception and representation of queerness? 
In his preface to the poem, Mallarmé compares “A Throw of the Dice” to a musical 
score: “de cet emploi à nu de la pensée avec retraits, prolongements, fuites, ou son dessin même, 
résulte, pour qui veut lire à haute voix, une partition” (“this visual dissection of thought, with its 
indentations, prolongations, fugues, and overall appearance on the page, produces, for those who 
wish to read it aloud, a musical score”) (1: 391). This “emploi à nu de la pensée” (“visual 
dissection of thought”) refers to the exposition of a thought in its various layers and parts. In this 
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case, it is the poem’s principal phrase, “Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le hasard” (“A throw of 
the dice will never abolish chance”), whose composite layers and parts are exposed. Its 
fragmentation begins in the opening pages of the text, with the first four words, “UN COUP DE 
DÉS” (“A THROW OF THE DICE”) isolated on the right-hand side of the first Page.49 Written 
in capitalized letters and 22-point font, the fragment looks a lot like a title, but upon turning the 
page, we realize that it continues, in the same typeface, with the word “JAMAIS” (“NEVER”), 
on Page 2. We cannot read the rest of the phrase, however, because it is interrupted by a 
subordinate clause, written underneath in slightly smaller font, which reads: “QUAND BIEN 
MÊME LANCÉ DANS DES CIRCONSTANCES / ÉTERNELLES / DU FOND D’UN 
NAUFRAGE” (“EVEN WHEN THROWN UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES / EVERLASTING / 
FROM THE DEPTHS OF A SHIPWRECK”). This clause is in turn interrupted by the lines of 
Page 3, which are of smaller type face again, and which evoke images of a shipwreck in a stormy 
sea. The poem continues in this manner, interweaving different layers of thought and 
distinguishing between them by the use of different typefaces. In his comparison of the text to a 
musical score, Mallarmé explains that “La différence des caractères d’imprimerie entre le motif 
prépondérant, un secondaire et d’adjacents, dicte son importance à l’émission orale” (“The 
difference in typeface between the principal motif and secondary or adjacent ones signals their 
respective importance to the oral performance of the text”), and he adds that “la portée, 
moyenne, en haut, en bas de page, notera que monte ou descend l’intonation” (“the ranging 
position of the lines, from the middle, to the top, to the bottom of the page, indicates whether the 
reader’s intonation is to rise or fall”) (1: 391-92).   
 
49 Following the convention established by Robert Cohen, I have used the capitalized Page to 
designate each folio. 
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Michel Murat proposes that the metaphor of the musical score serves to remind us that 
there is an oral component to the text and to provide a familiar analogy through which to 
understand a formally unusual poem (107). But with respect to the poetic line, more specifically, 
the comparison of the text to a musical score highlights the need to read the line in relation to the 
page around it. Musical notes on a score are identified in two ways – rhythmically and 
melodically. Their rhythmic value is established by their appearance (for example, the difference 
between a whole note, half note, and quarter note), but their melodic value is established by their 
position (where lower positions on the staff correspond to lower pitches and higher positions to 
higher pitches). The poem functions in much the same way, with its typefaces corresponding to 
the oral weight of the line and its line position indicating rising or descending intonation. For this 
reason, our oral interpretation of the poem relies upon the typographic appearance of the poetic 
lines, as well as their position on the page.   
With respect to our visual interpretation of the text, the page plays an equally important 
role. On Pages 3 and 4, the majority of the poetic lines span the width of two pages, so that we 
are encouraged to view both pages simultaneously, as a folio. The inevitable central page-break, 
however, creates a noticeable gap in the poetic line that crosses over it. As a result, the white 
space of the margins that normally mark the beginning and end of the poetic line now emerges 
from within the line’s interior. But such a visual disturbance actually enriches our interpretation 
of the line. On Page 3, for example, the central margin appears between the words “par” and 
“avance” of the line, “par          avance retombé d’un mal à redresser le vol” (“already on its way 
back down as it struggles to remain even keel”), which describes the plunging helm of the ship as 
it seesaws in the storm. The whiteness of the page surges up in the middle of the line, breaking it 
in two, much like “l’Abîme blanchi” (“the white Abyss”) of the stormy sea breaking through the 
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hull of the ship. Such a visualization of the storm and shipwreck is further reinforced by the 
arrangement of the poetic lines on the page. As Michel Murat has remarked, the slanting 
accumulation of lines on Page 3 visually recreates the appearance of an upended ship (130). And 
with the lines’ representing the body of the ship, the central page-break functions to depict the 
breach in its hull.  Similarly, the lines of Page 4 can be read as a visual representation of a 
whirlpool, with the white space of the central margin depicting the hollow center of the 
whirlpool’s vortex. In this sense, as well, the white space of the page functions as an integral part 
of the text’s visual representation, rather than simply serving as its background or frame.   
Whereas the white space of the page contributes in a fairly straightforward way to our 
oral and visual interpretations of the poem, its contribution to our semantic interpretation is a 
little more complicated. This is partly because the poem’s narrative coherence is often already 
obscured by the text’s syntax, whose interweaving and nesting clauses consistently interrupt any 
one line of thought. Page 4, for example, picks up the supplemental narration of the storm at sea 
to recount the final moments of the ship and its captain. The captain of the sinking ship holds the 
dice in his hand, hesitating to throw it. Will he let the fateful number remain forever 
undetermined in his clenched fist, or will he roll the dice in vain, out into the stormy waves? It 
remains to be determined since, with the turn of the page, the poem returns to its principal 
phrase. The words “N’ABOLIRA” (“WILL ABOLISH”) appear in 22-point font at the bottom of 
Page 5, forming a continuation of the previously interrupted fragment, “UN COUP DE DÉS 
JAMAIS” (“A THROW OF THE DICE NEVER”). But before the phrase can continue any 
further, it is interrupted once more by the supplemental narrative, which intervenes on Page 6. 
The text on this Page both starts and ends with the expression “COMME SI” (“AS IF”), a 
repetition that gives it an air of stasis as the text circles back to where it started, much like the 
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“simple insinuation” (simple insinuation) that it describes circling around the mouth of the abyss. 
Page 7 then interrupts this supplemental narrative of the shipwreck with another layer of thought 
– the description of a solitary feather poised on a dark velvet hat. Richard Weisberg sees in this 
image a reference to Hamlet and his well-known struggle with indecision (790). Page 8 brings us 
back to the sea narrative by depicting the fleeting image of a mermaid as she suns on a rock 
before disappearing into the mist. And Page 9 returns to the poem’s principal theme – that of a 
dice throw and the chance that it fails to abolish. The words, “LE HASARD” (“CHANCE”), also 
written in 22-point font, finally conclude the poem’s principal phrase: “UN COUP DE DÉS 
JAMAIS … N’ABOLIRA … LE HASARD” (“A THROW OF THE DICE NEVER … WILL 
ABOLISH … CHANCE”).   
Like a rolling dice that eventually comes to a stop, revealing the number that chance had 
kept uncertain, the poem’s principal phrase has finally come to an end, providing a long-
anticipated resolution to the “rythmique suspens” (“rhythmic suspense”) created by its 
accumulating subordinate clauses. All that was suspended in numeric and syntactic 
indeterminacy is now determined. And with the conclusion of this phrase, the quill appears to 
drop from the poet’s hand, like the dice from the captain’s. Directly under the words “LE 
HASARD” (“CHANCE”), we read: “Choit / la plume / rythmique suspens du sinistre / 
s’ensevelir / aux écumes originelles / naguères d’où sursauta son délire jusqu’à une cime / flétrie 
/ par la neutralité identique du gouffre” (“Falls / the quill / rhythmic suspense of the destruction / 
to bury itself / in the original spray / from which, not that long ago, its delirium leapt to the 
heights / withered / by the corresponding neutrality of the abyss”). The italicized clause, like an 
extraneous stage direction, describes the last, permanent descent of the poet’s quill toward the 
white abyss of the page. This quill, whose “blancheur rigide” (“rigid whiteness”) once gleamed 
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in contrast to the dark sky, is now “flétrie” (“withered”), beaten and disheveled, as a result of its 
encounter with the cold disinterest of the abyss that is both stormy sea and blank page. And like 
the sunken shipwreck embedded on the ocean floor, the quill now lies dormant on the white 
abyss of the page. 
But the poem does not end here. With the principal phrase concluded, it picks up a new 
main clause, also written in capitalized letters, but of slightly smaller size. Spanning the last two 
Pages of the poem, this clause reads (without the interjecting subordinate clauses): “RIEN … 
N’AURA EU LIEU … QUE LE LIEU … EXCEPTÉ … PEUT-ÊTRE … UNE 
CONSTELLATION” (“NOTHING … WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE … BUT PLACE ITSELF 
… EXCEPT … PERHAPS … A CONSTELLATION”). All traces of the captain-poet’s struggle 
against the stormy sea/blank page have disappeared “dans les parages / du vague / en quoi toute 
réalité se dissout” (“in these waters / nebulous / in which all reality dissolves”) (Page 10). And 
all that remains visible is a silent, shimmering constellation, “à l’altitude … aussi loin qu’un 
endroit fusionne avec au delà” (“at a height … so great that place fuses with the beyond”) (Page 
11).  
This residual image remains the focus of the poem’s final Page, over the course of which 
it appears to merge visually, conceptually, and metaphorically with the text itself: “Ce doit être / 
le Septentrion” (“It must be / the Septentrional constellation”), we learn. Mallarmé’s reference to 
this particular group of stars recalls the concluding image of “Sonnet in -x,” where, “dans l’oubli 
fermé par le cadre, se fixe / de scintillations sitôt le septuor” (“in the mirror’s framed oblivion are 
fixed / by the sparkling twinkle of its stars, the septet”). Through his reference to the musical 
term “septet,” Mallarmé encourages the reader to establish an aural connection between 
constellation and text, in which the constellation’s seven stars parallel the sonnet’s seven rhymes, 
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as Alain Chestier has noted (48). In “A Throw of the Dice,” the connection is established 
visually. As Cohn has pointed out, the arrangement of the text on the page in fact resembles the 
shape of the Big Dipper (27-28). It can be seen to cover the whole of Page 11, with its handle on 
the left page and its trough on the right. And it can be seen again, in miniature, in the cluster of 
lines concluding the poem.  
A connection between constellation and text is established conceptually, as well, by the 
supplemental clauses of Page 11. Their description of the constellation is abstract enough that it 
can also be read as a description of the poem itself, as well as a description of a rolling dice: The 
constellation is described as cosmically enumerating, “sur quelque surface vacante et supérieure, 
le heurt successif […] d’un compte total en formation” (“on some high and vacant surface, the 
successive impacts […] of a final sum in formation”) (Page 11). Such a description also evokes a 
sort of tallying of dice rolls, or alternatively, the progressive formation the poem, whose 
subordinate phrases jostle each other as they accumulate on the blank page. The text continues 
after this description with an accumulation of present participles: “veillant / doutant / roulant / 
brillant et méditant” (“watching / doubting / rolling / shining and contemplating”), where the 
implied subject of each verb appears to alternate between constellation, text, and dice. And the 
conclusion of the phrase – “avant de s’arrêter / à quelque point dernier qui le sacre” (“before 
stopping / at some final point that crowns it”)  – could be read as referring to all three at once: 
Just as a rolling dice eventually comes to a stop under its crowning number, so a constellation 
moving slowly through the sky eventually reaches its pinnacle, and a text unfolding thought by 
thought eventually arrives at its anointing phrase. The poem then comes to an end itself, its own 
anointing phrase written simply at the bottom of the Page: “Toute Pensée émet un Coup de Dés” 
(“Every Thought yields a Throw of the Dice”). 
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For Mallarmé, a thought is not a simple or linear event, which means its transcription 
onto the page cannot be, either. As the poet states in “Crise de vers” (“Crisis of Verse”), “l’acte 
poétique consiste à voir soudain qu’une idée se fractionne en un nombre de motifs” (“the poetic 
act consists in suddenly remarking that an idea fragments into a number of motifs”) (Œuvres 
Complètes 2: 209). This is why, as he explains in the preface to “A Throw of the Dice,” “il ne 
s’agit pas, ainsi que toujours, de traits sonores réguliers ou vers – plutôt, de subdivisions 
prismatiques de l’Idée” (“as is always the case, it is not about regular sonorous characteristics or 
poetic lines –rather, it is about prismatic subdivisions of the Idea”) (Œuvres Complètes 1: 392). 
Like a prism splitting light into its composite colors, the poetic act splits l’Idée (the Idea) into its 
composite layers and constellates them across the page. The poet has no more control over the 
nature of this fragmentation and dispersal than he does over the outcome of a dice throw. His 
task, nonetheless, is to roll this dice, and to work toward a syntactical, oral, and visual 
representation of the dispersed fragments. With every new thought, a new dice roll, and a 
different prismatic scattering to transcribe onto the Page.   
The poet’s endeavor to transcribe this process is what gives the poem its characteristic, 
constellated, appearance. On some pages, the text is grouped around focal points, and on others, 
it is scattered across the expanse of the Page, like stars in the sky. Such a visual presentation of 
poetic lines encourages us, in fact, to perceive the text as we would perceive a constellation. In 
“Écrire au ‘folio du ciel’: Le Modèle de la constellation dans Un Coup de Dés de Mallarmé” 
(“Writing on the ‘Folio of the Sky’: The Shape of the Constellation in ‘A Throw of the Dice’ by 
Mallarmé”), Elsa Courant remarks that “la lecture du « Coup de Dés » nous impose d’effectuer 
un travail de liaison entre des syntagmes dispersés, exactement comme nous le ferions pour 
identifier une constellation” (“the task of reading ‘A Throw of the Dice’ requires us to engage in 
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a process of connecting the dispersed syntactic units, exactly as we would connect dispersed 
stars when identifying a constellation”) (884). This act of connecting is facilitated by Mallarmé’s 
use of varying typefaces, where certain words “ressortent davantage par leur taille, leur police, 
leur isolement sur le blanc de la page” (“stand out on account of their size, their typeface, their 
isolation against the white of the page”) in a way that corresponds to “les différences de 
brillance, de taille, d’importance des étoiles qui définissent les groupements des constellations” 
(“the differing brightness, size, and importance of the stars characterizing the groups of stars in a 
constellation”) (884). When we “read” a constellation, we do not recognize and interpret each 
star individually; rather, we look at all of its stars at once and recognize the relation between 
them. Approaching the text in a similar manner allows us to adopt a more global perspective, to 
view the various layers of thought simultaneously, and to consider how they might fit together to 
form a signifying whole. For this reason, a contextualized visualization of the poetic line, which 
takes into consideration the lines’ arrangement on the surrounding page, becomes essential if we 
are to more fully appreciate the poem on a semantic level.  
But the gradual fusion of text and constellation is significant for another reason, as well: 
it brings the poem closer to what Mallarmé has termed l’œuvre pure (the pure literary work). 
This œuvre pure is a theoretical ideal toward which every literary composition aspires. It remains 
just beyond reach, however, because every spoken or written composition must rely on the 
medium of language. And language is flawed. As Mallarmé remarks in “Crise de vers” (“Crisis 
of Verse”), “Les langues imparfaites en cela que plusieurs, manque la suprême : […] la diversité, 
sur terre, des idiomes empêche personne de proférer les mots qui, sinon se trouveraient, par une 
frappe unique, elle-même matériellement la vérité” (“Languages, imperfect because multiple, 
lack the one, supreme language: […] the diversity of dialects on Earth prevents any individual 
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from uttering words which would constitute, in their singular materiality, the truth”) (Œuvres 
Complètes 2: 208). With every different language, a different representation of the truth. There is 
no single language which is, itself, truth. Furthermore, a frustrating disparity often exists 
between the aesthetic qualities of words and the ideas that they serve to evoke. Mallarmé gives 
the example of the words “nuit” (“night”) and “jour” (“day”): “quelle déception, devant la 
perversité conférant à jour comme à nuit, contradictoirement, des timbres obscur ici, là clair” 
(“such disappointment, when faced with the distortion that assigns, in contrary fashion, ‘day’ a 
dark timber and ‘night’ a light timber”) (2: 208). Upon pronouncing nuit, we inevitably introduce 
bright timbers into a word that serves to evoke darkness, and upon pronouncing jour, we do the 
contrary. “Tourné à de l’esthétique” (“Becoming quickly concerned with the question of 
esthetics”), comments Mallarmé, “mon sens regrette que le discours défaille à exprimer les 
objets par des touches y répondant en coloris ou en allure” (“my senses lament the fact that 
discourse fails to express things through strokes that correspond in coloring or appearance”) (2: 
208).   
And so, there is a chance that with every word put to paper, the poem deviates a little 
further from the purity and potential of its originally blank page. The poet’s task, however, is to 
abolish this chance, one word at a time, by using language in such a way as to offset its inherent 
imperfections and limitations. This use of language is what differentiates poetry from 
“l’universel reportage” (“the all-purpose reporting”) of everyday use (2: 212). “Au contraire 
d’une fonction de numéraire facile et représentatif, comme le traite d’abord la foule, le dire, 
avant tout, rêve et chant, retrouve chez le Poëte, par nécessité constitutive d’un art consacré aux 
fictions, sa virtualité” (“Whereas the masses treat speech – first and foremost a form of dreaming 
and singing – as a simple and representative means of exchange, the Poet, whose art requires the 
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act of fabrication, recovers its potential”), states Mallarmé (2: 213). Poetry must recover 
language’s potential so that it might regain or recreate – through text – the potential of the 
originally blank page. L’œuvre pure is the literary work that accomplishes this impossible task. 
And for this reason, it alone is capable of truly and fully representing l’Idée (the Idea). 
In “Crisis of Verse,” Mallarmé describes the nature and functioning of the pure text. He 
explains that “l’œuvre pure implique la disparition élocutoire du poëte, qui cède l’initiative aux 
mots” (“the pure literary work entails the elocutary disappearance of the poet, who hands his 
initiative over to the words themselves”) (2: 211). Mobilised “par le heurt de leur inégalité” (“by 
the friction of their unevenness”), these words “s’allument de reflets réciproques comme une 
virtuelle traînée de feux sur des pierreries, remplaçant la respiration perceptible en l’ancien 
souffle lyrique ou la direction enthousiaste de la phrase” (“light up from their reciprocal 
reflections like a streak of fire reflecting off the surfaces of precious stones, replacing the poet’s 
perceptible breath with the ancient lyrical murmur or the enthusiastic flow of the phrase”) (2: 
211). The poet, as speaker, will have stepped back so that the words might act on their own 
accord, undirected and unrestrained in their potential. The poem will be animated from within by 
the breath of an ancient lyricism or the flow of its phrasing. And most remarkably, it will be a 
silent and radiant writing, whose words shine and reflect off one another like a flame off 
polished gemstones. It is perhaps for this reason that “A Throw of the Dice,” like “Sonnet in -x,” 
concludes with the image of a shimmering constellation. Silent, autonomous, and radiant, this 
cosmic writing in the sky offers a sublime visualization of l’œuvre pure.   
But a key difference separates the poetic text from the constellation with which it has 
been gradually merging. Whereas the constellation’s white stars shine against a black sky, the 
text’s black words contrast against a white page. Mallarmé is acutely aware of the less lustrous 
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dynamic between text and page. “On n’écrit pas, lumineusement, sur champ obscur” (“One does 
not write, luminously, against a dark background”), he remarks in “L’action restreinte” (“Action 
Restrained”), “l’alphabet des astres, seul, ainsi s’indique […] l’homme poursuit noir sur blanc” 
(“the alphabet of the stars, alone, presents as such […] man proceeds in black on white”) (2: 
215). And this is, inevitably, also the case for “A Throw of the Dice.” The poem’s written words 
do not shine brightly against a dark background like the stars of a constellation; nor do they glow 
and reflect off each other like a streak of fire off gemstones. Despite the poet’s efforts to mitigate 
the imperfections of language, the poem’s text will never fully assume the radiant quality of 
l’œuvre pure. And for this reason, it will only ever produce a lackluster representation of l’Idée.   
This is perhaps why Mallarmé encourages us to read more than the poem’s text. When 
defining and explaining the act of reading in “Le Mystère dans les lettres” (“The Mystery in 
Letters”), he emphasizes our interaction with “le blanc” (“the white space”) more than our 
interaction with the written text itself: 
 
Lire –  
 
Cette pratique – 
 
Appuyer, selon la page, au blanc, qui l’inaugure son ingénuité, à soi, oublieuse 
même du titre qui parlerait trop haut : et, quand s’aligna, dans une brisure, la moindre, 
disséminée, le hasard vaincu mot par mot, indéfectiblement le blanc revient, tout à 
l’heure gratuit, certain maintenant, pour conclure que rien au-delà et authentiquer le 
silence – 
 
Virginité qui solitairement, devant une transparence du regard adéquat, elle-même 
s’est comme divisée en ses fragments de candeur, l’un et l’autre, preuves nuptiales de 
l’Idée. 
 
L’air ou chant sous le texte, conduisant la divination d’ici là, y applique son motif 
en fleuron et cul-de-lampe invisibles. (2: 234) 
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(Reading –  
 
This practice –  
 
To bring to the inaugural white space of the page one’s own openness, unmindful 
of even the loud typeface of the title: and, when, vanquished word by word, chance has 
been straightened out into the smallest of scattered fragments, the initially gratuitous 
white space invariably returns, this time conclusive, to affirm that there is nothing more 
and to authenticate the silence –  
 
Purity which has, under the clarity of the correct gaze, divided into its own candid 
fragments, each proof of the pureness of the Idea. 
 
The air or melody underlying the text, carrying the prophecy from one point to 
another, stamps this white space with its invisible fleuron.) 
 
 
It is the white space, not the word, that both inaugurates the page and concludes the text. And its 
invariable return, after even the smallest alignment of words, authenticates the presence and role 
of silence in our reading. When regarded in a certain way by the reader, this white space appears 
to split into fragments, much like the textual representation of l’Idée. And when the underlying 
“air ou chant” (“air or melody”) that silently drives the text comes to an end, it stamps its 
invisible fleuron in the white space at the bottom of the page. If we are to read this white space, 
and the silence that it represents, we must adopt an ingenuous “transparence du regard” (“clarity 
of gaze”) that is not limited in focus to the black text of the poetic line. This unreserved reading 
approach will look past even the looming words of the title in order to engage with the white 
fragments of silence around it. Unlike the poem’s fragments of text, which produce a lackluster 
representation of the Idea, the poem’s fragments of silence serve to authenticate its purity. They 
are, as Mallarmé terms it, “preuves nuptiales de l’Idée” (“proof of the pureness of the Idea”). 
Free of the imperfections of language that haunt the poem’s text, they retain the purity and 
potential of the originally blank page.   
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This silent white space is part of any page of text. But in “A Throw of the Dice,” it is 
incorporated into the poem itself, contributing to our reading on an oral, a visual, and a semantic 
level. Even if we cannot read white space as we would read words, it is as much a part of the 
poem as the text itself. And by incorporating the white space of the page into the poem, 
Mallarmé incorporates, along with it, the purity and potential that it has retained. In this way, “A 
Throw of the Dice” does, in theory, have the ability to truly and fully represent the Idea. This 
ability simply resides in the signifying white space of its page, rather than in the words of its text. 
If we can succeed in adopting an ingenuous “clarity of gaze” that can “read” this white space as 
well as the text, we might be able to glimpse the luminous Idea behind the poem’s prismatic 
representation of thought.   
How does Mallarmé’s literary theory relate to the queered heteronormative paradigms 
above? Initial alternative visualizations of the paradigm are formed by manipulating 
heteronormativity’s lines of attraction and identification so that the relations between its subject 
positions are, in turn, altered. For example, the heteronormative line of attraction joining male 
sex to female sex can be visualized differently so that it joins male sex to male sex in a 
homosexual relation. Similarly, the heteronormative line of identification joining female sex to 
female gender can be visualized differently so that it joins female sex with male gender in a 
gender non-conforming relation. These visualizations are limited, however, to working with the 
subject positions and relations that construct the original heteronormative paradigm: Like the 
heteronormative paradigm, the queered paradigms consist of four dots representing two possible 
sexes and two possible genders. And like the heteronormative paradigm, they also use lines of 
identification and lines of attraction. More recent alternative visualizations of the paradigm have 
mitigated this limitation, to a certain extent, by adding new subject positions (non-binary genders 
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and intersex variations) and new relations of attraction (pansexuality) to the paradigm. But these 
queered paradigms are still based on an internal relation of identity between sex and gender, and 
an external relation of attraction, whatever the nature of these relations may be. In this sense, 
they have expanded the alternatively visualized paradigms, but they have retained the basic 
framework of the original, heteronormative paradigm. If we were to apply Mallarmé’s literary 
theory to queer theory, we might say that the queered paradigms are limited by a flawed medium 
– the intentionally restricted language of heteronormativity. And for this reason, these queered 
paradigms can only ever be lackluster representations of queerness, whose radiance remains as 
difficult to fully and truly capture as the radiance of the Idea at the origin the poem.  
This is not to say that the queered paradigms are without value. They are as valuable to 
our understanding of queerness as the written or spoken text is to our understanding of a poem. 
And it is not to say that the alternatively visualized paradigms ineffectively queer the original. 
They very efficiently derange the supposed logic of heteronormativity. It is simply to suggest 
that by acknowledging the possibility of the paradigms’ limitations, and by entertaining the 
theoretical possibility of an “iridescent queerness” comparable to Mallarmé’s luminous Idea, we 
can expand our conception and representation of queerness and tackle more pervasive norms 
shaping notions of identification and attraction.    
In “A Throw of the Dice,” Mallarmé circumvents the limitations and imperfections of 
language by attributing meaning to the white space of the page and encouraging us to incorporate 
this signifying white space into our interpretation of the poem. Could we apply the same 
technique to the queered paradigms? Is it possible to circumvent the limitations of our 
representations of queerness by making the white space around their subject positions and 
relations signify, and by incorporating this white space into our conceptualizations and 
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representations of queerness? The existence of agender and asexual identities points toward such 
a possibility. Asexuality, for example, does not manipulate or redirect the paradigm’s line of 
attraction toward new or unsanctioned subject positions. It simply transcends the line completely 
and posits a subject position that is not defined by, or subject to, sexual attraction. And in a 
similar way, agender transcends the paradigm’s line of identification, positing a subject position 
that is not defined by, or subject to, gender. As such, asexuality and agender cannot be 
represented by the dots and lines of the heteronormative paradigm, even if we chose to rearrange 
or propagate them. Asexual and agender subject positions exist somewhere in the white space, 
unmarked and undefined by the paradigms’ dots and lines. In this sense, the white space 
surrounding the paradigms can no longer be overlooked as a source of nothingness or 
meaninglessness. It has been made to signify a lack of sexual attraction or a lack of gender 
identification.   
 Is a lack of sexual attraction or a lack of gender identification enough to make this white 
space an alternative source of queerness – one that is not limited by the flawed language of 
heteronormativity? If we see queerness as a subversive potential whose task is to undermine the 
hegemony of heteronormativity, a lack of sexual attraction or gender identification does not 
constitute queerness. In fact, it precludes even the possibility of queerness because there is 
nothing to subvert. At the same time, however, this conception of queerness is limited by its 
express reliance upon the language of heteronormativity: As Butler has demonstrated, queering 
through subversion requires a strategic redeployment of existing norms, not a creation of new 
ones.50 So perhaps our conception of queerness is as lackluster as our representations of it. And 
 
50 See, in particular, p. 19, p. 24, and p. 26 of “Critically Queer.” GLQ, vol. 1, no. 1, 1993. 
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perhaps a more lustrous conception of queerness would consider a lack of sexual attraction or a 
lack of gender identification as, in fact, fundamentally queer.   
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, queerness is understood in terms of 
sexual inversion – that is, an inversion of one’s gender identity with respect to one’s sex. The 
equivalent of today’s male homosexuality, for example, is understood not as the attraction of one 
man to another, but as the attraction of an inwardly feminine individual to a man. As Karl 
Heinrich Ulrichs characterizes it in The Riddle of Man-Manly Love (1864-65), a male sexual 
invert is “anima muliebris virile corpore inclusa” (“a woman’s soul in the body of a man”). As 
this theory of sexuality implies, our conception of queerness was influenced by an unquestioned 
assumption – that sexual attraction could only occur between opposites. Once this assumption is 
eventually challenged, enabling such queerness to be understood in terms of same-sex attraction, 
the homosexual becomes the more common representation of queer sexuality. In much the same 
way, the emergence of bisexuality challenges another unquestioned assumption – that sexual 
attraction is limited in its object to one sex. What unquestioned assumption(s) might be limiting 
our current conception of queer sexuality? Could it be the assumption of sexual attraction itself? 
A similar evolution can be traced with respect to our conceptions of gender identity. 
While in different terms, sexual inversion challenged the assumption that sex always aligns with 
gender, and the possibility of such misalignment was recuperated by initial theories of 
transsexuality and transgenderism. Then, the assumption of two genders was questioned, with 
the emergence of trans* and non-binary gender identities. It is through consideration of an 
agender identity, however, that we have challenged the assumption of gender identity altogether.   
Previous conceptions of queerness evolved by questioning assumptions about the nature 
of sexual attraction and the nature of gender identification. A conception of queerness that 
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includes the possibility of asexuality and agender, however, has evolved by questioning two 
slightly more pervasive assumptions – that attraction has to be sexual and that identity has to be 
gendered. These assumptions signal the presence of additional, underlying norms. In the realm of 
attraction, for example, heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and pansexuality are 
themselves divisions of the larger norm of allosexuality. And the hegemony of allosexuality over 
asexuality signals the presence of additional, underlying ideologies, like that of 
“sexualnormativity.” For this reason, it does not matter that asexuality does not divert or invert 
the heteronormative paradigm’s lines of attraction in any way. It has transgressed the notion of 
sexual attraction altogether in order to take on larger underlying norms like allosexuality and 
larger underlying ideologies like sexualnormativity. The same can be said for agender, which 
altogether transgresses the notion of gender identity in order to take on larger underlying norms 
related to identity. In this sense, a lack of sexual attraction and a lack of gender identity can in 
fact be considered queer. Their queerness simply entails the transgression, rather than the 
subversion, of heteronorms.   
In Gender Trouble, Butler criticizes Monique Wittig’s call to altogether transgress the 
heteronormative category of sex, arguing that, even if transgressing a heteronorm were possible, 
such an act would not necessarily weaken its hegemony. This is why she proposes a subversive 
repetition of gender norms, which aims to undermine their hegemony rather than transgress it. As 
the emergence of asexuality and agender has demonstrated, however, a transgression of 
heteronorms is, in fact, possible. This possibility does not necessarily undermine Butler’s claim. 
It could simply signal a later phase in the queering process. That is to say, perhaps it eventually 
becomes possible to transgress a hegemonic norm precisely because this norm has been 
sufficiently subverted, its hegemony sufficiently undermined. In other words, perhaps both 
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subversion and transgression are valid methods of queering, but the subversion of a heteronorm 
must precede its transgression. 
In any case, a more lustrous conception and representation of queerness will involve both 
the subversion and transgression of heteronorms. This is because the weakening of 
heteronormativity does not necessarily imply a strengthening of queerness. With respect to the 
heteronormative paradigm, for example, alternatively visualized arrangements of its subject 
positions and relations initially challenge the supposed truth of heteronormativity, weakening its 
claim to universality. But it is the eventual normalization of these alternatives that will ultimately 
diminish the hegemony of its norms. As they become normalized, these alternatives lose their 
subversive potential. Queer today, norm tomorrow, so to speak. And in becoming norms 
themselves, they will lose their queerness altogether. For this reason, if our conception of 
queerness is limited to a subversion of heteronorms and a weakening of their hegemony, then 
queerness will lose luster over time. The transgression of heteronorms, however, will enable 
queerness to retain its luster by adopting novel forms and meanings as older ones become 
normalized. 51   
The transgressive potential of queerness need not be limited to a transgression of 
heteronorms. As we continue to view queerness from different angles and perspectives, even 
newer forms of queerness, such as asexuality, will eventually become normalized, allowing 
more-recently-recognized norms, like allosexuality, also to be transgressed. As one facet of 
queerness loses luster through normalization, the brilliance of another facet will catch our eye. 
 
51 This process of growth and evolution can be witnessed in asexuality, for example, with the 
emergence of the ace spectrum and different orientations of romantic attraction 
(heteroromanticism, homoromanticism, and panromanticism), the transgression of the 
assumption of romantic attraction (aromanticism), the transgression of the assumption of 
reciprocal attraction (lithromanticism), and the introduction of a queerplatonic relationship.   
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For this reason, a conception of queerness that fully exploits both its subversive and 
transgressive potential is not simply more lustrous; it is, more specifically, iridescent. Its 
different facets shine at different times, depending on the perspective from which we view it. 
And given the dynamic nature of iridescence, no single representation of queerness will succeed 
in capturing it. Rather, a gradual accumulation of representations, each depicting a slightly 
different facet of queerness, will function much like the accumulating fragments of text 
comprising “A Throw of the Dice” and its prismatic division of l’Idée. If we can adopt a more 
global perspective, we can view various layers of queerness simultaneously, like the various 
layers of thought comprising the Idea at the origin of the poem. And if we can recognize and 
appreciate how these layers combine to form a signifying whole, we might be able to glimpse the 
iridescent nature of queerness. 
Since asexuality constitutes a lack of sexual attraction, and agender a lack of gender 
identity, these forms of queerness cannot be represented by the black, positively delineated dots 
and lines of the heteronormative paradigm, regardless of how we rearrange or propagate them. 
They reside, instead, in the white, negatively defined space between and around these dots and 
lines. Unmarked by subject positions and relations extrapolated from the heteronormative 
paradigm, this white space is not limited by the flawed language of heteronormativity. As such, it 
functions as an alternative source of queerness – one that can be mined for its transgressive, 
rather than subversive, potential. While the subversive potential of queerness is what enables it to 
undermine the hegemony of heteronormativity, its transgressive potential is what enables it to 
grow and evolve. This capacity for growth is important to our conception of queerness, which 
must continue to expand as we continue to recognize the hegemony of more encompassing 
norms. And this capacity for evolution is important to our representation of queerness, which 
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must continue to take on new forms as its initial forms become normalized over time. Therefore, 
if we aim to more fully and truly represent queerness in all its iridescence, we cannot focus 
solely on the positively defined subject positions and relations extrapolated from the 
heteronormative paradigm. We must work to maintain an ingenuous “transparence du regard” 
(clarity of gaze), which can look past the hegemonic framework of the paradigm to acknowledge 
the as-yet undefined possibilities that can be mined from the white space surrounding its dots and 
lines.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
With the turn of the nineteenth century, lyric poetry witnesses a remarkable revitalization 
after two centuries of relatively scarce poetic output. And by the turn of the twentieth century, 
the lyric tradition is evolving in dynamic fashion as the notion of modernité encourages poets to 
break with past traditions, reject established values, and experiment with novel forms and styles. 
At the same time, French culture witnesses a proliferation of legal, scientific, and literary 
discourses revealing a novel fascination with manifestations of sexual perversion and gender 
subversion. An examination of the intersections between these concurrent cultural developments 
reveals a complex discursive, aesthetic, and theoretical relation between the poetic and the queer 
in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century France.  
The French lyric tradition both shapes, and is shaped by, the period’s discursive 
production of queer identity and desire. Cultural characterizations of poetic identities and sexual 
identities appear to have influenced one another, with Alfred de Vigny’s characterization of the 
poète maudit inspiring Marcel Proust’s characterization of the sexual invert, and the femme 
poète’s frequent depiction as a type of intersex or third gender. Other common poet types, 
namely the poète voyou and the poète voyant, appear to occupy a somewhat queer position in 
relation to society. By functioning in deliberate disaccord with social norms and values, the poète 
voyou cultivates a lifestyle apart from and against the social order. And by striving to see beyond 
“the known,” the poète voyant strives to uncover, imagine, or construct alternative ways of 
thinking and being that are not limited by various ideologies. All of these poet types are 
embodied by the poet figure Sappho who, in accordance with the period’s burgeoning fascination 
with queer sexuality, re-emerges in nineteenth-century France as a definitively lesbian figure. 
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Poets identify not only with Sappho’s poetic identity, but also, with her queerness. And for 
Charles Baudelaire in particular, Sapphic eroticism becomes synonymous with the poetic ideal. 
The lyric “I,” perhaps the most defining characteristic of the lyric tradition, has a 
particularly constraining effect on the poetic subject that it precedes and conditions. Any lyric 
poet attempting to express a “love that dare not speak its name” must negotiate and mitigate the 
implications of the pronoun’s autobiographical assumption, which implies a direct reference 
between poet-speaker and poet-author. And if a poet is not a heterosexual male, they must 
subversively repeat this lyric “I” in ways that create space for the emergence and expression of 
alternative subjectivities. Such subversive repetition can be witnessed in Marcel Proust’s “Je 
contemple souvent le ciel de ma mémoire” (“I Often Contemplate My Memory’s Skies”), where 
his unstable first-person pronoun appears to change referents as the poem progresses. In the 
context of lyric translation, Renée Vivien, Pierre Louÿs, and Marceline Desbordes-Valmore 
repeat their translated lyric “I” in ways that subvert the transparency norm and destabilize the 
hierarchical distinction between masculinized author and feminized translator. And in the context 
of the love lyric paradigm, Paul Verlaine’s use of a plural first-person pronoun and Renée 
Vivien’s use of an androgynous first-person pronoun subvert the paradigm’s binary structure and 
destabilize heteronormative readings of the poems. So, while the highly conventionalized lyric 
“I” precludes the expression of queer subjectivities, poets’ subversive repetition of the first-
person pronoun works the weaknesses in this norm to create space for alternative subjectivities. 
Their subversive repetition thoroughly destabilizes the first-person pronoun and contributes to a 
defining feature of the nineteenth-century French lyric tradition – the progressive destabilization 
of a conventionally transparent and coherent lyric “I.”   
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And finally, the poetic line, which conveys meaning in a variety of ways, makes the 
poetic genre particularly well-suited to implicit or non-verbal expressions of queerness. The 
often highly figurative and connotative language of lyric poetry allows poets to implicitly 
express their own queer identity or desire, thereby facilitating discursive productions of 
queerness that remain subject to censure or societal disapprobation. Or, by attributing meaning to 
formal aspects of a poem, poets can reinforce their expressions of queerness. Renée Vivien’s 
“Sonnet féminin” (“Feminine Sonnet”), for example, replaces the traditional alternation between 
masculine and feminine rhymes with all feminine rhymes to aurally reinforce a sense of 
femininity and visually reinforce a pairing of feminine with feminine. And Paul Verlaine’s 
sonnet, “Sapho,” inverts the traditional ordering of quatrains and tercets, recalling the “inverted” 
sexuality of Sappho herself. But such metaphorical inscriptions of queerness into a poem’s 
formal elements raise certain interpretive issues: First, readers must consider the context that 
enables these elements to signify in a such a way and recognize that their queerness changes 
according to the historical, cultural, and linguistic context in which a poem is written and read. 
And second, readers must try to avoid the risk of essentializing readings, which, for example, 
attribute Charles Baudelaire’s use of inverted sonnets to his capacity for artistic innovation while 
attributing Paul Verlaine’s use of inverted sonnets to his own sexual “inversion.”  
As certain poets of modernité break with past traditions and reject established values, 
their formal and stylistic innovations queer conventional conceptions of French poetry. This 
form of literary queering can be witnessed in Stéphane Mallarmé’s “Sonnet in x,” for example, 
which embraces meaninglessness in a way that recalls Lee Edelman’s theory of queer negativity. 
Similarly, Victor Hugo’s dislocated alexandrine constitutes a form of literary queering à la Judith 
Butler. Through his stylistically subversive repetition of the alexandrine, Hugo loosens French 
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poetry’s traditional alignment of syntax and meter. And the prose poem, which Charles 
Baudelaire adopts as a means to express modernité’s characteristic duality, constitutes a more 
deconstructive form of literary queering. By eliminating the versification from poetry, the prose 
poem calls into question the notion of poeticity, as well as our traditional categorization of poetry 
as “marked” and prose as “unmarked” genres, and ultimately, the very definition of a marked 
and unmarked form of literature.  
By conceptualizing queerness in poetic terms, we can gain insight into the nature of 
queerness and the critical potential of queer theory. As my analysis of Stéphane Mallarmé’s “A 
Throw of the Dice” reveals, if we are to more fully apprehend the Idea that the poem aspires to 
represent, we must learn to read the white space of the page like we do the black marks of the 
text. This more encompassing reading approach can be applied to visualizations of the 
heteronormative paradigm in ways that enable us to conceptualize novel forms of queerness. 
Most representations of queerness visualize alternatively organized paradigms by altering the 
conventional relations between subject positions or adding new subject positions and relations. 
These alternatively visualized paradigms are as important to our understanding of queerness as 
the written text is to our understanding of a poem. But if we are to more fully apprehend the 
queerness that our alternatively visualized paradigms aspire to represent, we must also turn our 
attention to the blank space between and around the paradigm’s subject positions and relations. 
The recent conceptualizations of agender and asexuality appear to reside in this blank space, 
since a lack of gender identification and a lack of sexual attraction cannot be positively 
delineated within the paradigm. By altogether transgressing the norms of gender identification 
and sexuality, rather than subverting them, these “white space” forms of queerness challenge 
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ideologies that are even more encompassing than heteronormativity, such as the ideology of 
sexualnormativity.  
The intricacies of this relation between the poetic and the queer highlight the need for a 
more nuanced conception of queer poetry. A poem’s queerness does not derive solely from the 
queerness of its author or the queerness of its subject-matter. It can derive from the poem’s 
destabilization of the conventional lyric “I,” from its cultivation of meaninglessness, from its 
manipulation of formal elements such as rhyme scheme or meter, or from its elimination of 
defining features like versification. For this reason, critical approaches to queer poetry need not 
be limited to primarily biographical and thematic readings of poetic texts; they can incorporate 
literary readings, as well, and situate such readings within a theoretical framework that draws 
from both poetic theory and queer theory. These two theories have the potential to inform one 
another. When poetry is conceptualized in queer terms, the emerging notion of literary queering 
provides a new lens through which to approach the evolution of lyric traditions, and when 
queerness is conceptualized in poetic terms, queer theory gains the ability to not only subvert the 
norms of heteronormativity, but to transgress them entirely, so that it might evolve and challenge 
the hegemony of ever more encompassing norms.  
These ideas open new pathways of exploration for both literary studies and LGBTQ 
studies. The lyric tradition plays a pivotal role in the discursive production of queer identity and 
desire. And the emerging cultural interest in manifestations of queerness shapes the lyric 
tradition in return. It would be interesting to trace these influences in other cultural or historical 
settings. The notion of literary queering extracts the queer from its conventional engagement 
with sex and gender norms and transposes it into an engagement with literary norms. Such a 
contextual shift raises many questions regarding the relation of social norms to literary norms. 
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How do they compare? Do they inform each other? And how to they intersect in large-scale 
phenomena like artistic movements, which are both products and producers of cultural norms? 
And finally, if a poem’s queerness need not derive solely from the queerness of its author or the 
queerness of its subject-matter, the study of queer poetry has the potential to more critically 
engage with poetic texts, and the literary category of queer poetry has the potential to be much 
larger and more diverse than initially thought.  
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